Project Finance International September 20 202366
While the mature TEBL market has settled
around a 95% to 100% advance rate against
a tax equity commitment, debt sizing in
the nascent TRABL market continues to
evolve. Debt sizing for PTC sales is further
complicated by the longer-term repayment
period, and the fact that PTCs – and therefore
the corresponding payments from a tax
credit buyer – uctuate based on a project’s
generation prole.
Some near-term projects may not have
arranged tax credit sale agreements at
nancial close, as the demand for construction
nancing is outpacing the ability of project
developers to source tax credit buyers on
attractive terms. Some lenders are advancing
TRABL commitments against the value of
uncommitted credits, at advance rates that
range from 50% to 75% of expected credit
value. Other lenders are requiring full
or partial sponsor credit support during
the period before a tax credit purchase
commitment is executed.
Structure and recapture – There are at least
two key variations on the conventional project
nancing structures discussed in the historical
structures section. The rst, depicted in Figure 3,
is similar to a conventional tax equity partnership
and is designed to avoid a recapture event if the
lenders foreclose.
Lender foreclosure on the assets of or equity in
the project company during the ve-year period
after a project is placed in service may result in
a recapture of the unvested portion of the ITC. A
recapture event would cause a tax credit buyer
to lose its tax credit and would likely trigger an
indemnity obligation from the project owner that
sold the credits.
In a conventional tax equity partnership,
after an ITC asset is placed in service, the term
lenders do not have liens on the investor or
on the investor’s interests in the partnership.
A foreclosure will be on the borrower or
on the sponsor member’s interests in the
partnership, which will not result in a
recapture of the tax credit allocated to the tax
equity investor.
To achieve a similar result in a tax credit sale
structure, the project owner may choose to hold
the project in a joint venture between the term
borrower and an afliate and allocate the ITC
to the afliate. The afliate’s equity and assets
are not part of the lenders’ collateral, thereby
avoiding recapture if the lenders foreclose on the
term borrower.
This structure is easily adaptable for a
tax equity partnership or tax credit transfer
arrangement. It may, therefore, be attractive to
both sponsors and lenders, because it provides
the exibility to toggle between a bridge loan
repayment from a tax equity investor or a tax
credit buyer.
For transactions in which this exibility is
desired, lenders and borrowers should determine
the base case assumption of the value of the
credits for debt sizing purposes, and provide
exibility for prepayments and incremental
borrowings to toggle to the correct advance rate
once the nal take-out structure is known.
In a PTC sale transaction, in which tax credit
recapture is not a concern, the term lender may
negotiate to maintain asset-level collateral for the
tenor of the loans. One variation of this structure
is depicted in Figure 4.
This structure is more favourable for lenders
than the conventional back-leverage structure,
as it permits the lenders to maintain asset-level
liens throughout the term of the nancing, and
to remain structurally senior to obligations under
the tax credit transfer agreement. Lenders may
also require a pledge of the tax credit transfer
agreement and associated deposit account (for
example, if they are bridging to payments under
such agreement).
• Intercreditor terms – TRABL lenders will evaluate
certain due diligence terms in the tax credit
sale agreement, including remedies for under-
performance, liquidated damages for credit
shortfalls, and the scope of indemnities offered
by sellers. Lenders will attempt to ensure that
they are shielded from or have seniority over the
project owner’s obligations to a tax credit buyer.
Interparty agreements between the lenders and
tax credit buyers may provide certain terms that
apply prior to foreclosure (such as forbearance
and cure rights), and specify the lenders’ rights
to enforce the tax credit buyer’s commitment to
purchase tax credits.
Conclusion
The IRA has heralded new opportunities to
monetise tax credits and arrange project
nancing for renewable energy and energy
transition projects in the US. The nancing
landscape will remain dynamic as market players
adapt to new transaction structures that enable
optimal use of the new subsidy regimes.
n
FIGURE 4 - PTC VARIATION
Collateral Package
Borrower/Project
Company
Affiliate Partner
Sponsor Entity
Tax Equity Partnership
Lenders
Tax Credit
Purchaser
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