S S
Space War in Ukraine
Robin Dickey
Michael P. Gleason
A W S
Jake Suss
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
Gary L. Davenport
Offensive Dominance in Space
Brian R. Goodman
Funding National Defense
Hardwired for Hardware
T S
C N
E W
M I
Douglas E. Lumpkin
Philip N. Stewart
Joel D. Kornegay
L T US A
David J. Kritz
Shane A. Smith
Narratives in Conflict
D A
Robert S. Hinck
Sean Cullen
Vol. 3 No. 1 S 2024
A Journal of
Strategic Airpower & Spacepower
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Gen David W. Allvin, USAF
Chief of Space Operations, US Space Force
Gen B. Chance Saltzman, USSF
Commander, Air Education and Training Command
Lt Gen Brian S. Robinson, USAF
Commander and President, Air University
Lt Gen Andrea D. Tullos
Chief Academic Officer, Air University
Dr. Mark J. Conversino
Director, Air University Press
Dr. Paul Hoffman
Editor in Chief
Dr. Laura M. urston Goodroe
Mark J. Conversino, PhD
James W. Forsyth Jr., PhD
Kelly A. Grieco, PhD
John Andreas Olsen, PhD
Nicholas M. Sambaluk, PhD
Evelyn D. Watkins-Bean, PhD
John M. Curatola, PhD
Christina J.M. Goulter, PhD
Michael R. Kraig, PhD
David D. Palkki, PhD
Heather P. Venable, PhD
Wendy Whitman Cobb, PhD
https://www.af.mil/ https://www.spaceforce.mil/ https://www.aetc.af.mil/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/
Æther
A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower
Advisory Editorial Board
Senior Editor Print Specialists Illustrator Web Specialist Book Review Editor
Dr. Lynn Chun Ink Cheryl Ferrell
Diana Faber
Catherine Smith Gail White Col Cory Hollon, USAF, PhD
Æther
A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower
SPRING 2024 VOL. 3, NO. 1
3 Letter from the Editor
Funding National Defense
5 Hardwired for Hardware
Congressional Adjustments to the Administration’s Defense
Budget Requests, 2016 to 2023
Travis Sharp
Casey Nicastro
Spacepower and Strategy
20 Space and War in Ukraine
Beyond the Satellites
Robin Dickey
Michael P. Gleason
36 Asymmetric Warfare in Space
Five Proposals from Chinese Strategic Thought
Jake Suss
50 US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
Integrating Commercial Capabilities for a Resilient and Flexible
Space Architecture
Gary L. Davenport
66 Offensive Dominance in Space
Brian R. Goodman
Narratives in Conflict
81 Decoding the Adversary
Strategic Empathy in an Era of Great Power Competition
Robert S. Hinck
Sean Cullen
Ethics and Warfare
95 Moral Injury
Wounds of an Ethical Warrior
Douglas E. Lumpkin
Philip N. Stewart
Joel D. Kornegay
111 Lethal Targeting through US Airpower
A Consequentialism Perspective
David J. Kritz
Shane A. Smith
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 3
FROM THE EDITOR
Dear Reader,
In March, the administration released the Department of Defense’s scal year (FY)
2025 budget proposal, which reects the short- term belt- tightening implemented by
the FY 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act. e implications of this, coupled with the ten-
dency for Congress to default to appropriation by continuing resolution, portends an-
other year of overall programmatic development and execution uncertainty for the
Department. Ongoing global geopolitical unrest, compounded most recently by active
wars in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip and aided and abetted by nonstate actors, is occur-
ring simultaneously with the advent of what looks to be the most contentious US pres-
idential campaign in recent history.
In sum, there is no shortage of urgent national and international security topics
relevant to the Department of the Air Force worth exploring. Accordingly, our spring
issue of Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower considers subjects rang-
ing from defense spending and space strategy to strategic narratives and ethics in war.
In Funding National Defense, Travis Sharp and Casey Nicastro analyze congressional
changes to budget requests from FY 2016 through FY 2023 and nd the legislative
branch has preferenced programmatic spending over personnel and operation and
maintenance expenditures, requiring DoD leaders to convey priorities clearly and
Congress to sustain critical levels of nonhardware defense spending.
Our Spacepower and Strategy forum leads with an article calling attention to
Ukraine’s novel use of space. Robin Dickey and Michael Gleason discuss how
Ukraine, a nonspacefaring nation, has made far better use of the domain than its
spacefaring adversary, Russia—particularly in the areas of ground infrastructure, so-
ware, and information- sharing practices. ese ndings yield signicant policy,
strategy, and doctrine lessons for the US armed forces. In the second article in the fo-
rum, Jake Suss oers ve proposals for space strategy based on historic Chinese strate-
gic thought. ese proposals center on exploiting asymmetric advantages that will
limit adversaries’ use of the domain and help the United States win conicts in and
through space.
e third article considers resiliency in space. Gary Davenport argues the newly
created Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve—modeled on the Civil Reserve Air
4 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
From the Editor
Fleet (CRAF)—should build on lessons learned from CRAF structure and implemen-
tation in order to ensure commercial interest in the program and overall success when
implemented. Lastly, Brian Goodman analyzes the US Space Force’s notion of com-
petitive endurance through international relations theory, proposing a new theory of
oense dominance in space and oering recommendations to mitigate the possibility
of conict in and through space.
Our third forum, Narratives in Conict, features an in- depth analysis of the notion
of strategic empathy. Robert Hinck and Sean Cullen explain the function strategic
narratives serve in the development and practice of strategic empathy and the role
such empathy plays in military planning and strategy.
In the rst article of our nal forum, Ethics and Warfare, Douglas Lumpkin, Philip
Stewart, and Joel Kornegay examine the occurrence of moral injury in US service
members. ey nd that while it can result in highly negative outcomes, it can build
readiness and resilience in military teams and organizations if leaders approach it cor-
rectly. e forum and our issue conclude with a discussion on lethal targeting/targeted
killing, viewed through the lens of the ethics theory of consequentialism. David Kritz
and Shane Smith propose a four- element, ethics- based model that military planners
can employ in situations involving the potential for lethal targeting/targeted killing.
ank you for your continued support of the journal. As always, we encourage
thoughtful, well- reasoned responses to our articles, with the potential for publishing
in a future issue. Æ
~e Editor
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 5
Funding National Defense
HARDWIRED FOR
HARDWARE
Congressional Adjustments to
the Administration’s Defense
Budget Requests, 2016 to 2023
Travis sharp
Casey NiCasTro
As a result of the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act, defense budget growth will be limited for
scal year (FY) 2024 and FY 2025. An analysis of congressional adjustments to defense
budget requests from FY 2016 to FY 2023 reveals a Congress that favors programmatic
expenditures over personnel and operation and maintenance. In a time of scal austerity in
the near term, DoD priorities must be clearly and concisely conveyed to Congress, and
Congress must balance its predilection for hardware with the need to appropriately fund
the nonhardware programs and components of the Department.
A
er increasing the DoD budget in real terms during seven of the past eight
scal years (2016–23), Congress has pivoted toward suppressing spending by
passing the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
1
Approved in June 2023 as part of the
debt ceiling deal, the law limits defense budget growth for the next two years while
threatening automatic across- the- board cuts, known as sequestration, of approxi-
mately $40 billion below planned spending levels if Congress takes too long to pass
full- year appropriations.
2
ese provisions eectively hold the defense budget hostage
to incentivize Congress to complete its appropriations work on time.
e law’s ultimate eects on spending will depend on future congressional actions,
particularly how Capitol Hill handles regular and supplemental budget bills in 2024
and 2025. Despite these uncertainties, the shi from steady spending growth to sud-
den budgetary restraint indicates a mercurial Congress struggling to balance compet-
ing priorities and factions.
e Hill’s uneven approach to the defense budget’s size, with years of bipartisan
support for hey increases suddenly giving way to an intensive focus on spending
Lieutenant Commander Travis Sharp, USNR, PhD, is a senior fellow and director of defense budget studies at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, DC.
Casey Nicastro is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, DC, and holds
a master in international relations from Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Interna-
tional Studies.
1. Travis Sharp, Inconsistent Congress: Analysis of the 2024 Defense Budget Request (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [CSBA], October 2023), 5, https://csbaonline.org/.
2. Sharp, 7.
6 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Hardwired for Hardware
limits, also characterizes its treatment of specic expenditures. Based on an analysis of
congressional adjustments to the administration’s defense budget requests from 2016
to 2023, this article nds that Congress has exhibited a programmatic orientation to-
ward defense spending characterized by adding funds for procurement and, to a much
lesser extent, research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).
At the same time, Congress has subtracted funds for military personnel, including
service member pay and allowances, and operation and maintenance (O&M), includ-
ing ying hours, ship operations, training, and maintenance. In short, Congress has
retained its long- running xation on acquiring “hardware,” particularly favored weap-
ons systems such as missile defense, ships, and aircra. Of note, this article uses adjust-
ments as a generic term referring to Congress’ combined adding and subtracting of
funds to DoD budget requests, not as a technical term denoting the various processes
for realigning or reprogramming appropriated funds.
3
Congress’ preference for hardware is not exactly surprising. Lawmakers possess
compelling reasons to address defense spending programmatically.
4
As Charles Hitch,
creator of the Defense Department’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,
observed in the 1960s, “ese [weapons systems] choices have become . . . the key
decisions around which much else of the defense program revolves.”
5
Other studies
have determined Congress’ obsession with big- ticket weapons programs remains alive
and well.
6
Still, the article’s reconrmation of this enduring pattern should alert de-
fense strategists as budgets atten during the Fiscal Responsibility Act’s two- year
timespan—and potentially remain at aerward due to continued congressional ad-
vocacy for spending limits, a political dynamic that dominated 2023.
e United States is currently navigating intense military competitions against
China and Russia while managing deadly conicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.
is extraordinarily demanding security environment, which blends long- term and
immediate challenges, necessitates varied investments across the Joint force. As Gen-
eral Mark Milley, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta, remarked in 2023, “We
must not allow ourselves to create the false trap that we can either modernize [for to-
morrow] or focus only on today—we must do both.”
7
3. Philip J. Candreva, National Defense Budgeting and Financial Management: Policy and Practice
(Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2017), 318–26.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, e Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), 3–7.
5. Arnold Kanter, “Congress and the Defense Budget: 1960–1970,” American Political Science Review
66, no. 1 (March 1972): 135.
6. Seamus P. Daniels and Todd Harrison, “Assessing the Role of Congress in Defense Acquisition Pro-
gram Instability,” paper prepared for the 18th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, Naval Postgradu-
ate School, Monterey, CA, May 2021, https://dair.nps.edu/; and Report on Congressional Increases to the
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Defense Budget (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DoD], August 4, 2023),
https://comptroller.defense.gov/.
7. Jim Garamone, “Milley Says Investments in Military Capabilities Are Paying O,” DoD, May 11,
2023, https://www.defense.gov/.
Sharp & Nicastro
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 7
As budgets stagnate, if Congress does not moderate its hardware spending add- ons,
at least in select areas, then it risks shortchanging the “soware” underpinning US mili-
tary power, including people, readiness, education, and other key ingredients of combat
eectiveness oen funded through the military personnel and O&M budgets.
8
History shows the risk of underfunding these critical areas is real. Since the Cold
War’s end, military personnel and O&M cuts oen have exceeded procurement and
RDT&E cuts when defense spending stagnates, worsening readiness shortfalls during
those periods. Making hard trade- os between hardware and so- called soware
proved less necessary for Congress as it boosted defense budgets throughout the past
decade. Such trade- os will prove essential under the Fiscal Responsibility Act as well
as any prospective spending control agreement enacted in its wake. Congress will not
have to stop adding money for weapons systems, but it will likely have to lessen those
additions to ensure readiness receives the necessary funding.
If history is any guide, overcoming these diculties now and in the future will re-
quire both the Department of Defense and Congress to make improvements. e Pen-
tagon should nd new ways to persuade Congress to support essential investments,
particularly for nonhardware priorities. At the same time, military planners must de-
velop concepts to ght and win with what the Department already has. On the legisla-
tive side, Congress needs a stronger pipeline of defense policy entrepreneurs capable
of leading their colleagues to more sound decisions more of the time, specically by
harnessing their procedural power to elicit more impactful information from the Pen-
tagon. Without actions like these, Congress’ xation on hardware could inadvertently
produce a US military that is less broadly prepared to succeed in a dangerous world
where the margin of error has become perilously small.
9
Hypotheses and Data on Congressional Spending
Adjustments
Over the past 60 years, scholars have developed three competing hypotheses about
how Congress addresses the administration’s defense spending requests.
10
e negli-
gible hypothesis holds that Congress does not have a signicant impact on either the
overall level of defense spending or the allocation of spending across programs.
8. Michael C. Horowitz, e Diusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 5; and Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining
Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 203.
9. Robert M. Gates, “e Dysfunctional Superpower: Can a Divided America Deter China and Rus-
sia?,” Foreign Aairs 102, no. 6 (November/December 2023).
10. Raymond H. Dawson, “Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative
Authorization of Weapons Systems,” American Political Science Review 56, no. 1 (March 1962): 43; Edward
J. Laurance, “e Congressional Role in Defense Policy Making: e Evolution of the Literature,” Armed
Forces and Society 6, no. 3 (Spring 1980): 436–38; Barry M. Blechman, e Politics of National Security:
Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 23–29; and Jamie M. Morin,
“Squaring the Pentagon: e Politics of Post- Cold War Defense Retrenchment” (Ph.D. diss., Yale Univer-
sity, May 2003), 306–7.
8 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Hardwired for Hardware
Proponents of this view imagine a Congress that essentially tinkers at the margins and
functions as “a pushover for the Pentagon,” as Senator William Proxmire (D- Wisconsin)
once put it.
11
If the negligible hypothesis holds true, then congressional spending adjust-
ments should appear small and inconsequential, generally adhering to the administra-
tion’s plans.
e scal hypothesis posits that Congress concerns itself with the defense spending
topline and pays limited attention to the particulars. Advocates of this model envision
a Congress that modies DoD funding requests primarily to achieve government-
wide budgetary goals. If the scal hypothesis holds true, then congressional spending
adjustments should concentrate on the largest portions of the defense budget—the
O&M and military personnel accounts—and exhibit an across- the- board or balanced
character, in dollar or percentage terms, consistent with a general indierence toward
specic programs.
e programmatic hypothesis claims that, as one analyst describes it, “Congress
addresses the defense budget in policy terms and uses its power of the purse as a
tool to inuence the shape of defense programs.”
12
Lawmakers may demonstrate a
programmatic orientation for strategic reasons, as when they feel that specic mili-
tary activities underpin America’s place in the world. ey may also focus on pro-
grams for parochial reasons, as when their constituents depend on funding associ-
ated with certain activities. In practice, these strategic and parochial motivations
oen overlap and may conict, making them dicult to disentangle.
13
If the pro-
grammatic hypothesis proves true, then congressional spending adjustments should
exhibit discernible patterns across time and category whereby funds ow toward
favored activities and away from disfavored activities.
To assess these hypotheses, the authors collected data on congressional defense
spending adjustments from scal year (FY) 2016 to FY 2023. e dataset started with
2016 because that was the rst year of the upward dri in defense spending referenced
in the introduction and ended with 2023 because that was the last year data were
available. e dataset contains adjustments as reported in Congress’ annual enacted
basic DoD appropriations bill, meaning it excludes military construction, family
housing, nuclear weapons activities, and supplementals, or extra expenditures added
outside the Department’s annual base budget request. Since the dataset covers only
11. Kanter, “Congress,” 129.
12. Lawrence J. Korb, “Congressional Impact on Defense Spending, 1962–1973: e Programmatic
and Fiscal Hypotheses,” Naval War College Review 26, no. 3 (November–December 1973): 50.
13. James M. Lindsay, “Parochialism, Policy, and Constituency Constraints: Congressional Voting on
Strategic Weapons Systems,” American Journal of Political Science 34, no. 4 (November 1990); James M.
Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994),
172–75; and Rebecca U. orpe, e American Warfare State: e Domestic Politics of Military Spending
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
Sharp & Nicastro
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 9
enacted appropriations, it excludes both authorizing legislative activity and House and
Senate interim decisions preceding nal enactment.
14
e authors made certain technical modications to the data to account for irregu-
lar reporting practices used in the nal years of the Budget Control Act, the law that
capped defense budgets from FY 2012 to FY 2021, specically with respect to funding
for Overseas Contingency Operations. Skipping these corrections or performing them
dierently does not change the central ndings.
Altogether, the dataset consists of nearly 10,000 observations, a gure that excludes
the arithmetical and ination manipulations required to generate the results. Al-
though the dataset does not include every line item contained in the DoD appropria-
tions bill, it provides a sucient body of evidence for the article’s analysis.
Congressional Adjustments to DoD Funding Requests,
2016 to 2023
Over the past 75 years, Capitol Hill has not reexively given the Pentagon whatever
it asked for, refuting the negligible hypothesis. From FY 1950 to FY 2023, Congress
subtracted from DoD’s base budget request three times more oen than it added to
the request.
15
Understanding this historical thriiness illuminates the anomaly of re-
cent years in which Congress approved signicantly larger base budgets than the De-
partment of Defense requested. Congress has overridden the Department with such
generosity only twice before. Once was during President John F. Kennedy’s rst year
controlling the budget (FY 1962), as the young president maneuvered to fulll his
campaign pledge to eliminate a “missile gap” with the Soviet Union.
16
e second was
during one of the most intense phases of the war in Iraq (FY 2006 and FY 2007).
14. Robert J. Art, “e Pentagon: e Case for Biennial Budgeting,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no.
2 (Summer 1989); Mackubin T. Owens, “Micromanaging the Defense Budget,” Public Interest 100 (Sum-
mer 1990); and Paul Stockton, “Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post- Cold War
Military,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 2 (Summer 1995).
15. Linwood B. Carter and omas Coipuram Jr., Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills:
FY1970–FY2006 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service [CRS], November 8, 2005), 29–30,
https://apps.dtic.mil/; Barbara Salazar Torreon and Soa Plagakis, Defense Authorization and Appropria-
tions Bills: FY1961–FY2021 (Washington, DC: CRS, July 12, 2021), 39, https://crsreports.congress.gov/;
and Sharp, Inconsistent Congress, 15.
16. Travis Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending,” Policy
Sciences 52, no. 3 (September 2019): 386–89.
10 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Hardwired for Hardware
Figure 1. Congressional adjustment to president’s budget request as report-
ed in enacted DoD appropriations bill, by appropriation subtitle (FY23 $ bil-
lions, excluding supplementals).
17
Since FY 2016, Congress has not concentrated its spending adjustments in military
personnel and O&M, the appropriation titles that receive the most funding (g. 1).
Instead, it has emphasized procurement and RDT&E. is nding thus rebuts the s-
cal hypothesis. From FY 2016 to FY 2023, Congress added $79 billion for procure-
ment above the administration’s requests. (e article reports all budgetary gures in
FY 2023 constant dollars). at $79 billion gure is 1.4 times greater, in absolute value
terms, than the adjustments made to the three other accounts combined. Congress
added nearly 40 percent of that extra $79 billion in FY 2022 and FY 2023 following
the expiration of the Budget Control Act.
is procurement push likely reected a desire to compensate for years of smaller-
than- preferred hardware budgets.
18
Lawmakers perhaps also reasoned that under-
funding military personnel, and thereby freeing up funds for procurement additions,
17. Sharp, Inconsistent Congress, 18–19.
18. Eric Edelman et al., Providing for the Common Defense: e Assessment and Recommendations
of the National Defense Strategy Commission (Washington, DC: DoD, November 2018), 54–56, https://
www.usip.org/.
Sharp & Nicastro
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 11
was warranted because recruiting shortfalls resulted in personnel costs being smaller
than expected.
19
Regardless of the rationale, however, previous studies have reported a
similar congressional preoccupation with procurement, so the nding here rearms
an enduring trend, not an isolated response to contemporary circumstances.
20
Over-
all, the data show that Congress has continued its long- running pattern of using pro-
curement increases as a preferred tool for shaping the US military, supporting the
programmatic hypothesis.
Although procurement received most of Congress’ largesse, two aspects of RDT&E
spending deserve mentioning. First, the RDT&E budget grew faster than other ac-
counts over the past decade, and the data prove that Congress enabled this central
trend in US defense spending.
21
Second, Congress continued relying heavily on
RDT&E-directed spending requests, commonly known as earmarks, to steer funds to
pet projects.
22
So, even though Congress’ RDT&E additions totaled less than its pro-
curement additions, the former still provided legislators with a powerful way to ad-
vance their priorities in line with the programmatic hypothesis.
Congress’ recent practice of overfunding procurement and RDT&E while under-
funding military personnel and O&M carries risks with defense spending attening
under the Fiscal Responsibility Act. During budgetary downturns since the end of the
Cold War, hardware funding has oen received preferential treatment, at least accord-
ing to the crude metric of absolute dollars. In years since FY 1992, when defense
spending remained at or declined in real terms, military personnel and O&M fund-
ing reductions exceeded procurement and RDT&E reductions 71 percent of the time
by an average margin of $18 billion.
23
e portion of defense spending dedicated to military personnel plus O&M has
declined modestly since FY 1992, so Congress has not been simply cutting more from
a growing spending area, contradicting the scal hypothesis. is 30-year trend re-
verses the pattern from the Cold War, when procurement plus RDT&E reductions
were usually larger and procurement oen functioned as a “slack variable” by absorb-
ing disproportionate cuts during budgetary downturns.
24
Readiness shortfalls have oen intensied in those years with at budgets and
larger cuts to military personnel and O&M, particularly when that outcome repeated
19. omas Novelly et al., “Big Bonuses, Relaxed Policies, New Slogan: None of It Saved the Military from
a Recruiting Crisis in 2023,” Military.com, October 13, 2023, https://www.military.com/.
20. Kanter, “Congress,” 131–32; Korb, “Congressional Impact,” 54–55; and Daniels and Harrison, “As-
sessing the Role,” 8–9.
21. Sharp, Inconsistent Congress, 3.
22. John M. Donnelly, “Hill- Favored Projects Called Defense Budget’s ‘Black Hole,’ ” Roll Call, May 23,
2023, https://rollcall.com/.
23. DoD, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2024 (Washington, DC: CRS, May 2023), Table
6-8, 138–145, https://comptroller.defense.gov/.
24. Kevin N. Lewis, National Security Spending and Budget Trends since World War II (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), 81, 109, https://www.rand.org/.
12 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Hardwired for Hardware
itself over multiple years, as happened during the mid-1990s and early-2010s.
25
In
general, underfunding military personnel and O&M can degrade military prepared-
ness in many ways, including by diminishing support for service members, reducing
training opportunities, and constraining equipment maintenance.
26
Today, the Air
Force and Navy are suering from several of these problems, with reduced ying
hours and inadequate maintenance infrastructure, respectively, representing areas of
special concern.
27
Congress could mitigate these diculties with funding increases, but under con-
strained budgets, those additions would have to come at the expense of procurement
add- ons. Continuing to add procurement funds risks exacerbating readiness chal-
lenges by forcing the US military to possess equipment that it did not request, creating
larger- than- anticipated bills for the personnel, training, and maintenance needed to
operate that equipment.
To be clear, the argument here is not that distributing cuts equally across appro-
priation titles constitutes a strategically optimal response to contracting budgets. Such
an approach is awed because it fails to incorporate assessments of both the probabil-
ity of war erupting and the US military’s standing relative to potential adversaries. By
the same logic, however, privileging hardware over military personnel and O&M, re-
gardless of shiing war risks and power balances, represents an equally unsound ap-
proach. In the budget- constrained years ahead, Congress’ willingness to forswear add-
ing funds for hardware when necessitated by international developments, and instead
allocating those funds to invest in readiness and other deserving areas of the Joint
force, will prove essential to producing a US military that is as prepared as possible to
defend the nation’s interests across the globe.
From FY 2016 to FY 2023, Congress concentrated its spending adjustments in fa-
vored and disfavored investment areas, precisely as the programmatic hypothesis pre-
dicts. Five appropriation subtitles emerged as clear congressional favorites, receiving
among the largest increases in both dollar and percentage terms: Navy shipbuilding
and conversion, Navy aircra procurement, Air Force aircra procurement, Army
RDT&E, and Army aircra procurement.
Although Congress clearly preferred adding money for procurement and RDT&E,
not military personnel and O&M, it did subtract funds from multiple procurement
subtitles, including several missile and ammunition accounts. For example, it cut the
25. Jerre Wilson and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Shoring Up Military Readiness (Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution, January 1999), https://www.brookings.edu/; and Robert Hale, Budgetary Turmoil at the
Department of Defense from 2010 to 2014: A Personal and Professional Journey (Washington, DC: Brook-
ings Institution, August 2015), 4–9, https://www.brookings.edu/.
26. Todd Harrison, “Rethinking Readiness,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 8, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 42–44.
27. Dakota L. Wood, 2024 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation,
2024), 456–59, 492–99, https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/; Military Readiness: Improvement in Some
Areas, but Sustainment and Other Challenges Persist, GAO-23-106673 (Washington, DC: Government Ac-
countability Oce, May 2, 2023), https://www.gao.gov/; and Michael P. DiMino and Matthew C. Mai, “e
US Military Has a Readiness Problem,” Stars & Stripes, October 24, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/.
Sharp & Nicastro
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 13
Air Force’s missile procurement requests by an average of 5 percent (~$140 million)
per year in real terms. e fact that Congress underfunded munitions purchases, de-
spite their residing in the favored procurement account, demonstrates a selectivity
consistent with the programmatic hypothesis rather than the indiscrimination associ-
ated with the scal hypothesis.
In terms of policy implications, the underfunding of munitions indicates Congress
shares responsibility for the disappointing state of the US munitions industrial base
revealed by ongoing American support for Ukraine.
28
Without steadier congressional
support for munitions procurement, the US military will face serious problems in any
future war against a peer adversary.
29
Digging even deeper into line- item data for the ve favored subtitles, Congress
added funds for favored investments in line with the programmatic hypothesis, al-
though some evidence also exists for the scal hypothesis. Congress increased spend-
ing on preferred programs, in particular unmanned aircra systems (UAS) across the
services, Army rotary wing aircra, Navy surface and expeditionary vessels, and Air
Force C-130s. e extra resources absorbed by these programs, measured in both dol-
lar and percentage terms, conrms their status as congressional darlings, a result also
reported in previous research.
30
Of course, DoD budgetary gamesmanship potentially aected the observed out-
comes. e Pentagon may have knowingly reduced its budget requests for certain pro-
grams anticipating that Congress would add funding during the appropriations pro-
cess. Additionally, any favoritism in Congress’ allocation of classied funds cannot be
addressed by this unclassied analysis.
Judging whether the favored programs deserved Congress’ budgetary largesse un-
der the current US defense strategy is another matter entirely. On the one hand, the
funding increases provided to UAS oer a clear example of Congress embracing
newer technologies critical to US strategy, particularly since military service support
for several of these systems has proven uneven at best.
31
On the other hand, Congress’ generous funding of helicopters and C-130s, among
others, shows its preference for supporting established weapons systems. ese types of
programs potentially lack the compelling operational need justifying hey budgetary
28. Stacie Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis, Precision and Posture: Defense Spending Trends and the FY23
Budget Request (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security [CNAS], November 2022), https://
s3.us- east-1.amazonaws.com/; Pettyjohn and Dennis, “Production Is Deterrence”: Investing in Precision-
Guided Weapons to Meet Peer Challenges (Washington, DC: CNAS, June 2023), https://s3.us- east-1
.amazonaws.com/; and Tyler Hacker, “Money Isn’t Enough: Getting Serious about Precision Munitions,”
War on the Rocks, April 24, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/.
29. Tyler Hacker, Beyond Precision: Maintaining America’s Strike Advantage in Great Power Conict
(Washington, DC: CSBA, June 2023), https://csbaonline.org/.
30. Daniels and Harrison, “Assessing the Role,” 17.
31. Valerie Insinna, “Get Ready for Another Fight over the Future of the MQ-9 Reaper,” Defense News,
May 26, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/.
14 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Hardwired for Hardware
increases, especially given the opportunity costs of funding them.
32
In a March 2023
statement before the House Armed Services Committee, for instance, General Jacque-
line Van Ovost, commander of US Transportation Command, testied that the current
C-130 inventory remains adequate for meeting airli requirements in the near future.
33
at said, it remains dicult to make unassailable judgments about the operational rel-
evance of specic weapons given the unpredictability of the future strategic environment.
Congressional committee assignments do not fully explain Capitol Hill’s preference
for established weapons systems. Air Force C-130s illustrate the point. Since FY 2016,
the C-130 and EC-130 programs received increases of 84.5 percent and 85.1 percent,
respectively, over the Defense Department’s aggregate requests. From FY 2018 to FY
2023, Congress provided the Air Force with an additional $6.3 billion for the procure-
ment of C-130J aircra—a nearly 1,825 percent increase from the Defense Depart-
ment’s requested amount of $347 million.
Yet, the legislator whose district features the main C-130 plant, Representative
Barry Loudermilk (R- Georgia), has never served on a committee relevant to C-130
acquisition.
34
C-130 contractors, supply chains, and basing locations are spread
throughout the United States, fortifying its political support, but the same is true for
other programs such as the F-35 that received only a 10.8 percent congressional in-
crease over the Defense Department’s aggregate requests. Ultimately, the C-130’s re-
cent budgetary success likely has resulted from Air National Guard and industry lob-
bying, the aircra’s broad range of uses, and Congress’ decades- long love aair with
the program. ese three factors, though more complex, oer more explanatory
power than the notion of a small cabal of legislators sitting on the right committees
who control the program’s destiny.
35
Two patterns in Congress’ spending adjustments indicate a more scal than pro-
grammatic orientation. First, Congress regularly reduced spending on programs
viewed as underperforming or overfunded, including the Army’s RQ-11 UAS and
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS)
blimp; the Navy’s Infrared Search and Track (IRST) and carrier refueling and overhaul
programs; and the Air Force’s KC-46A refueling tanker. In each of these cases, Con-
gress justied its cut by invoking program management factors such as cost growth,
acquisition plan modications, accidents, production quality shortcomings, and
schedule delays. In no cases reviewed by the authors did Congress justify the reduc-
tion by citing a given program’s lack of relevance to US defense strategy.
32. Jan Tegler, “Air Force under Pressure as Airli Capacity Falls,” National Defense, June 3, 2022,
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/,
33. Joint Readiness and Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Hearing: Posture and Readiness
of the Mobility Enterprise – TRANSCOM and MARAD, Hearings before the House Armed Services Commit-
tee, 118th Congress (2023) (statement of General Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, commander, US Transporta-
tion Command, United States Air Force), https://www.ustranscom.mil/.
34. Ballotpedia, s.v. “Barry Loudermilk,” accessed July 27, 2023, https://ballotpedia.org/.
35. Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
Sharp & Nicastro
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 15
is rst pattern reveals an irony in congressional defense budgeting. Although
Congress displays a programmatic orientation driven by strategy or parochialism or
both, it generally justies its decisions in scal terms using the language of eciency
and stewardship of taxpayer dollars. As a result, scal rationales function as a shield
for Congress to make decisions that are presumably rooted in programmatic consid-
erations of one kind or another.
Second, in areas such as Army RDT&E and Navy aircra procurement, Congress
distributed its spending increases across a wide variety of programs, a pattern also
more consistent with the scal hypothesis. Many of these investments supported wor-
thy programs, but Congress’ failure to make more decisive choices, particularly with
Army RDT&E, indicates a tendency to spread extra money around rather than mak-
ing informed bets on a handful of key programs.
Surveying congressional spending adjustments over time brings two insights into
sharper relief (g. 2). First, congressional adjustments did not discernibly change fol-
lowing the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, an important document that
codied the Defense Department’s intention to prevail in great power competition.
Congress reoriented aspects of its legislative agenda aer the strategy appeared, to be
sure, but that reorientation did not register clearly in the budgetary outcomes analyzed
here. In fact, some congressional adjustments seemingly contradicted the strategy.
For instance, steady congressional increases for defense- wide and Army RDT&E
contrasted with volatile adjustments for Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps RDT&E.
e strategy called for implementing technological advancements across the Joint
force, of course, but it emphasized elding forces capable of striking diverse targets
inside enemy air and missile defense networks—a capability typically associated with
air and naval forces.
36
Although the size of congressional adjustments does not necessarily reect their
quality, Congress did not provide the type of steady RDT&E increases for air and na-
val forces that one might expect given the strategy. Of course, it is possible that Con-
gress identied fewer deciencies with air and naval RDT&E requests and thus had
fewer reasons to add funds. Still, the diering treatment of RDT&E budgets across
components provides at least suggestive evidence for the programmatic hypothesis.
36. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: DoD, January 2018), 6, https://
dod.defense.gov/.
16 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Hardwired for Hardware
Figure 2. Congressional adjustment to president’s budget request as re-
ported in enacted DoD appropriations bill, appropriation titles, and selected
subtitles by year (FY23 $ billions, excluding supplementals).
37
Second, some congressional spending additions exhibited the across- the- board or
balanced character associated with the scal hypothesis. e appropriation titles and
Air Force procurement charts in gure 2, for example, depict balanced growth rates
across dierent spending categories, a sign of Congress doling out proportional in-
creases while still favoring certain categories in dollar terms. Yet the procurement by
department chart oers a counterexample of Congress bestowing faster- growing in-
creases on the Air Force than on other departments. Overall, although the balance of
evidence supports the programmatic hypothesis, Congress is still prone to making
scal- style adjustments in certain areas.
Conclusion
is article demonstrates that Congress continues to exhibit a largely program-
matic orientation toward defense spending characterized by overfunding procure-
ment and RDT&E while underfunding military personnel and O&M. e article’s
analysis of spending adjustments since 2016 show that congressional action signi-
cantly aects the defense budget’s size and shape, refuting the negligible hypothesis,
37. Sharp, Inconsistent Congress, 20–21.
Sharp & Nicastro
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 17
and it displays discernible preferences across programs, undercutting the scal hy-
pothesis. e central policy problem identied by the article involves whether Con-
gress can stave o its hunger for hardware and steer funds into other parts of the Joint
force, when needed, to maximize US military preparedness under the constrained
budgets of the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
e Department of Defense and Congress both shape defense budget outcomes,
and both institutions should take steps to improve their handling of American defense
policy in the challenging years ahead. If they do not, the US military may nd itself
less prepared to compete eectively against China and Russia while protecting
broader American interests around the world.
e Defense Department should nd better ways to persuade Congress to support
capabilities viewed as essential to warghting success. For starters, senior defense of-
cials should communicate precise, tangible, and specic rationales for the minimum
investments needed in each spending account. ey should express these rationales to
Congress in compelling, jargon- free, plain English that makes their force requirements
clear—a departure from the Department’s tendency to bury its recommendations in
technocratic language that can inadvertently obscure the existence of risk.
38
As retired
Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula concluded recently, “Making better-
informed decisions about the acceptability of risk and, by extension, what should be
done about it requires better communication among all relevant stakeholders.”
39
e Department of Defense should also recognize that Congress possesses a pro-
grammatic orientation and thus will never approve exactly what the Pentagon requests,
though clearer communication by the Pentagon will help shape congressional desci-
sions. As a result, defense planners must develop operational concepts that enable the
US military to ght and win using what Congress has provided. If senior ocials judge
they cannot accomplish the mission with the resources provided, then they must let
Congress know. Yet senior ocials should also avoid letting the perfect become the
enemy of the good by a disproportionate focus on what Congress withholds, and in-
stead concentrate on making ecient and eective use of what is provided.
As an atomistic institution lacking the Defense Department’s hierarchical structure,
Congress depends on individual lawmakers to achieve policy outcomes. Consequently,
any lasting improvements in Congress’ handling of the defense budget will only come
from actions taken by individual policy entrepreneurs who synthesize politics, problems,
and policies to create meaning for other lawmakers trying to navigate the oen intimi-
dating ambiguity of defense policymaking.
40
A skilled policy entrepreneur not only must
38. ane C. Clare, “Networking to Win: Mission Prioritization for Wartime Command and Control,”
War on the Rocks, January 15, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/; and Peter C. Combe II, Benjamin Jensen,
and Adrian Bogart, Rethinking Risk in Great Power Competition (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, February 2023), 4–8, https://www.csis.org/.
39. David A. Deptula, “Managing Risk in Force Planning,” in 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed.
Dakota L. Wood (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2022), 30, https://www.heritage.org/.
40. Nikolaos Zahariadis, Ambiguity and Choice in Public Policy (Washington, DC: Georgetown Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 19–22.
18 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Hardwired for Hardware
act outside their political self- interest with some regularity but also must know more
about the policy process than any of their colleagues.
41
Expanding Capitol Hill’s pipeline of defense policy entrepreneurs has never been
easy, and today’s fractured politics present additional diculties. Yet opportunities do
exist to make progress. In the mid-1970s, Representative Les Aspin (D- Wisconsin),
then a newly elected congressman who later became a leading defense policy entre-
preneur of his generation, penned a series of insightful articles about Congress’ role in
defense policy and budgeting.
Aspin’s main advice was that legislative policy entrepreneurs should focus on im-
plementing procedural changes that indirectly shape decision- making processes to
produce better outcomes more of the time. Emphasizing procedure plays to Congress’
strengths because, as he observed, “Making decisions on the basis of rational argu-
ment requires confronting the issues directly, and Congressmen, who are pressured
from all sides, who are continually short of time, and who suer from lack of exper-
tise, are not likely to do that.”
42
In short, skillful legislators use procedure to get what
they want through subtlety rather than confrontation.
Procedural expertise and subtlety are virtues in short supply on Capitol Hill today,
but they still oer the best hope of improving congressional defense budgeting. Poten-
tial procedural rearrangements available to Congress include changing executive
branch reporting relationships, mandating the establishment of certain facts before
actions can occur, designating who can make decisions, and bringing outside groups
or new groups into decision processes.
43
Of these options, mandating the establishment of facts prior to action appears es-
pecially promising. Such mandates, if designed properly, would force senior defense
ocials to present the type of clear, tangible, and specic assessments described in
order to satisfy DoD budget requests. e goal here would not be to burden the
Defense Department with additional pro forma reporting requirements. Rather, it
would be to create categorically dierent requirements whereby senior DoD leaders
must deliver plain- English justications for advancing preferred programs in hopes
of convincing a critical mass of lawmakers to approve them.
Establishing facts prior to action should happen when DoD leaders testify before
Congress on their annual budget requests; however, that process has devolved into
duplicative hearings characterized by an excess of indecipherable jargon making it of
questionable value to Congress, the Department of Defense, or the American public.
Excising a signicant portion of these unproductive annual posture testimonies
and replacing them with a smaller number of more consequential and comprehensible
sessions dedicated to assessing the Department’s progress on important initiatives
would generate far more useful information for Congress to make decisions. Such
41. Zahariadis, 21–22, 166.
42. Les Aspin, “e Defense Budget and Foreign Policy: e Role of Congress,” Daedalus 104, no. 3
(Summer 1975): 165.
43. Les Aspin, “Why Doesn’t Congress Do Something?,” Foreign Policy 15 (Summer 1974): 78–80.
Sharp & Nicastro
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 19
information will not eliminate the challenges created by Congress’ programmatic ori-
entation, but it stands a reasonable chance of helping Congress improve the coherence
and eectiveness of US defense policy by funding programs consistent with the Na-
tional Defense Strategy and DoD missions. Æ
20 ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER
Spacepower and Strategy
SPACE AND WAR IN
UKRAINE
Beyond the Satellites
robiN DiCkey
MiChael p. GleasoN
Much of the international attention on the use of space in Russia’s war in Ukraine—
commercial space services in particular—has focused on satellite capabilities while ignor-
ing the signicance of other aspects of space systems, such as ground infrastructure, so-
ware, and information- sharing practices. Although Russia has numerous military satellites
while Ukraine has none, international and commercial space information sharing and
innovations in terrestrial hardware and soware have allowed Ukraine to exceed Russia in
the use of space at the operational, strategic, and diplomatic levels. e US armed forces
can learn policy, strategy, and doctrine lessons including the importance of robust space
doctrine; decentralized, strategic information sharing; and the need to protect the ground
and communications segments of space systems.
S
pace has played a highly visible role in Russia’s war in Ukraine since and even
before Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Satellite images of Russian troop con-
voys and destroyed Ukrainian buildings have provided the backdrop informing
international perspectives of the war, while space data and services have directly sup-
ported warghters on the ground. Many observers have begun to refer to the war in
Ukraine as the “rst commercial space war,” paralleling descriptions of the 1991 Gulf
War as the “rst space war.”
1
Satellites themselves are usually the focus in discussions on military uses of space.
Yet, satellite ground systems, satellite data processing soware, decentralized informa-
tion sharing, and novel applications of data from existing satellite capabilities by
troops on the ground have transformed the value and use of space, especially for
Ukraine and its allies. Russia has failed to capitalize on a clear lead in number and
Robin Dickey, a member of the technical staff at The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space Policy and Strategy,
holds a master’s degree in international studies, concentrating in strategic studies, from the Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies.
Dr. Michael Gleason is a national security senior project engineer in The Aerospace Corporation’s Center for Space
Policy and Strategy.
1. Sandra Erwin, “On National Security: Drawing Lessons from the First ‘Commercial Space War,’ ”
SpaceNews, May 20, 2022, https://spacenews.com/; and Jonathan Beale, “Space, the Unseen Frontier in the
War in Ukraine,” BBC, October 5, 2022, https://bbc.com/.
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 21
quality of satellites over Ukraine, which owned and operated no national satellites
when Russia invaded. e underwhelming eects of Russia’s initial, perceived space
superiority indicate that space lessons learned from its war in Ukraine should also include
the importance of space doctrine, information- sharing processes, and ground- based en-
abling segments beyond the satellites—whether commercial or government- owned.
e networked, distributed approach to using and sharing information from space
pursued by Ukraine and its allies has demonstrated the asymmetric advantages of this
approach compared to the centralized, hierarchical structure used by Russia. Russian
forces have struggled to both collect sucient tactically useful information from satel-
lites and disseminate that information to warghters in a timely manner, due to their
rigid command structure.
Ukrainian forces on the other hand have been able to innovate and adapt with
more decentralized command and control (C2) and more direct communications and
coordination between tactical units. is has increased the demand for data process-
ing architectures able to process and disseminate much larger amounts of data to a
much larger number of recipients, a burden that could be considered and addressed in
future US architectures and strategies. is article explores the uses of space in Rus-
sia’s war in Ukraine and how innovations beyond those involving the satellite per-
forming the mission have shaped the battleeld, providing some preliminary lessons
for the United States’ uses of space across the Joint force in future conicts.
Components of Space Systems
Space systems can typically be broken down into three segments: (1) the space seg-
ment, or the satellites performing the mission; (2) the ground segment, or the systems
and personnel on Earth that operate the satellites and the facilities that receive, pro-
cess, and distribute data from satellites; and (3) the “link” segment, or the signals that
connect the satellites to each other and to users and operators on the ground through
data uplinks to the space segment and data downlinks back to the ground segment.
2
Each of these segments is vital to the collection and dissemination of data so that ne-
glecting any one segment diminishes the value of the others.
While satellites—the space segment—are usually what come to mind when think-
ing about space systems, the ground segment, link segment, and enabling soware
expand the denition of space systems far beyond the objects in orbit. e ground
segment can be subdivided into satellite command and control (C2) on the one hand
and the end- user segment on the other. For satellite C2, ground stations send com-
mands to and can receive updates and data from satellites, and for the end- user seg-
ment, individual- level systems such as mobile terminals, antennas, receivers, and
transmitters can provide interfaces between satellites and users in the eld. Figure 1
represents the three major segments.
2. Air Command and Sta College Schriever Space Scholars, Air War College West Space Seminar,
AU-18 Space Primer (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
22 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Space and War in Ukraine
Figure 1. Space system segments
Satellite Capabilities Supporting Ukraine and Its Allies
At the onset of the Russian invasion, Ukraine did not own or operate any satellites;
however, the United States and its NATO Allies have made space support available in
various forms. Commercial actors have also provided a historic degree of space ser-
vices to Ukraine. As a result, Ukraine has been able to leverage space systems far be-
yond expectations based on its capabilities prior to February 2022, which did not in-
clude independent access to space. While signicant public attention has been
directed at Ukraine’s success in using commercial space services at the tactical level,
space- based systems have also had notable operational- and strategic- level eects.
Position, Navigation, and Timing
Ukraine uses satellite services provided by the US military, most notably, GPS
position, navigation, and timing (PNT) signals. GPS signals enable a wide range of
precision strike rockets, bombs, and artillery shells used by Ukrainian forces.
3
At
the operational and strategic levels, GPS has been the NATO standard for PNT for
decades.
4
As Ukraine depletes its stocks of Soviet/Russia- sourced military equip-
ment, and as NATO countries rearm Ukraine with NATO standard weapons,
3. Beale, “Unseen Frontier.”
4. Tim Vasen, “Is NATO Ready for Galileo?,” Journal of the JAPCC [Joint Air Power Competence Cen-
tre] 28 (December 2019), https://www.japcc.org/; and Michael P. Gleason, “Galileo, Power, Pride, and
Prot” (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, January 31, 2009), 97, 215, https://apps.dtic.mil/.
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 23
Ukraine may rely more upon GPS. Although there are alternatives to GPS, such as
the European Galileo system, open- source reporting on the conict does not sug-
gest if or how they are being used.
Electro- optical and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Imagery
Before the February 2022 invasion, Ukraine beneted in several ways from US na-
tional security satellites. Imagery satellites provided intelligence to US national- level
leadership, enabling the Biden administration to condently raise the alarm globally
about Russia’s intentions and alert Allies to the threat. US- furnished strategic intelli-
gence made its way to NATO eld commands prior to the invasion, and the Alliance
deployed additional forces in the region.
5
Once the ghting began, US national security
Earth observation and electronic signals intelligence helped ll the intelligence gaps as
the US military pulled its surveillance planes back from international airspace near Rus-
sia’s borders and the Black Sea.
6
Commercial remote- sensing satellites include those capable of collecting high-
resolution, electro- optical imagery and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery. SAR
imagery, although not collected by as many satellites and operators as electro- optical
imagery, has the unique benet of functioning even in low- visibility conditions, such
as nighttime or cloudy weather. Commercial satellites help track buildups of Russian
forces and troop movements within Ukraine and in Russia and Belarus. e availabil-
ity of various kinds of imagery has helped Ukraine accurately locate, track, and target
Russian forces prior to strikes and conduct battle damage assessments aerwards,
which has in turn helped improve the eciency and conservation of ammunition.
7
Journalists and nongovernmental organizations have used satellite imagery creatively
to reveal war crimes committed by Russia. Commercial companies such as Maxar,
Planet, and BlackSky have directly contributed to this activity by providing images to
these entities.
8
ese collaborations have been used to map mass graves, the systematic
looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites, the forced adoption and re- education
5. Garrett Reim, “Lessons from War in Ukraine from Former USAFE Commander,” Aviation Week
Network, December 6, 2022, https://aviationweek.com/; and W. J. Hennigan, “U.S. Deploys Forces in Re-
sponse to Putin’s Ukraine Moves,” Time, February 22, 2022, https://time.com/.
6. Reim.
7. David Ignatius, “How the Algorithm Tipped the Balance in Ukraine,” Washington Post, December 19,
2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/; Steve Rosenberg and Jaroslav Lukiv, “Ukraine War: Drone Attack
on Russian Bomber Base Leaves ree Dead,” BBC, December 26, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/; Anna
Ahronheim, “Russian Bombers Capable of Carrying Nukes Detected near Finland,” Jerusalem Post, Septem-
ber 30, 2022, https://www.jpost.com/; and Egle E. Murauskaite, “U.S. Military Assistance to Ukraine in 2022:
Impact Assessment,” Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA), SMA EUCOM Speaker Series, livestreamed
presentation, March 15, 2023, YouTube recording, 1:01:47, https://www.youtube.com/.
8. Denise Chow and Yuliya Talmazan, “Watching from Space, Satellites Collect Evidence of War
Crimes,” NBC News, May 3, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/.
24 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Space and War in Ukraine
of Ukrainian children in camps, the systematic destruction of food production and stor-
age capacities, and the targeted destruction of health and education facilities.
9
Satellite Communications
Ukraine uses several commercial satellite communication (SATCOM) systems for
a wide variety of purposes. In the opening days of the conict, Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky stayed in regular contact with the United States even while mo-
bile, using a secure satellite phone that the White House had given the Ukrainian gov-
ernment before the invasion occurred.
10
Iridium, Globalstar, and Inmarsat all have
capabilities in that sector.
11
Zelensky also uses Starlink satellites to directly address Ukrainians, national parlia-
ments, and international organizations around the world. Commercial telecom satel-
lites enable Ukrainians to stay connected with each other as well. e Luxembourg-
based satellite operator SES broadcasts most Ukrainian TV channels and has provided
space- based emergency internet and phone services to refugee camps along the
Ukrainian border.
12
Starlink provides broadband internet connectivity for a wide range of military and
civilian users across Ukraine and has been crucial to Ukraine’s battleeld successes.
Starlink satellites provide connectivity enabling secure communication and situational
awareness from top echelons to command bunkers and units in the eld.
13
On the
battleeld, Ukrainian warghters have used internet connectivity provided by Starlink
as a key communication method for a wide range of activities as they nd, target, and
destroy enemy forces.
14
Starlink also enables “tele- maintenance” of US and NATO weapon systems in Ukraine.
When something breaks and Ukrainian forces lack the expertise to repair it, Ukrainian
forces have used Starlink to reach back to US maintenance specialists at a base in Poland.
9. “Recent Reports,” Conict Observatory, accessed on March 1, 2023, https://hub.conictobserva
tory.org/.
10. Kylie Atwood and Zachary Cohen, “US in Contact with Zelensky through Secure Satellite Phone,”
CNN, March 1, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/; “e Phone at Zelensky Uses to Avoid Being Found by
Russia,” Marca, March 16, 2022, https://www.marca.com/; and “Iridium 9575A for U.S. Government,”
Iridium (website), accessed March 2, 2023. https://www.iridium.com/.
11. Ben Gran, “What Is a Satellite Phone?,” SatelliteInternet.com, June 12, 2023, https://www.satelliteinter
net.com/.
12. Pierre Weimerskirch, “SES Supports Ukraine from Space,” RTL Today, March 2, 2022, https://
today.rtl.lu/.
13. Beale, “Unseen Frontier.”
14. Sam Skove, “How Elon Musk’s Starlink Is Still Helping Ukraine’s Defenders,” Defense One, March
1, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/; Nick Allen and James Titcomb, “Elon Musk’s Starlink Helping
Ukraine to Win the Drone War,” Telegraph, March 18, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/; and Alexander
Freund, “Ukraine Using Starlink for Drone Strikes,” DW (Deutsche Welle), March 27, 2022, https://www
.dw.com/.
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 25
ese specialists diagnose the problem via video, walk the Ukrainian forces through the
recommended xes, or help put a new part on order directly from the eld.
15
ere have been several challenges involved in relying on Starlink, including public
incidents where SpaceX founder and CEO Elon Musk questioned on social media
whether Starlink services should continue to be provided to Ukraine.
16
SpaceX’s grow-
ing restrictions on Starlink services within Ukraine have caused concern and driven
some exploration of alternatives.
Other commercial satellite companies provide Ukraine internet connectivity from
space, including Viasat, OneWeb, SES, Iridium, Inmarsat, Eutelsat, and Avanti.
17
Vi-
asat, OneWeb, and SES are all working to build more capacity, including through new
constellations and new agreements with Ukrainian telecom operators.
18
Nevertheless,
Starlink remains the most visible provider of mobile satellite communication services
in Ukraine.
Radio Frequency Monitoring
Some commercial satellites have another relevant capability: the ability to monitor
radio frequency (RF) signals. Commercial space- based RF sensing is useful to detect
jamming of GPS and communication signals and geolocating the jamming’s source.
19
GPS jamming can disrupt many basic services, including transportation networks, air
travel, logistics, and telecommunication. Tracking this interference can help operators
come up with alternatives and work- arounds.
20
For example, in March 2022, the com-
pany HawkEye 360 publicly announced it had “the capability to detect and geolocate
Global Positioning System (GPS) interference, with analysis of data over Ukraine re-
vealing extensive GPS interference activity.”
21
e United States, the European Union (EU), and like- minded nations also use
commercial satellites to help enforce the sanctions imposed on Russia and Russian
individuals. For example, the yachts of individually sanctioned Russian oligarchs have
15. Patrick Tucker, “US Soldiers Provide Telemaintenance as Ukrainians MacGyver eir Weapons,”
Defense One, September 18, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/.
16. Isabelle Khurshudyan et al., “Musk reatens to Stop Funding Starlink Internet Ukraine Relies on
in War,” Washington Post, October 14, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
17. eresa Hitchens, “A Musk Monopoly? For Now, Ukraine Has Few Options outside Starlink for
Battleeld Satcoms,” Breaking Defense, October 19, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/.
18. Hitchens; “OneWeb Conrms Successful Deployment of 40 Satellites Launched with SpaceX,”
Eutelsat OneWeb, press release, January 10, 2023, https://oneweb.net/; Martin Coulter and Supantha
Mukherjee, “Telecom Operator Veon Conrms Deal with British Satellite Firm OneWeb,” Reuters, March
1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/; and Courtney Albon, “SES Launches Advanced Broadband Satellites
As Military Demand Grows,” C4ISRNet, December 16, 2022, https://www.c4isrnet.com/.
19. Tracy Cozzens, “HawkEye 360 Tech Reveals Early GPS Interference in Ukraine,” GPS World, April 29,
2022, https://www.gpsworld.com/.
20. Cozzens.
21. “Hawkeye 360 Signal Detection Reveals GPS Interference,” Hawkeye 360, press release, March 4,
2022, https://www.he360.com/; and Cozzens.
26 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Space and War in Ukraine
been tracked globally using RF monitoring of onboard ship automatic identication
system transmitters from companies such as Hawkeye 360, Spire, and Kleos Space.
22
Such tracking has enabled the seizure of the yachts when they reach foreign ports.
23
Likewise, the same commercial space companies contribute to tracking cargo ships
that are evading sanctions, documenting the the of Ukrainian grain and enabling
subsequent enforcement actions and future reparations.
24
Space Capabilities beyond Satellites
e robust and diverse satellite capabilities coming to bear in Russia’s war in
Ukraine, especially from the commercial sector, are only a third of the story. Every
service provided by a satellite in orbit is made usable by hardware and soware on
Earth. Innovations in these terrestrial aspects of space systems as well as novel policies
and practices for sharing satellite information have done just as much, if not more,
than the satellite capabilities themselves to provide Ukraine an advantage in the war.
The Ground Segment
Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated both the value and the vulnerability of
the Earth- based aspects of space systems. Modems, terminals, and other ground-
based receivers of satellite communications signals have been highly visible in the
conict. One of the reasons Starlink has been so broadly used at the tactical level is
because the antennas are the size of a pizza box, smaller than those of many other
commercial satellite systems, making them easy to carry by mobile, tactical teams.
25
Mobile satellite ground systems have been vital for replacing the telecommunications
ground infrastructure destroyed by Russia.
Ground segments of space architectures have also become targets. In the hour be-
fore troops moved into Ukraine in February 2022, Russia conducted a cyberattack
that disabled Viasat modems, including terminals used for Ukrainian command and
control. is attack also had international and strategic eects, disabling tens of thou-
sands of ground- based terminals throughout Europe and disrupting wind turbines
22. Tim Fernholz, “Satellites Are Hunting ‘Dark Vessels’ at Evade Sanctions at Sea,” Quartz, Novem-
ber 8, 2022, https://qz.com/.
23. Alessandra Bonomolo and William McLenna, “Inside the Capture of a Russian Oligarch’s Super
yacht,” BBC, November 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/.
24. Simão Oliveira, “Grain Laundering: Seeing Who’s Hiding in the Dark Shipping,” Spire (blog), Oc-
tober 26, 2022, https://spire.com/; Michael Biesecker et al., “Russia Smuggling Ukrainian Grain to Help
Pay for Putin’s War,” AP, October 3, 2022, https://apnews.com/; Fernholz, “Satellites”; and Jérôme Weiss,
“Sanctions on Russia As It Presses In on Ukraine,” Spire, April 14, 2022, https://spire.com/.
25. Admin, “David, Goliath, & Space – Is is How Future Wars Will Be Fought?,” Downlink, Produced
by US Defense & Aerospace Report, podcast, 37:12, February 12, 2023, https://defaeroreport.com/; and
Hitchens, “Musk Monopoly?”
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 27
and internet services.
26
Russia’s action showed how many aspects of infrastructure and
communications in Ukraine and Europe relied on the terminals, while also highlight-
ing a major cyber vulnerability in these ground systems.
27
Unlike the similarities between the threats posed by cyberattacks to ground and
space segments, physical threats can play very dierent roles against the ground seg-
ments of space systems than against the space segments. While physical threats to
satellites are still somewhat limited to either direct- ascent missiles or co- orbital weap-
ons capable of reaching specic orbits, satellite control centers or terminals traveling
with military units can be just as vulnerable to physical attack as any other facility or
materiel on Earth.
Conversely, Ukrainian armed forces have sometimes taken advantage of some of
Russia’s unwitting uses of data from space systems. For example, GPS PNT receivers
are commercially available and ubiquitous around the world, embedded within in-
numerable commercially available products, such as smartphones. Some smartphone
photos taken by Russian forces and posted on social media had embedded GPS-
enabled geolocation data.
28
Ukrainian forces were able to target those GPS coordinates
and destroy Russian forces with precision, using GPS- enabled munitions.
29
The Link Segment
Space does not just connect people to other people; it also connects people to sys-
tems that sense and shoot. Autonomous vehicles and remotely piloted drones are of-
ten guided through satellite communications links, allowing much greater drone
range. At the unit level, Ukrainian forces have leveraged Starlink to relay drone video
feeds directly to artillery batteries in real time, allowing artillery batteries to observe
precisely where their artillery rounds are landing and adjusting re as needed.
30
Re-
connaissance drones using Starlink satellite relays have also enabled coordination of
other ground forces, such as directing soldiers with shoulder- red, antitank weapons
where to position themselves for an attack.
Attack drones that directly target Russian tanks, positions, and other objectives are
also enabled by Starlink.
31
One example is the coordinated drone attack on the Russian
navy at Sevastopol on October 29, 2022. Drones provided real- time intelligence, con-
fused the enemy by creating chaos at the base, and enabled the main explosive- laden
26. Anthony J. Blinken, “Attribution of Russia’s Malicious Cyber Activities against Ukraine,” US De-
partment of State, press release, May 10, 2022, https://www.state.gov/.
27. Katrina Manson, “e Satellite Hack Everyone Is Finally Talking About,” Bloomberg, March 1,
2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/.
28. Stavros Atlamazoglou, “Deadly HIMARS Strikes Show How Ukrainian Forces Are Turning Cell
Phones into ‘Force Multipliers,’ ” Business Insider, January 15, 2023, https://www.businessinsider.com/.
29. Beale, “Unseen Frontier.”
30. Skove, “Starlink”; and Tamir Eshel, “Coordinated Drone Attack Targets the Russian Black Sea Fleet
at Sevastopol,” Defense Update, October 30, 2022, https://defense- update.com/.
31. Skove; and Freund, “Ukraine.”
28 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Space and War in Ukraine
autonomous strike boats to close in on the intended targets. is targeting included a
precision hit on the Admiral Makarov, reportedly the Black Sea Fleet’s new agship aer
themissile cruiser Moskva sank.
32
Yet the direct use of space to enable drones and other military systems has raised
concerns from the commercial operators of such satellite communications networks.
In February 2023, following complaints to the UN by Russia about Starlink’s support
to Ukraine, SpaceX Chief Operating Ocer Gwynne Shotwell expressed opposition to
certain “oensive” uses of Starlink by Ukrainian forces and stated actions were being
taken to restrict those uses.
33
Although the eects or follow- through on that statement are not yet clear in open
sources, this dynamic raises questions of whether certain commercial satellite opera-
tors, without US government input, will begin unilaterally restraining themselves
around activities they deem “o limits” in a conict. Ukraine’s precedent- setting use
of commercial space services, providing commercial links that enable kill chains on a
scale never seen before, may make some commercial satellite companies uncomfort-
able and cause them to reevaluate their interests.
The Role of Data
While the data and services collected and processed by space systems have been
invaluable in Ukraine, one reason why the impact has been so signicant has been the
underlying policy and doctrinal environment that enabled or encouraged data to be
shared quickly with key stakeholders. In addition, along with innovations in hard-
ware, the soware and applications allowing units to rapidly process and disseminate
information have proven invaluable to Ukrainian military eorts against Russia.
Ukrainian forces have also beneted from receiving raw rather than processed data,
along with requisite training on how to exploit the raw data. e timeline for transfer-
ring data from space to warghters has dropped from days to hours or, in some cir-
cumstances, fewer than ten minutes.
34
e “Uber for artillery” application, GIS Arta, allows units collecting information
on potential targets, including from satellites, to share that information directly with
units that could re on the targets.
35
is pairs sensors with shooters in a decentral-
ized network instead of having to funnel specic information up and back down
through centralized command nodes.
As another example, Palantir soware can draw imagery from a total of 306 com-
mercial satellites. Soldiers in battle can use handheld tablets to request more satellite
coverage if they need it. Western military and intelligence services work closely with
32. Eshel, “Drone.”
33. Adela Suliman, “SpaceX Questions Ukraine’s Use of Starlink for War,” Washington Post, February
9, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
34. David Sandy (former chief of sta, UK Ministry of Defence Space Directorate), interview by Mick
Gleason, virtual, February 2023.
35. David Burbach, comments, in “David, Goliath, & Space.”
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 29
Ukrainians to facilitate this information sharing.
36
Cloud- based environments have
also helped remove data stovepipes and minimize the need to translate between sys-
tems.
37
Ultimately, sharing data is less expensive than collecting it, so pursuing new
models for dissemination of data allows for a wider range of possibilities to add value
and utility.
38
e encouragement of information sharing and decentralized data dissemination
has helped counter Russian narratives and reveal Russia’s activities and war crimes,
while also increasing the resilience and eectiveness of Ukrainian armed forces. e
availability and relative ease of sharing commercial satellite imagery were key factors
in generating the international support for sanctions against Russia.
In 2022, a US Intelligence Community leader noted that the US Intelligence Com-
munity more than doubled its procurement of commercial satellite imagery leading
up to the conict.
39
According to the ocial, the imagery from companies “was able
to ow directly to those who need [it], EUCOM, NATO, and directly to Ukrainians.”
40
In some cases, the so power enabled by sharing imagery from satellites manifested
into hard power advantages, including more war materiel provided to Ukraine. Much
of this was hard to anticipate. For example, Germany changed its longstanding Russia
policy, Ostpolitik, to oer heavy arms to Ukraine, including sending advanced battle
tanks to the country.
41
In sum, even without satellites Ukraine has been able to use space systems to great
eect, highlighting that satellites are only one part of the equation. is does not di-
minish the importance of satellites but should elevate appreciation for the importance
of the ground and link segments. Russia’s use of space in its war in Ukraine provides
another useful case.
Strategic and Operational Use of Space by Russia
Russia has used satellites for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
and communications while attempting to interfere with space assets supporting
Ukraine. Yet the constraints imposed by Russia’s highly centralized military C2
36. Ignatius, “Algorithm.”
37. Todd Harrison and Matthew Strohmeyer, “Commercial Space Remote Sensing and Its Role in
National Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2, 2022, https://www
.csis.org/.
38. Josef Koller, “e Future of Ubiquitous, Realtime Intelligence: A GEOINT Singularity,” Aerospace
Corporation Center for Space Policy and Strategy, August 8, 2019, https://csps.aerospace.org/.
39. Sandra Erwin, “As Russia Prepared to Invade, U.S. Opened Commercial Imagery Pipeline to
Ukraine,” SpaceNews, April 6, 2022, https://spacenews.com/.
40. Erwin.
41. Frank Jordans, Kirsten Grieshaber, and Samya Kullab, “US, Germany to Send Advanced Tanks to
Aid Ukraine War Eort,” AP, January 25, 2023, https://apnews.com/; and Isabel Muttreja and Bernhard
Blumenau, “How Russia’s Invasion Changed German Foreign Policy,” Chatham House, November 18,
2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/.
30 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Space and War in Ukraine
methods and an aging space architecture have resulted in a perceived underwhelm-
ing contribution of Russian space capabilities to the ght.
Russian Military Space Capabilities
In early 2022, at the onset of its war in Ukraine, Russia had numerous but some-
what limited space capabilities. e Russian PNT system, GLONASS, enables deploy-
ments, force movement, and precision- guided munitions. Russia uses a small number
of highly capable ISR satellites, with more than 30 satellites providing electro- optical
imagery as well as a new radar observation platform, systems for missile warning, and
electronic and signals intelligence satellites.
42
But this still leaves signicant gaps in its space- based ISR coverage. Russian mili-
tary SATCOM is insucient as well. One expert indicated: “Russian troubles appar-
ently hinge on a shortage of open optical and synthetic aperture radar satellites.
Whereas its decient command, control, and communications (C3) systems are the
result of having too few satellite communication channels and terminals.”
43
Russia’s
communications infrastructure had such low battleeld performance that Russian
forces turned to unsecure means of communication such as mobile phones.
Whatever the limitations of Russia’s military space capabilities leading up to the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine was at a clear disadvantage in terms of satellite
capabilities, as mentioned above. Yet, Russia has largely failed to capitalize on its ad-
vantage. e reasons why span well beyond the satellite capabilities themselves and
involve both the ground and link segments and the problem of data management.
Even in cases where Russia is collecting information or communicating via space
systems, it has faced diculty in disseminating the information and data to Russian
forces in an ecient or timely fashion. An assessment of Russia’s space capabilities
from 2019 indicated that even its new ISR systems had issues: “In addition to the high
failure rate of the satellites, the products and services that they do provide oen fail to
meet the requirements of end users and are not competitive with equivalent foreign
capabilities.”
44
While the Russian SATCOM architecture appears to be more robust
than space- based ISR, military communications operate under a very hierarchical,
slow, and vertically organized structure in contrast to the more network- centric ap-
proaches used by the Ukrainian armed forces and their allies.
45
Russia’s highly centralized command structure limits its utilization of information
from space, as demonstrated by the combat operations of Russian battalion tactical
groups in Ukraine in 2013 and 2015. A review of the failures and vulnerabilities of
42. Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion (Washing-
ton, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022), https://www.dia.mil/.
43. Pavel Luzin, “Russia’s Space Satellite Problems and the War in Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 19,
no. 76 (May 24, 2022), https://jamestown.org/
44. Anatoly Zak, Russian Military and Dual- Purpose Spacecra: Latest Status and Operational Over-
view, CNA Occasional Paper (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, June 2019), https://www.cna.org/.
45. Luzin, “Satellite Problems.”
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 31
these units found C2 was centralized so that there was no networked common operat-
ing picture (COP), making changes to it dicult to disseminate quickly and e-
ciently. Moreover, intelligence collection tended to be narrowly focused without gen-
eral coverage beyond a specic objective.
46
It is not entirely clear if Russia has
corrected these deciencies, suggesting that in the near term, Russia will not be able
to eectively use its space capabilities for tactical warghting to an extent comparable
to the United States, its Allies and partners, and Ukraine.
While several commercial satellite rms support Russia’s military activities, Russia
has made less use of commercial space capabilities than Ukraine and its allies have.
47
is is partially because many commercial companies have now locked Russia out of
their services, and face sanctions from the United States and others if they allow Rus-
sia to use these services. For example, the Russian companies TerraTech and AO
BARL provide satellite imagery of Ukraine to Russia, and the Chinese company
Spacety and its Luxembourg- based subsidiary provided SAR imagery to the Wagner
Group, according to the sanction announcement.
48
But Russia’s less- than- robust use
of commercial satellite services is also due to its military structure, which is not con-
ducive to the decentralized, networked approach favored by these commercial tech-
nologies.
49
Beyond technical, doctrinal, and commercial challenges, human factors may be
playing a signicant role in Russia’s limited uses of space in Ukraine. As with other
industries across Russia, the space industry has struggled with incompetence, corrup-
tion, and mismanagement for decades, with “unqualied or unmotivated personnel
responsible for human errors,” contributing to major quality control issues.
50
ese
problems are paired with personnel issues on the battleeld, especially regarding inex-
perienced Russian conscripts and convicts.
51
It is hard to decentralize data and
decision- making if there is no trust or distribution of competency.
Counterspace Systems: Not Just Countersatellites
e Russian military focuses heavily on electronic warfare capabilities, including a
range of ground- based and mobile systems to counter GPS, communications, and ra-
dars.
52
Other counterspace capabilities pursued by Russia include cyber systems,
46. Nicolas J. Fiore, “Defeating the Russian Battalion Tactical Group,” Armor (Spring 2017), https://
www.moore.army.mil/.
47. Luzin, “Satellite Problems.”
48. “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group As a Transnational Criminal Organization,” US
Department of the Treasury, press release, January 26, 2023,https://home.treasury.gov/.
49. “David, Goliath, & Space.”
50. Zak, Russian Military.
51. Victoria Smolkin, “One Reason Russia Is Struggling in Ukraine,” Politico, March 3, 2022, https://
www.politico.com/; and Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila Hrabchuk, “As Morale Suers, Russia and
Ukraine Fight a War of Mental Attrition,” Washington Post, October 13, 2022, https://www.washington-
post.com/.
52. Challenges to Security.
32 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Space and War in Ukraine
directed- energy weapons like the Peresvet laser weapon system, and the direct- ascent
antisatellite (ASAT)-capable Nudol system.
53
ese systems have been put to use both
in the lead up to and during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. e Nudol system, for ex-
ample, was used to destroy a defunct Russian satellite in an ASAT test in November
2021, three months before the invasion of Ukraine.
Russian forces have actively interfered with space systems supporting Ukraine. In
UN meetings, Russian delegates have publicly called out numerous commercial space
companies, claiming that the companies were supporting the Ukrainian armed forces
in a way that could make them “legitimate targets for retaliation.”
54
In practice, many
Russian counterspace activities have focused more on communications links and
ground architectures than on satellites.
e Russian cyberattack on Viasat in February 2022 was able to deny Ukrainian
forces the use of key space capabilities by exploiting a vulnerability in ground sys-
tems.
55
Russian interference with global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals has
disrupted targeting and troop coordination as well as carried the potential to disrupt
air travel, logistics, and other basic services.
56
Yet Russia’s eorts to jam Starlink satel-
lites have faced resistance as Starlink operators have been able to adapt code to coun-
ter the interference, a countermeasure referred to as “fantastic” and “eye- watering” by
Oce of the Secretary of Defense Director of Electronic Warfare Dave Tremper.
57
Lessons for the United States
Asymmetric Advantages
e US Joint Force may gain many insights from Ukraine that highlight both US
asymmetric advantages and potential gaps or areas for improvement. For example,
military planners, strategists, and analysts should recognize that the satellite capabili-
ties themselves are not the stars of this show. Instead, the ground and link segments
53. Challenges to Security.
54. “Statement by the Head of the Russian Delegation K.V. Vorontsov at the Second Session of the
Open- Ended Working Group Established Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 76/231 (Unocial Translation),”
UN Oce for Disarmament Aairs, September 12, 2022, https://documents.unoda.org/; “First Commit-
tee, 22nd Plenary Meeting – General Assembly, 77th Session,” UN Web TV, October 26, 2022, video,
3:12:22, https://webtv.un.org/;“5th Meeting, 3rdSession Open- ended Working Group on Reducing Space
reats,”UN Web TV,February 1, 2023, video, 2:57:58,https://webtv.un.org/;and “4th Meeting, 3rdSes-
sion Open- ended Working Group on Reducing Space reats,” UN Web TV, January 31, 2023, video,
2:47:48, https://webtv.un.org/.
55. “Russia behind Cyberattack with Europewide Impact an Hour before Ukraine Invasion,” United
Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Oce, press release, May 10, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/.
56. Cozzens, “HawkEye 360.”
57. Kate Duy, “Interference: Elon Musk Reported Russia Was Increasing Eorts to Jam Starlink Satel-
lite Internet in Ukraine, But Hasn’t Succeeded,” Business Insider, May 11, 2022, https://www.businessin-
sider.com/; and Duy, “A Top Pentagon Ocial Said SpaceX Starlink Rapidly Fought O a Russian Jam-
ming Attack in Ukraine,” Business Insider, April 22, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/.
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 33
that facilitate networked data dissemination methods and innovative application of
the data from satellites have allowed Ukraine, with no satellites of its own, to make
better use of space than Russia. As well, planners, strategists, and analysts should con-
sider how threats have manifested against these ground segments and links rather
than to satellite capabilities.
Ukraine has demonstrated that what matters is not only what satellite data or ser-
vices are provided, but also how they are delivered to the warghter. In April 2023,
then- Major General David Miller—who at the time was director of operations, train-
ing, and force development for US Space Command—indicated that warning, surveil-
lance, and targeting information ultimately has no value if it cannot get to the user.
58
Trained, motivated, and innovative warghters themselves are a further force multi-
plier, as shown by how Ukrainian forces have leveraged space capabilities.
59
Similarly, Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman stated that a key
goal of the US Space Force going forward is “making sure that not only do we have the
systems to do the mission, but that our operators have the training, the experience,
and we have validated tactics that actually enable those capabilities.”
60
e use of space in Ukraine has shown that commercial data sources provide eec-
tive alternatives to classied space- derived information, enabling more ecient infor-
mation sharing across partners and Allies. Information- sharing policies and practices
combined with the space- derived information itself have allowed the United States
and its Allies and partners to coordinate a comprehensive response to Russia’s inva-
sion of Ukraine across military, diplomatic, and economic sectors.
Moreover, the war is a reminder of the competitive advantage the United States and
its partners and Allies achieve from the strength of open, transparent societies com-
pared to closed autocracies. e sheer volume and variety of sources and means of
dissemination facilitated by space services and used by Ukraine to share information,
particularly about the movements and potential war crimes of Russian forces, have
helped keep Russia from controlling the narrative on the international stage. Russia’s
centralized structures have largely prevented it from being able to use space eectively
in Ukraine. As a result, the Kremlin has failed to shape the perception of the invasion
in a way that favors Russia. ese dynamics could play out similarly in a crisis involv-
ing other countries that try to tightly control the ow of information, such as China.
Areas for Improvement
One of the most signicant challenges demonstrated by Russia’s war in Ukraine is
the vulnerability and threat toward ground components and soware related to space
58. “Spacepower Security Forum 2023: A Mission to Protect and Defend Assets in Space,” transcript of
conference proceedings, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, April 5, 2023, https://mitchellaerospace
power.org/.
59. “Spacepower Security Forum.”
60. eresa Hitchens, “Ukraine Spotlights ‘Criticality’ of Space in Conict: Saltzman,” Breaking De-
fense, January 13, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/.
34 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Space and War in Ukraine
systems. Several leaders across industry and the military have indicated that ground
systems and soware, such as cloud environments, can be particularly vulnerable in
conict.
61
Accordingly, the hardening of ground systems, soware, and cloud environ-
ments may be a key investment in securing space systems as a whole. Distributed ar-
chitectures in ground systems, not just in space, have been put to the test for several
commercial actors throughout the war. e US Space Force may be able to derive di-
rect lessons for future architectures, particularly for SATCOM.
General Kevin Chilton, the former commander of US Strategic Command, has
pointed to the challenge raised by this dynamic for the Joint force writ large. e
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—not the Space Force—typically buy the user
equipment and therefore “need to step out and make sure they have the proper user
equipment, or the space capabilities are for naught.”
62
is statement highlights how a
satellite’s value is dependent on the usability of its data by warghters and decision-
makers. erefore, Joint force investments in user equipment play a key role in the
eectiveness of Space Force capabilities. Coordinating across organizational seams
among end users, satellites, and data processing and dissemination can pose a com-
plex task requiring sound policy and doctrine, not just capable technology.
e Joint force will also need to consider the challenge of balancing the hierar-
chical needs of a military with the potential benets of decentralization of informa-
tion and decision- making. Although decentralization has aided Ukraine’s use of
space in many ways, legal, policy, and operational requirements will require a de-
gree of centralization to ensure the US military is able to achieve its objectives in an
eective, responsible manner.
Conclusion
e space enterprise is not conned to satellites in orbit. As impressive as satellite
capabilities may be, Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated their operational and
strategic impacts are magnied vastly by terrestrial hardware and soware, and by the
networked, distributed approach to using and sharing information.
It is also clear that merely possessing satellite capabilities is not enough to ensure
space support for the warghter. Increasing opportunities to make use of space infor-
mation and services developed by others have enabled Ukraine to close the gap in
space capability while Russian forces have apparently struggled to provide sucient
space- derived information to their warghters in a timely fashion. is dynamic indi-
cates that doctrine, policy, information- sharing structures, and data- processing capa-
bilities, while not always the most visible components of space strategy, can be a driv-
ing force for competitive advantage in war.
Russia’s war in Ukraine spotlights many trends and patterns that the Joint force
should watch closely for future implications to the role space may play in war. e war
61. “Spacepower Security Forum.”
62. “Spacepower Security Forum.”
Dickey & Gleason
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 35
demonstrates the value of space to terrestrial forces while also highlighting the value
of links—interconnectivity—and terrestrial systems for space forces. Even as the US
Space Force develops an independent identity and structure as a service, it must con-
tinue to strengthen the ties to and interoperability with the rest of the Joint force. Æ
36 ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER
Spacepower and Strategy
ASYMMETRIC
WARFARE IN SPACE
Five Proposals from Chinese
Strategic Thought
Jake suss
Chinese thinkers like Sun Tzu oer universally- applicable strategic recommendations for
national security, but the advancement of military space operations invites further analysis
of Eastern thinking as it relates to space. Such strategic thinking applied to new challenges
posed by the space domain in the development of broader space strategy expands perspec-
tives and improves durability. Looking through the strategic lens of Chinese thought re-
garding exploiting local asymmetric advantages elucidates several recommendations for
limiting adversaries’ use of the domain and winning conicts extending to space.
D
espite more than two millennia passing since Sun Tzu wrote e Art of War,
its tenets are still applicable today. Militaries across the world study Sun Tzu
and apply strategic prescriptions derived from chariot warfare in the Warring
States period (475–221 BCE) to modern military conict.
1
Although his lessons have
stood the test of time, advancements in modern technology and military strategy
open new areas for contemplation through a Chinese strategic lens.
Space is a relatively recent addition to historical warghting domains and is ripe for
a deeper consideration in terms of Sun Tzu and later Chinese strategic thinking.
2
As
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) builds its military capabilities, including space-
based assets, Chinese thought becomes increasingly more applicable to understanding
Beijing’s intentions and developing Western doctrine regarding space matters. In or-
der to win in space and ll a theoretical gap in modern space strategy, planners must
consider broadly applicable strategic guidance through the lens of historical and con-
temporary Chinese thought.
Space is a critical component of modern life and warfare. In the First Gulf War,
China witnessed the American military’s use of space to dominate Iraq’s military—at
Captain Jake Suss, USAFR, is an analysis branch chief at US Borders and Custom Protection. He has served with
US Space Command and holds a master of arts in intelligence studies from American Military University.
1. Sun Tzu, e Art of War: Bilingual Chinese and English Text, trans. Lionel Giles and John Minford
(North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2016).
2. John W. Raymond, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, Space Capstone Publication (Washington
DC: Headquarters US Space Force, June 2020).
Suss
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 37
the time, the fourth largest military in the world.
3
American military capabilities,
including space- enabled navigation and communications, were decades ahead of
China’s post- Tiananmen military.
In the three decades since the First Gulf War, international space capabilities have
proliferated and increased in sophistication. Global navigation satellite system con-
stellations now power civilian smartphones in addition to military smart bombs.
Space- based internet such as SpaceX’s Starlink oers speeds 3,500 times faster than
dial up, and high- resolution commercial satellite imagery now costs tens of dollars—
thousands of dollars cheaper than a decade ago.
4
Militarily, space is a key enabler for terrestrial forces. Control of the ultimate high
ground is more contested than ever. e PRC, Russia, India, and the United States
have tested antisatellite (ASAT) missiles capable of reaching low-Earth orbit (LEO).
5
Several countries are pursuing electronic warfare, directed energy, and cyber capabili-
ties that could temporarily or permanently disable satellites or disrupt space- enabled
services.
6
Although the First Gulf War is widely considered the rst space- enabled
conict, no country has yet contested space in open conict.
7
As a result, space com-
bat strategy currently relies on theoretical underpinnings derived from other do-
mains, models, and exercises, rather than concrete historical combat examples. While
real- world space combat will certainly modify today’s space strategy, the lack of his-
torical models makes a thorough and sound theoretical background a crucial starting
point for future space conict.
e Art of War provides a basis for contemplating modern combat, but the nature
of the space domain and recent developments in Chinese military thought invite an
analysis of Eastern strategic thinking relevant to space. Many areas of Sun Tzu’s work
are applicable in all domains, yet space provides unique opportunities and challenges
not considered by e Art of War’s terrestrial- only environment.
is article examines historical and contemporary Chinese strategic writing to il-
luminate areas for consideration in broader space strategy. is includes the application
3. Dean Cheng, “Evolving Chinese inking about Deterrence: What the United States Must Under-
stand about China and Space,” Heritage Foundation, March 2018, https://www.heritage.org/.
4. Yarnaphat Shaengchart and Tanpat Kraiwanit, “Starlink Satellite Project Impact on the Internet
Provider Service in Emerging Economies,” Research in Globalization 6 (June 2023): 100132, https://doi
.org/; Kim Ann Zimmermann and Jesse Emspak, “Internet History Timeline: ARPANET to the World
Wide Web,” LiveScience, April 8, 2022, https://www.livescience.com/; and Dexter Jagula, “Satellite Imag-
ery for Everyone,” IEEE Spectrum, November 22, 2022, https://spectrum.ieee.org/.
5. Victoria Samson and Brian Weeden, “Op- Ed: India’s ASAT Test Is Wake- up Call for Norms of Be-
havior in Space,” SpaceNews, January 23, 2023, https://spacenews.com/; and James Dickinson, Hearing on
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs,
Before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 117th Cong., 2nd session (2022) (“Pri-
orities and Posture of United States Space Command,” presentation by General James H. Dickinson, com-
mander, US Space Command), https://www.armed- services.senate.gov/.
6. Dickinson.
7. Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, “e First Space War: e Contribution of Satellites to the
Gulf War,” RUSI Journal 136, no. 4 (1991).
38 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Asymmetric Warfare in Space
of historical writings like irty- Six Stratagems, Maoist “people’s war” doctrine, and con-
temporary PRC writings on space strategy. While the proposed strategic recommenda-
tions are written through the lens of such Chinese sources, they are as universally ap-
plicable as those from e Art of War.
Asymmetric Warfare
To understand the basis for Beijing’s thoughts on space, one must rst understand
the strategic context of historical and contemporary Chinese thought on strategy writ
large. Finding asymmetric advantages underpins the strategic thought of military the-
orists spanning from ancient China to the modern PRC. Sun Tzu devoted an entire
chapter to the discussion of weak and strong points and how to concentrate one’s own
strength at the enemy’s weak points.
8
Wang Jingze expanded on this thought in his
sixth-century irty- Six Stratagems by proclaiming one should avoid direct confron-
tation with a strong enemy and instead attack weaknesses elsewhere.
9
More recently, in the twentieth century, Mao Zedong also emphasized the need to
attack only when the local balance of power is advantageous and victory assured by
pitting strength against weakness.
10
Contemporary Chinese strategists like Qiao Liang
and Wang Xiangsui call for expanding these asymmetric attacks into domains like
economic, cultural, and information domains.
11
PRC activities similarly demonstrate
a willingness to use asymmetric tactics, like maritime militia vessels, against countries
like the Philippines whose military capabilities lag far behind China’s.
12
Attacking a superior force with an inferior force is generally recognized as folly in
Chinese strategic thought; however, such a strategy focuses more on local, relative asym-
metries, unlike the contemporary Western thought of absolute asymmetries. Aer 2001,
the United States devoted signicant attention to doctrine focused on the rise of “non-
traditional, asymmetrical, and insurgent- terrorist” threats, highlighting holistic, com-
parative strengths.
13
Both historical and contemporary Chinese strategists assess that
asymmetries can provide local, sometimes temporary strengths that can achieve tactical
advantages. ese asymmetries can occur in tactical and operational levels, with “whole
pitted against separate parts of a whole,” so that a strategically weaker country can still
8. Sun Tzu, Art of War.
9. Wang Jingze, irty- Six Stratagems, bilingual ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Lionshare Chinese Classics,
2015), 6.
10. Mao Zedong, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse- Tung: e Little Red Book, bilingual ed. (Beijing,
China: Peking Foreign Language Press, 1996), Mao Tse- Tung Internet Archive, https://www.marxists.org/.
11. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing
House Arts, 1999).
12. Andrew Erickson and Connor Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for Naval Analyses,
2016, https://www.cna.org/.
13. Michael J. Mazarr, “e Folly of ‘Asymmetric War,’ ” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2008): 33.
Suss
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 39
leverage asymmetries.
14
ese tactical advantages compound to form strategic victory
through self- preservation and destruction of the enemy.
15
Modern People’s Liberation Army (PLA) literature emphasizes the transient, lim-
ited nature of control derived from balancing relative strengths to achieve objectives.
16
Particularly in light of China’s recent comparative military disadvantage since the First
Opium War (1839–42) and the “century of humiliation,” exploiting small, transient, or
ideological asymmetries is crucial to maximizing capability against holistically more
capable adversaries.
17
Additionally, although PRC combat power is advancing rapidly,
with the ultimate goal of creating a globally powerful military force, many military
leaders still envisage conict from a position of holistic disadvantage, so the PRC must
maximize local asymmetries to achieve strategic goals.
18
Consequently, the following
recommendations derive and apply Chinese strategy and context to inform the
broader development of space strategy.
Proposals for Space Strategy
e following sections oer ve general proposals concerning the execution of
space operations across the conict continuum, which Chinese thinkers generally
perceive as including ongoing competition.
19
ese considerations are derived pri-
marily from historical and modern Chinese theoretical views of asymmetric warfare,
historical Chinese thought, and contemporary PLA writings, but they are applicable
to conict in the space domain. As with Sun Tzu’s original writing, they are not in-
tended to serve as imperatives or laws that cannot be violated, but as recommenda-
tions to consider. Contravening one of these proposals does not guarantee defeat, nor
does following each one guarantee victory. Yet as strategic recommendations for space
operations, abiding by these propositions could enhance one’s prospects for victory.
Proposal 1. Space is an idea, not just a location. Space strategy should be separated
from location in order to attack the enemy’s weaknesses and optimize one’s own
strengths.
As mentioned, ancient and modern Chinese strategy generally emphasizes nding
asymmetric ways to secure victory. e sum of historical strategists’—Sun Tzu,
Wang Jingze, and Mao—thoughts on conict, particularly with an enemy of equal or
14. Sun Tzu, Art of War, 382.
15. Mao, Quotations.
16. 记荣仁 and 王学进 [Ji Rongren and Wang Xuejin], “试析制交通权与制空权,制海权的关系
[Assessing the Relationships between Command of Communications, Command of the Air, and Com-
mand of the Sea],” 中国军事科学 [China Military Sciences] 15, no. 4 (2002).
17. Xinhua, “Full Text: Speech by Xi Jinping at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the CPC,” Global
Times, July 2017, https://www.globaltimes.cn/.
18. Xinhua.
19. Eric Kuznar and George Popp, “China’s Perception of the Continuum of Conict,” NSI, October
2019, https://nsiteam.com/.
40 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Asymmetric Warfare in Space
superior strength, is to nd and exploit weaknesses. Moreover, the PRC’s history of
ideological conict with capitalism and Mao’s exhortations that “every Communist
and revolutionary should take up this [ideological] weapon” further underscore its
penchant to attack an adversary’s ideas, not just physical capabilities.
20
In that light,
space is as much an idea as it is a location.
Of course, there are physical laws and a distinct geography that dene space, but the
modern military use of space essentially distills to persistent or recurring overhead ac-
cess. e ability to overy countries at will is a signicant benet of space operations, but
the mechanism of access may come just as easily from nontraditional persistent over-
head capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or balloons as from orbital
assets. Space operations must consider more than the physical geography of space,
which enables targeting and overcoming the enemy’s advantages while nding innova-
tive ways to provide persistent overhead capabilities to one’s own forces.
is theory of attacking space as an idea rather than as a physical location is par-
ticularly useful for countries with relative weaknesses in space. Considering the idea
of space as persistent overhead access expands attack vectors beyond the physical ge-
ography of space and enables alternatives for countries without robust space capabili-
ties. For example, the United States is heavily reliant on space- based capabilities, but
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has an extremely small space-
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.
21
For the DPRK
and other countries with limited space capabilities like Iran, even a high- altitude nu-
clear detonation that destroys most of the satellites in LEO would have little eect on
their own minimal space capabilities.
Furthermore, nontraditional persistent overhead capabilities provide additional
asymmetric advantages, particularly in times of conict. In peacetime, satellites ying
outside the atmosphere enjoy legal protections not aorded to objects like balloons,
but the PRC has already demonstrated a willingness to out sovereignty issues with
high- altitude balloons.
22
Conict reduces the import of some legal considerations, and
although subject to considerations of international opinion and strategic escalation,
using balloons or UAVs to provide persistent overhead coverage in conict aords
secondary benets. e PRC demonstrated that even in peacetime, balloons may y
largely unhindered over 40 countries and ve continents.
23
When unconstrained by
peacetime rules, balloons could easily provide both theater coverage of a conict in
the Indo- Pacic as well as strategic overight of the American homeland.
Nontraditional persistent overhead capabilities also provide targeting, command,
and control complications to adversaries. While the United States shot down a Chinese
20. Mao, Quotations, 5891.
21. “Why Are North Korea’s Satellite Launches Controversial?,” Reuters, November 22, 2023, https://
www..reuters.com/.
22. Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese Balloon Had Tools to Collect Electronic Communi-
cations, U.S. Says,” New York Times, February 9, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/.
23. Wong and Barnes.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 41
balloon in February 2023, it used a h- generation ghter and advanced
heat- seeking missile to do so.
24
During a conict, the widespread use of balloons or
other aerial objects to augment or replace space services like ISR and communications
would dramatically increase adversary targeting requirements, particularly when cou-
pled with the use of dummies and decoys.
In a regional conict around Taiwan or the South China Sea, the additional aircra,
missiles, and personnel required to defend the American homeland from balloons
would be unavailable to participate in deployed operations. Conversely, balloons
launched on a westward trajectory from India or the Middle East could complicate
PRC air defense targeting solutions.
High- altitude balloons also split most countries’ space, air defense, and territorial/
homeland defense commands. In a 2023 congressional hearing, US Air Force General
B. Chance Saltzman jokingly underscored this in answer to a question on “near space”
balloons by referring to them as “far air.”
25
PRC organizations are similarly divided:
the PLA Strategic Support Force has space responsibilities, PLA Air Force has the re-
sponsibility for strategic air defenses, and the PLA maintains tactical air defenses.
26
As
a result, the widespread use of alternative persistent overhead assets will complicate a
country’s targeting calculus, even if these balloons carry no oensive capabilities or
countermeasures.
e use of high- altitude balloons or UAVs to provide traditionally space- based ser-
vices oers several additional advantages for spacefaring and nonspacefaring nations
alike. Because these assets are relatively closer to the Earth’s surface, signal strength is
signicantly stronger in accordance with the inverse square law. Similarly, due to the
increased proximity, electro- optical, infrared, or other imagery capabilities may be
more detailed than space- based imagery or will require less substantial equipment.
us, nontraditional overhead systems can provide advantages in communications
and ISR services.
Additionally, the physical location of balloons or high- altitude UAVs may improve
electronic attack capabilities. is is similarly true for communications jammers or
other electronic warfare options. Finally, adding defensive missile countermeasures
like ares and other electronic countermeasures will increase a balloon’s or UAV’s re-
silience and add further targeting complications for adversaries. is is particularly
true when swarms of balloons or UAVs with intermixed ISR, communications, jam-
ming, and dummy platforms clog a country’s airspace during a conict.
Balloons and UAVs are only two examples of the vulnerabilities and opportunities
that arise when decoupling space strategy exclusively from its geographic location.
24. Jim Garamone, “F-22 Safely Shoots Down Chinese Spy Balloon o South Carolina Coast,” US De-
partment of Defense (DoD), February 4, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/.
25. Sandra Erwin, “Space Force: We Expect to See ‘Interfering, Blinding’ of Satellites during Conict,”
SpaceNews, March 15, 2023, https://spacenews.com/.
26. Anthony Cordesman and Joseph Kendall, “China Military Organization and Reform” (working
dra, Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], August 1, 2016), https://csis- website- prod
.s3.amazonaws.com/.
42 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Asymmetric Warfare in Space
Challenging the idea of traditionally space- based services oers signicantly more
prospects to array asymmetric strengths against adversary weaknesses, both oen-
sively and for providing capabilities to terrestrial forces. Finally, although balloons and
UAVs are tested options available today, there are likely novel capabilities not yet de-
veloped or elded that may be even more eective.
Proposal 2. Space is the principal battleeld in space warfare, but space operations
are inseparable from terrestrial operations and objectives. Space warfare comprises
activities aecting and aected by the orbital, link, and ground segments, and should
contribute to achieving strategic goals.
Space operations predominantly occur in or aect space. Chinese military diction-
aries and strategic analyses consider space operations to be military actions occurring
primarily in space with the intent to seize, hold, and use command of space.
27
Ameri-
can military doctrine denes the space area of responsibility as altitudes equal to or
greater than 100 kilometers above mean sea level.
28
Both these denitions are helpful
in understanding the principal area of space operations along the competition con-
tinuum, but additional nuance is required to assess the full range of actions that occur
in, aect, and are aected by space.
Space operations are comprised of three principal segments: orbital, link, and
ground. e orbital segment includes assets in space, the link segment covers the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum used to communicate with and between satellites, and the
ground segment includes the terrestrial infrastructure used to control and communi-
cate with satellites.
29
Degrading any of these segments can compromise space- based
services and may achieve the tactical goal required for a specic operation.
Attacking dierent segments or combinations thereof may provide the most eec-
tive or accessible vector. Targeting the ground or link segments of an adversary’s space
system echoes Wang Jingze’s dictum to “besiege Wei to rescue Zhao,” by nding a
more convenient target to attain the desired eect.
30
e logistical cost of denying an
adversary space capability by destroying its ground infrastructure may be signicantly
lower than denying the same in space. Conversely, using nonkinetic space capabilities
to set more advantageous political conditions in competition carries far lower risk
than some terrestrial options. e skilled strategist must consider the full range of
27. Jiang Lianju and Wang Liwen, eds., In eir Own Words: Lectures on the Science of Space Operations
(Maxwell AFB, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, April 2013), https://www.airuniversity
.af.edu/.
28. Dickinson, Hearing; and Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14 (Washington, DC: Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Sta, April 10, 2018, incorporating change 1, October 26, 2020).
29. Brian Garino and Jane Gibson, “Chapter 21: Space System reats,” CSIS, September 2018, https://
aerospace.csis.org/.
30. Wang, irty-Six Strategems, 5.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 43
attack options in the objective military conditions, within which one directs the mili-
tary “drama full of color, power and grandeur.”
31
While occurring predominantly in space, military space operations are inseparable
from terrestrial operations and strategic goals. Space eects may intrinsically generate
strategic outcomes, but more oen, space is a tool that supports actions in other do-
mains. Space- enabled capabilities such as ISR, precision navigation and timing (PNT),
and communications aect forces’ ability to conduct operations.
32
Although one must eld oensive and defense capabilities to ensure space access
and control while denying the enemy the same, controlling space without providing
space- enabled services does not signicantly benet terrestrial or strategic objectives.
Just as air superiority is not the only requirement for strategic victory—which the
United States learned in Vietnam and Afghanistan—control of space alone does not
guarantee victory.
33
Unless and until the Earth is no longer the principal population
center for humanity, space operations must support strategic terrestrial objectives.
Proposal 3. It does not matter if an attack is kinetic or nonkinetic, as long as it
achieves the objective. Debris- generating kinetic kills have long- lasting consequences;
they should be anticipated. Nonkinetic kills provide exible escalatory options and
can work in concert with kinetic kills to achieve desired eects. Nonkinetic attacks
against the adversary’s mind may achieve desired eects as eciently as against
electromagnetic targets.
Nonkinetic options that generate space eects are at least as important as kinetic
capabilities. Because nonkinetic attacks generally do not create debris, their use
threshold is far lower. Reversible nonkinetic attacks like jamming and dazzling lasers
further lower the threshold for use. Strategists like Sun Tzu consider the conict con-
tinuum quite uidly, which resonates in modern PRC gray zone activities, so revers-
ible eects both help to improve one’s position in competition and leave an outlet for
foes to escape and save face.
34
Nonkinetic attacks may also facilitate kinetic attacks or deception operations. For
example, blinding space domain awareness satellites while executing a co- orbital, ki-
netic antisatellite attack greatly increases the attack’s chance of success. Similarly, a
temporary cyberattack that interrupts a reconnaissance satellite’s downlink may be
more eective than blatantly destroying the satellite in allowing naval forces to enter a
battlespace surreptitiously.
Traditional nonkinetic attacks span the electromagnetic spectrum, from radio
frequency jammers to lasers, but attacking an adversary’s mindset or partners can
be just as eective. SpaceX’s decision to limit Ukraine’s use of its services for military
31. Mao, Quotations, 5053.
32. Jiang and Wang, Lectures.
33. Giulio Douhet, e Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University
Press [AUP], 2019).
34. Sun Tzu, Art of War, 529; and Kuznar and Popp, “China’s Perception.”
44 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Asymmetric Warfare in Space
purposes during its conict with Russia demonstrates the usefulness of this
tenet.
35
SpaceX made this decision unilaterally, not under an adversary’s inuence,
but it demonstrates the power a country may wield if it can inuence a foreign com-
mercial provider or ally to curtail services.
In fact, because proliferated constellations such as Starlink are more resilient than
traditional architectures, generating eects against them through inuence may be
signicantly more cost eective than generating the same eect with jammers or other
oensive capabilities.
36
Generating nonkinetic eects by inuencing an adversary’s
allies or commercial providers may be particularly eective for countries who rely on
ground segment stations located abroad. is is a direct corollary to the irty- Six
Stratagems advice on spies, to “undermine the enemy’s ability to ght by secretly caus-
ing discord between him, his friends, [and] allies.”
37
Proposal 4. Space operations are strategic in nature and can have a strong deter-
rent eect. To deter eectively, the enemy must fear one’s capabilities prior to a
conict. During a conict, space should be used aggressively to retaliate and achieve
a favorable operational situation.
Both the United States and the PRC emphasize deterring conict as a key task for
their militaries and as preferable to open warfare.
38
Space can act as a key contributor
to deterrence, including deterring the tactical use of counterspace capabilities, as well
as supporting nuclear strategic deterrence. PRC discussions underscore not only this
use of space as a contributor to holistic strategic deterrence, but also the use of some
space capabilities that require a lower threshold than nuclear deterrents, providing
exibility in deterrent options.
39
A comprehensive discussion of space’s role in strate-
gic deterrence and deterrence theory is beyond the scope of this article, but a brief
overview of several key space deterrence themes is provided.
Deterrence requires the use of threats in one or multiple domains to dissuade a tar-
get from taking actions that change the status quo.
40
A key component of this under-
standing is that deterrence requires forcing an adversary to do (or refrain from doing)
an action, not just inuencing an adversary’s thought. For example, many Imperial
Japanese military leaders—including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto—believed attack-
ing the United States to be an unwinnable strategy, but this did not deter their actions
35. James FitzGerald, “Ukraine War: Elon Musk’s SpaceX Firm Bars Kyiv from Using Starlink Tech for
Drone Control,” BBC News, February 9, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/.
36. Greg Hadley, “Proliferated Architecture Necessary for Future Satellite Communications,” Air &
Space Forces Magazine, January 7, 2022, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/.
37. Wang, irty-Six Strategems, 36.
38. Lloyd J. Austin III, 2022 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: DoD, October 27, 2022),
https://media.defense.gov/; and M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).
39. Jiang and Wang, Lectures.
40. Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, Cross- Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 2.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 45
in December 1941.
41
Consequently, eective deterrence requires that the adversary
fear the capabilities and actions they would face in a conict to the extent that they are
unwilling to begin a war at all or at minimum refrain from undesired actions. is can
help achieve Sun Tzu’s dictum to “subdue the enemy’s troops without ghting.”
42
A key component to managing adversaries’ trepidation of friendly capabilities is
ensuring that they both understand some threats arrayed before them and fear the
still- unknown secret capabilities. Striking a balance between revealing one’s capabili-
ties to ensure an adversary knows of their existence while maintaining secrecy and
preventing the development of countermeasures is crucial. An adversary cannot fear
an unknown capability, but some weapons or tactics may only be eective for their
rst use. It is seldom advantageous to disclose capabilities for which the adversary can
easily develop countermeasures, or whose value derives from its surprise.
Similarly, disclosing capabilities that adversaries can easily duplicate, particularly
given the PRC’s penchant for reengineering, is unwise. Conversely, weapons that the
adversary already possesses, weapons for which there are no easy countermeasures, or
a willingness to use attacks in other domains to counter space aggression are useful
disclosures for deterrence.
Many space operations are inherently strategic in nature, and space capabilities can
signicantly contribute to strategic deterrence. While nuclear weapons are the ulti-
mate strategic deterrent, space plays an essential enabling role. Satellites are a critical
component of nuclear command, control, and communications, and the United States
heavily leverages space- based ISR architectures to provide rst warning of nuclear
launches.
43
Nuclear- tipped ballistic missiles transit through space, and space- based
threats to terrestrial targets such as space planes or fractional orbital bombardment
systems can challenge traditional missile warning and defense architectures.
44
Additionally, modern reliance in some countries on space- based capabilities such
as communications and PNT services provides an opportunity for generating dra-
matic strategic eects across an adversary’s entire population. PRC literature also dis-
cusses space’s opportunity to restrain the outbreak of war or escalation thereof by “dis-
playing necessary space strategic strengths that have deterrence as their goal.”
45
Putting aside concerns for destabilization, consider the deterrent eect to a techno-
logically advanced country preparing for an immediate military campaign if its entire
country suered even a 60-second simultaneous loss of PNT, access to nuclear com-
mand and control satellites, and a space- based ISR blackout. Even a brief interruption
of some of these capabilities may force a country to reconsider oensive operations.
41. Ian W. Toll, Pacic Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacic, 1941–1942 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012).
42. Sun Tzu, Art of War, 170.
43. Marie Villareal Dean, “Space- Based Nuclear Command and Control: A Guide,” CSIS, January 13,
2023, http://aerospace.csis.org/.
44. Dickinson, Hearing.
45. Jiang and Wang, Lectures, 58.
46 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Asymmetric Warfare in Space
Space also provides opportunities to deter attacks against one’s own space assets
and targets for cross- domain deterrence. e threat of facing counterspace weapons
may be enough to deter an adversary from using one, and immediate retribution in
kind may deter further space attacks. Depending on the scale of the conict, a country
may also be able to deter counterspace weapons employment by threatening its ter-
restrial launch or command and control locations with cyberattacks or conventional
munitions. PRC maritime militia gray zone activities demonstrate a parallel willing-
ness to use this type of cross- domain deterrence strategy in other domains.
46
Additionally, PRC thinking on integrated strategic deterrence stresses that some
options are better deployed and coordinated across domains, either challenging the
ground and link segments or by threatening retaliation in other domains entirely.
47
Finally, denying adversary space capabilities provides an option for exible escalation
and deterrence of further aggression. A country may be unwilling or unable to pros-
ecute a war if faced with a denial of space services and capabilities.
Even during conict, oensive and defensive space operations may still be limited
in time or scope, but striving for space superiority maximizes one’s own capabilities
and limits an adversary’s freedom to operate.
48
Used in concert with other capabilities,
local space superiority, enough to control the right terrain for a few hours or minutes,
may be sucient to achieve strategic goals. While the Taiwan Strait is only 97 nautical
miles wide, it takes days for the United States to move aircra carriers into theater if
not already forward deployed.
49
Consequently, if the PRC can deny American space-
based ISR and communications for several hours, that may be enough to prevent easy
American intervention in a Taiwan invasion. Conversely, if the United States can de-
ceive China’s ISR satellites for several hours, it may enable sucient force redeploy-
ment from bases like Korea or Guam to cripple a PRC invasion eet.
Just as nuclear powers may still ght conventional wars, the scope and scale of a
conict may still limit the use of kinetic weapons that generate debris and threaten the
tenability of the environment. Yet a maximal use of nonkinetic options to generate
reversible and nonreversible space eects during conict is critical to mitigating an
adversary’s technological advantages while maximizing one’s own. Finally, in the face
of degraded technological weapons, a country’s asymmetric advantage in this way
may not be ghting under “informationized” conditions leveraging the totality of
modern technology, but rather may be one’s ability to employ analog weapons to
achieve strategic objectives instead of focusing on restoring degraded technologies.
50
46. Erickson and Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia.”
47. Lindsay and Gartzke, Cross- Domain Deterrence.
48. Cheng, “Evolving Chinese inking.”
49. Joseph W. Lisenby Jr., “Repelling a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: A Space, Forces, Time Dilemma for
United States Pacic Command” (research paper, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2001).
50. “China’s National Defense in 2010,” Ministry of National Defense, March 2011, http://eng.mod
.gov.cn/.
Suss
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 47
Proposal 5. Space has its own key terrain that must be seized and held to achieve
space dominance.
Although space is immense, there are key areas and points that are particularly ad-
vantageous for military use. As with terrestrial terrain features, occupying a key space
location can convey advantages for the operator and simultaneously deny those to an
adversary. ese features include orbits like LEO, sun- synchronous orbit, and geosyn-
chronous Earth orbit (GEO); Lagrange points; the Moon; and even terrestrial terrain
that enables space operations.
LEO and GEO are increasingly crowded orbits with distinct uses. LEO is relatively
close to Earth, enabling higher signal strengths, lower latency, better imaging resolu-
tion, and reduced li costs. e lower altitude reduces launch costs, which makes pro-
liferated architectures more cost ecient. Moreover, the proximity makes LEO opti-
mal for ISR satellites and even some communications payloads. At 35,786 kilometers
altitude above Earth’s equator, GEO is signicantly farther than LEO, but satellites in
GEO match Earth’s rotational period and essentially hover over the same position on
Earth’s surface. is distinct advantage provides benets for communications satellites
and some ISR satellites and confers a larger aperture than LEO satellites. Although a
larger expanse than LEO, the relatively narrow GEO belt provides precious few loca-
tions for a growing quantity of satellites.
Figure 1. GEO congestion
51
Both Chinese and American strategic space thought emphasize the need to seize
space superiority, which includes maintaining freedom of action in critical orbits.
52
Maximizing one’s own use of these orbits is benecial, but denying adversary use
when needed is equally important. Such denial may range from temporarily disabling
satellite relay communications to creating widespread kinetic damage.
Because of the challenges associated with launching more satellites, particularly if
an orbit is full of debris, space superiority may dier from superiority in other do-
mains. Contemporary Chinese space strategists emphasize that space superiority
51. Image Credit: “Artist’s Interpretation of Space Debris Orbiting Earth,” Catherine Smith.
52. Jiang and Wang, Lectures; and Raymond, Spacepower.
48 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Asymmetric Warfare in Space
includes the use of space and ability to deny adversaries the same, but it may be local
or temporary in nature.
53
is diers somewhat from other domains, for in space, a
country may achieve superiority simply by preventing others from using space with
counterspace weapons employed from other domains, while maintaining only a small
presence in the domain.
Lagrange points, which allow a spacecra to remain relatively stationary due to
gravitational eects, will become critical enablers for space operations as countries
move into cislunar space, to the Moon, and beyond. e PRC has already used a relay
satellite at Earth- Moon Lagrange 2, a point on the far side of the Moon, to facilitate a
lunar probe landing.
54
Additionally, Earth- Moon Lagrange 1, a point between Earth
and the Moon, has applications for space domain awareness looking back toward
Earth’s orbits.
Similar to the gravitational constraints of GEO, Lagrange points constitute a dis-
crete, precise location whose control may greatly facilitate attaining space superiority.
While not as proliferated as traditional Earth orbits, these points may acquire in-
creased value for space operations and become a point of contention for military space
competition. is is similarly true of the Moon, where the PRC and Russia agreed to
develop a joint lunar base.
55
Beyond the Moon’s economic and mineral implications,
control of the Moon and supporting Lagrange points may be space’s contested high
ground in coming years.
Space operations also require key terrestrial terrain, which makes this geography a
prime target to control. Spaceport locations can oer key advantages in orbit inclina-
tion, weather, and population proximity, so guaranteed launch access is an important
component of attaining space superiority.
56
Similarly, ground segment control stations
play a key role in space operations. Depending on the orbit and satellite’s purpose,
multiple ground stations or relays in both hemispheres may be critical for timely links,
control latency, and domain awareness. If using balloons or high- altitude UAVs to
provide persistent overhead capabilities, launch locations that can exploit jet streams,
trade winds, and winds alo are critical. Finally, all these terrestrial locations become
potential attack locations that aect space operations without the need to attack the
orbital segment.
Conclusion
Although space strategies may not heed each of these recommendations, sound mili-
tary planning will consider their implications. Conict in space is an emerging domain
53. Jiang and Wang.
54. Kristin Burke, “What Is China Doing at the Lunar Distant Retrograde Orbit?” (Maxwell AFB, AL:
China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, March 2022), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
55. Namrata Goswami, “e Strategic Implications of the China- Russia Lunar Base Cooperation
Agreement,” Diplomat, March 20, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/.
56. omas Roberts, Spaceports of the World (Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2019), https://www.re-
searchgate.net/.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 49
of military strategy, and rst contact in space will rely heavily on innovative solutions to
new dilemmas. Consequently, considering these perspectives from Chinese strategic
thought in the construction of space strategy broadens perspectives and improves dura-
bility in case of conict.
Conict in, through, and from space will require militaries to challenge traditional
concepts, attack enemy weak points to deny space benets, and nd new ways to pro-
vide services in a degraded environment. Space capabilities and the potential for space
conict are vital components of achieving national and terrestrial objectives. Space is
the ultimate high ground, but it must be one of many tools used in concert to achieve
strategic objectives.
Conict in space will likely rely on temporary and local space superiority, but one
only needs to achieve that superiority at the appropriate time and place to secure vic-
tory. Space combat may be temporary and reversible—for example, just enough to
blind ISR satellites during an invasion of Taiwan—or it may be the ultimate deterrent
to military operations. Regardless of the endeavor, success in space will require cun-
ning and ingenuity to outthink and outmaneuver one’s opponents.
is article provides only a brief, selected discussion of space within the context of
historical and modern Chinese military strategy, but additional study is needed to
continue developing a comprehensive space strategy. Additional research on coopera-
tion with Allies and partners, secrecy and deception, and developing space human
capital will benet space strategists. Moreover, an analysis comparing this with West-
ern strategic thinking and space doctrine based on Clausewitz’s theories would be
useful as well. e space domain’s importance is growing, so the demand for space
strategy and capabilities will only increase. Æ
50 ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER
Spacepower and Strategy
US COMMERCIAL
AUGMENTATION
SPACE RESERVE
Integrating Commercial
Capabilities for a Resilient and
Flexible Space Architecture
Gary l. DaveNporT
e recently announced Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve program, based on the
long- standing Civil Reserve Air Fleet, provides a mechanism by which the United States
can leverage the commercial space industry in support of military space security concerns.
As Congress considers funding the program, key lessons from the structure and imple-
mentation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet will bolster commercial interest in the program
and ensure its success in future conicts.
T
he character of space warfare is changing.
1
In 2022, the Russian war in
Ukraine revealed just how inuential the space domain is in war. Incredibly,
commercial actors, not states, appeared to provide the most impactful space
services to Ukraine at the start of the war. SpaceX’s Starlink enabled Ukrainian leader-
ship to not only communicate with its elded military forces but also continue its stra-
tegic messaging to the outside world to garner support.
2
Earth imagery companies
Planet and Maxar delivered near real- time intelligence detailing the order of battle
and battle damage assessments.
3
In a future conict, the United States can leverage its commercial industry to
quickly and eectively bolster or surge the national security space architecture. To ac-
complish this, the United States should model civilian- military cooperation in the
Major Gary Davenport, USSF, is an instructor of political science at the US Air Force Academy, where he serves
as research fellow for the Institute for Future Conflict and deputy director for the Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies.
1. ank you to Gregory Johnson and Giles “David” Arceneaux of the Institute for Future Conict,
and Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Smith of the US Air Force Academy, Department of Political Science, for
feedback on this project.
2. Kurt Vinion, “How Elon Musk’s Starlink Became Invaluable to Ukraine’s War Eort,” Radio Free
Europe, Radio Liberty, October 20, 2022, https://www.rferl.org/.
3. “Satellite Images Show More Russian Military Deployments in Eastern Ukraine,” Axios, April 13,
2022, https://www.axios.com/; and Mariel Borowitz, “e War in Ukraine Shows How Important Private
Satellite Companies Have Become—Especially in Times of Conict,” SatNews, August 16, 2022, https://
news.satnews.com/.
Davenport
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 51
space domain aer the air domain’s Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) framework. Lever-
aging the commercial industry enables the United States to become exible and
adaptable to evolving technologies, operational requirements, and commercial oer-
ings.
4
is eort aligns with the 2020 Defense Space Strategy, which states, “DoD will
develop an agile space enterprise that can take advantage of emerging technological
and commercial innovation in order to continually outpace adversaries’ threats.”
5
Space is more than a warghting domain. It is a strategic location, oering the
United States exploration, prestige, and wealth. As US commercial companies seek the
resources of the space domain, it is the duty of the US military to protect them.
6
e
CRAF model, which has proven successful in the air domain, would be well suited for
the space domain. Specically, certain aspects of the CRAF model are applicable to the
space domain and will provide resilience and increased capacity for the United States’
national security space architecture.
History has taught us that eventually, war is probable. In 2015, Harvard professor
Graham Allison stated that the odds of the United States and China going to war were
“much more likely than recognized at the moment.”
7
is sentiment has caused the
United States to shi its focus from the Middle East and once again prioritize great
power competition. Future conict between the United States and China will include
the space domain. To prepare for and deter conict through and in the space domain,
the United States needs a resilient and exible space architecture.
Terms of Reference
For the purposes of this article, a reserve eet consists of aircra or spacecra that
are fully or partially functional and equipped for service but not currently needed for
military operations. ese assets may already be in the eld or in a standby mode until
called upon. Once activated, the reserve eets complement existing organic military
capabilities. Commercial assets are operated by commercial operators who agree to
take tasking orders from US Transportation Command or US Space Command.
Increased capacity, sometimes referred to as exibility, provides a surge capability
of supplementary assets in times of humanitarian disaster, crisis, or conict. ese
may include ground- based sites, launch vehicles, air- based assets, or space- based as-
sets. Resilience is dened as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing condi-
tions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption.” It also “includes the ability
to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring
4. “RFI/Sources Sought Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR) Framework,” SAM.gov,
accessed August 14, 2023, https://sam.gov/.
5. Defense Space Strategy Summary (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DoD], June 2020), 7,
https://media.defense.gov/.
6. Namrata Goswami and Peter A. Garretson, Scramble for the Skies: e Great Power Competition to
Control the Resources of Outer Space (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020), 47.
7. Graham Allison, “e ucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?,” Atlantic, Septem-
ber 24, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/.
52 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
threats or incidences.”
8
Space architecture resilience or mission assurance can be
achieved by resisting attacks with defensive operations, surviving attacks with on-
board protection, and the reconstituting of assets aer an attack.
9
As an example,
Planet, a remote sensing company, achieves resiliency through its disaggregated sys-
tems in case of a failure.
10
In wartime, having resilience makes adversaries’ decision-
making processes more challenging.
The Military Space Domain
e space domain has been militarized since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in
1957, and although it was nothing more than a transponder, Sputnik struck fear into
the hearts of the American people as it demonstrated the ability to deliver Soviet capa-
bilities to anywhere in the world.
11
By 1967, more than 100 countries signed the Outer
Space Treaty to prevent the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction into outer space.
12
Space had become a domain that could no longer be
ignored, and countries started to discover how to use the ultimate high ground to cre-
ate a security advantage.
In 1991, the US military leveraged GPS, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR), and satellite communications (SATCOM) to outmaneuver Iraqi forces in
what has been referred to as the rst space war.
13
While space warfare arguably had
been conducted as early as the Cold War, Operation Desert Storm demonstrated how
the use of space capabilities acted as a force multiplier and thereby cemented the
United States’ reliance on space for military operations. US and Allied forces now turn
to space to support Joint warghting functions. Space capabilities support the Joint
warghter in the air, land, and sea domains, as well as protect and defend space from
both kinetic and nonkinetic hostile actions. If space assets are attacked and degraded,
ground forces will lose the force multiplier eects nominally provided.
Over the last 25 years, despite America’s desire to keep space a benign domain, ci-
vilian and military leaders have increasingly recognized space as a warghting
8. United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Terms (A Non-ocial Guide
to Department Dictionaries and Other Terminology Sources) (Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Interorgani-
zational Clearinghouse, November 2019), 834, https://www.jcs.mil/.
9. Space Domain Mission Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy (Washington, DC: Oce of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, September 2015), https://man.fas.org/.
10. Brad Townsend, Security and Stability in the New Space Age: e Orbital Security Dilemma (New
York: Routledge, 2020), 158.
11. Paul Dickens, Sputnik: e Shock of the Century (Chicago: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019).
12. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), December 19, 1966, UN Res 2222
(XXI), https://www.unoosa.org/.
13. Larry Greenemeier, “GPS and the World’s First ‘Space War,’ ” SciAm [Scientic American], February 8,
2016, https://www.scienticamerican.com/; and B. Chance Saltzman, “Remembering the First ‘Space War’: A
Discussion with Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman,” interview by Frank A. Rose, Brookings, March 19, 2021, You-
Tube video, 1:00:28, https://www.brookings.edu/.
Davenport
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 53
domain. In 1997, Air Force Chief of Sta General Ronald Fogleman rst described the
need for an air and space service.
14
In its 2001 report, the Rumsfeld Space Commis-
sion pushed even further and advocated for a separate Space Corps and eventually a
Space Department.
15
e Trump administration and Congress turned the latest page
by creating the US Space Force in 2019.
16
e Obama, Trump, and Biden administra-
tions have emphasized space exploration and policy development that enable the bur-
geoning US commercial space sector to compete internationally.
17
Space Force doc-
trine also emphasizes the need for unity of action and commercial space integration.
18
Yet despite advances in policy and organizational structure, the space architecture it-
self is long overdue for modernization.
e current US military space architecture is made up of outdated, large, relatively
immobile, and bespoke systems. e dated nature of these systems creates a risk for a
wide range of military activities, including space command and control, intelligence col-
lection and dissemination, and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3).
e commercial space sector is proving to be more adaptable to emerging technologies
and has surpassed the US government in its number of capabilities in what used to be a
civil- and military- dominated domain. e growing commercial space industry saw
$427.6 billion in revenue in 2022, up from $396.2 billion the year before.
19
In July 2023, the US Space Force identied the shortcomings in its own organic
capabilities, and aer consulting with industry, introduced a new concept known as
the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR) program.
20
is program is
modeled aer the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program, a cooperative and voluntary part-
nership between US airlines and the Department of Defense to augment military
14. Hearing on the Fiscal Year 1998 Department of Defense Authorization Request, House National Se-
curity Committee, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement from General Ronald R. Fogleman, chief of sta of the
Air Force), March 5, 1997, accessed August 14, 2023, https://irp.fas.org/.
15. Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Re-
port to the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization
(Washington, DC: Oce of the Secretary of Defense, January 11, 2001), 81, https://aerospace.csis.org/.
16. Christina Wilkie, “Trump Floats the Idea of Creating a ‘Space Force’ to Fight Wars in Space,”
CNBC, March 13, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/; and Elizabeth Howell, “Trump Launches US Space Com-
mand to Control the Warghting Domain,” Space.com, August 30, 2019, https://www.space.com/.
17. Barack Obama, National Space Policy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White
House, June 28, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/; Donald J. Trump, National Space Policy of
the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, December 9, 2020), https://trumpwhite
house.archives.gov/; and Joseph R. Biden, Jr., National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House,
October 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
18. John W. Raymond, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, Space Capstone Publication (Washing-
ton, DC: USSF, June 2020), 14, https://www.spaceforce.mil/.
19. Loren Grush, Tyler Kendall, and Bloomberg, “e Commercial Space Industry, Led by Elon Musk’s
SpaceX, Is Expected to Blast O with 41% Growth over the Next 5 Years,” Fortune, July 24, 2023, https://
fortune.com/.
20. “RFI/Sources.”
54 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
aircra capability during a national defense- related crisis. In return carriers are given
preference in handling commercial peacetime military cargo and passenger trac.
21
e commercial space age has arrived, and according to Heidi Shyu, under secre-
tary of defense for research and engineering, the United States must leverage the in-
novative commercial space industry.
22
Commercial companies’ programs are less
likely to become technologically obsolete compared with government programs. Pro-
liferated low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellations exemplify how commercial companies
are creating a network of on- orbit processing and battleeld management exibility.
Market competition, supported through sound regulation, will likely cause more fre-
quent innovative reinvestment in the commercial sector than the government sector.
Unlike the Department of Defense, private industry constantly invests to keep its
value in the market and maintain its competitiveness.
23
History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
For over 70 years, the Air Force has maintained a successful partnership with the
commercial air industry for the air domain. Since the establishment of the CRAF in
1951, the Air Force has benetted from additional capacity through the US airline in-
dustry.
24
is program has allowed the Air Force to surge its air eet capacity in times
of crisis. While not delivering combat forces directly into hot zones, the additional
CRAF aircra y sorties in relative safety, disencumbering military aircra and en-
abling them to y into combat situations. e CRAF model is only implemented in
extreme situations where the government cannot pull together sucient resources to
save lives. It is intended to be only short term. e US military is still required to be
combat ready for wartime events such as Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation
Desert Shield.
CRAF operates in three stages, with activation limited to stages I and II thus far.
Stage I covers minor regional crises, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief op-
erations, while stage II covers major theater wars. Stage III, which has not been acti-
vated to date, covers national mobilization.
25
By activating these stages, the US
21. “Civil Reserve Aireet,” US Department of Transportation, accessed September 18, 2023, https://
www.transportation.gov/; and David Graham, Sustaining the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program
(Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 2003), 6, https://apps.dtic.mil/.
22. Matthew Weinzierl and Mehak Sarang, “e Commercial Space Age Is Here,” Harvard Business
Review, February 12, 2021, https://hbr.org/; and Jaspreet Gill, “DoD Launches New ‘Eort’ to Rapidly
Adopt Commercial Space Capabilities,” Breaking Defense, April 18, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/.
23. Clayton M. Christensen, e Innovator’s Dilemma: e Revolutionary Book at Will Change the
Way You Do Business, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
24. “Civil Reserve Aireet.”
25. “Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” USAF (website), accessed February 22, 2023, https://www.af.mil/; and
David C. Arnold and Peter L. Hays, “SpaceCRAF: A Civil Reserve Air Fleet for Space- Based Capabilities,”
Joint Forces Quarterly 64 (2012).
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 55
Transportation Command commander gains the exibility to surge and respond
quickly to emergencies.
26
e rst call up of CRAF, utilizing stages I and II during the Persian Gulf War, not
only showcased the eectiveness and importance of the program but also brought to
light certain shortcomings.
27
Commercial airlines were responsible for transporting
67 percent of troops and 25 percent of air cargo to the Gulf during the conict. In the
aermath, the airlines successfully redeployed 85 percent of troops and 42 percent of
air cargo.
28
CRAF was activated for a second time during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and an
informal survey of CRAF participants indicated positive outcomes from the program’s
implementation.
29
e second activation was also limited to stages I and II. Stage I
was activated for the third time on August 22, 2021, for the evacuation of Afghan ref-
ugees as it was considered a humanitarian crisis.
30
ese three implementations prove the eectiveness of a reserve eet model and
represent how this could be advantageous if executed in the space domain. e space
domain is the largest of all the domains and yet the Space Force is the smallest of the
US armed services. e number of resilient forces required to not only protect and
defend orbital assets but also provide eects to Joint warghters is beyond the capacity
of the US government.
A Framework for Space
Advancements in space technology and increased military dependence on com-
mercial space capabilities have created operational vulnerabilities that policy has yet
to address. ese vulnerabilities exist in the launch, space, and ground segments. e
process by which the US government calls upon the space commercial sector to sup-
port its national security interests is as ad hoc and inecient as those used at the be-
ginning of the Global War on Terror. Yet, unrealized opportunities to quickly increase
space resiliency and capacity exist amid these vulnerabilities. By utilizing commercial
assets, a reserve eet can oer needed resiliency and capacity to military forces.
As proven in the Berlin Airli, there are many logistical challenges that must be
addressed to produce the desired results of integrating commercial and organic
26. John A. Tirpak, “CRAF for the Future,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, December 22, 2014, https://
www.airandspaceforces.com/.
27. “Department of Defense Activates Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” press release, DoD, August 22, 2021,
https://www.defense.gov; and Heidi M. Peters, “Afghanistan Evacuation: e Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) and the Defense Production Act (DPA),” Insight 11731 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, August 25, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/.
28. Graham, Sustaining, 6.
29. Graham.
30. Peters, “Afghanistan Evacuation,” 2; “DoD Activates”; and Dave Mistich “e Pentagon Is Calling
on 6 U.S. Airlines to Help with the Afghan Evacuation Eort,” National Publilc Radio, August 22, 2021,
https://www.npr.org/.
56 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
military capabilities.
31
e key sectors in the commercial space industry are launch
services, the space- based sector, and the ground- based sector, and each can be used to
augment military capability to increase capacity and resiliency. Similar to the airli
sector, the launch—spaceli—sector moves people and cargo. e space- based sector
includes satellite communications, space domain awareness, and orbital servicing ve-
hicles. e ground- based sector includes command and control sites and ground-
based telescopes. For this article, the ground sector includes the electromagnetic links
needed to operate satellites. Each of these sectors, although separate and unique, can
contribute to a CASR program.
CASR: Improving Resiliency
A commercial space reserve would enhance the US national space security archi-
tecture by oering improved resilience and increased capacity. is would be accom-
plished by using disaggregated constellations, which are most common in innovative
commercial applications. is approach goes further than purchasing additional com-
mercial services, which aligns with the chief of space operation’s interest in distrib-
uted, lower cost, commercial- type satellites to disaggregate critical systems.
32
Com-
mercial space reserve eets can oer a swi backup capability to the legacy systems
oen operated by the US military and Intelligence Community.
Launch Sector
CASR will create a resilient launch architecture capable of delivering military and
civilian satellites to orbit during times of crisis. Currently, the United States relies
heavily on launch service vehicles, such as SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and the United Launch
Alliance’s (ULA) Atlas V and Delta IV rockets. Yet if one of these launch vehicles were
to experience a failure or capacity constraint, such as that which occurred while trying
to resupply the International Space Station in 2022, the Space Force’s ability to launch
critical payloads into space could be severely impacted.
33
In a time of war, the United
States’ space resiliency will suer due to its incapability to reconstitute space assets.
To overcome this challenge, CASR allows the United States to quickly tap into a
larger pool of alternative launch services by including additional commercial space
transportation providers. Pre- arranged contracts with launch providers will reduce
logistical issues and time frames, thereby increasing the resiliency of both the spaceli
and space- based sectors. e space- based sector requires launch services to be resil-
ient, as the launch sector is responsible for reconstituting the space- based sector. A US
31. Graham, Sustaining, 26; eodore Joseph Crackel, A History of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (Wash-
ington, DC: Air Force History & Museum Program, 1998); and Peters, “Afghanistan Evacuation.”
32. Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Nominee Sees Growing reats to U.S. Satellites from Rival Powers,”
SpaceNews, September 13, 2022, https://spacenews.com/.
33. Stephen Clark, “Supply Chain Issues Delay Northrop Grumman’s Next Space Station Cargo Flight,”
Spaceight Now, July 19, 2022. https://spaceightnow.com/.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 57
Space Force payload could supersede any pending commercial payload and launch
more quickly once CASR is initiated.
Space Sector
Orbital service vehicles are a growing commercial industry. Under CASR these ve-
hicles would remove debris, refuel, and repair critical military satellites that are not
fully mission capable. Companies like Astro Scale, Northrup Grumman, and Starsh
Space are already hard at work developing and launching the rst orbital service ve-
hicle prototypes. ese evolving technologies will eventually lead to capabilities the
United States will rely upon for removing debris from orbit or providing satellite life
extensions, thereby enhancing resiliency.
34
In a situation that requires dangerous de-
bris to be removed, CASR could be activated more quickly than a traditional service
contract and preempt other paying customers in support of national security. is is
like CRAF, where aircra are called up in short order, interrupting regularly scheduled
services and redirecting assets to support a military operation.
CASR: Improving Capacity
Moving beyond resiliency, increased capacity is the second way national security
architecture is enhanced by a space reserve. A commercial space reserve eet provides
surge capacity to support US space objectives. For example, a commercial reserve eet
could provide exibility if the United States wanted to quickly expand its space pres-
ence or respond to emerging threats in space. is is dierent than adding a regular
commercial contract service. e CASR program will shorten the timeline needed to
mobilize assets, strengthen plans and wargames with expected available forces, and
solidify the authorities required to act in a crisis or conict.
e secretary of defense grants the US Transportation Command commander the
authority to activate CRAF in times of crisis. Similarly, the US Space Command com-
mander can be granted the authority to activate CASR. is gives the US military the
capability to quickly mobilize its commercial reserve eets to conduct military- related
missions without having to rely solely on legacy government vehicles or begin the
lengthy process of creating a new contract with a commercial partner and determin-
ing how to integrate the commercial assets.
Furthermore, technology in the space industry evolves rapidly, and spacecra or
satellite designs become outdated relatively quickly. Many of the operational military
satellites are decades- old. e legacy MILSTAR (Military Strategic and Tactical Relay)
program is the nuclear hardened, NC3 satellite constellation and was launched in the
34. SpaceLogistics, “Mission Extension Pod,” Northrop Grumman (website), accessed February 27,
2023, https://www.northropgrumman.com/; “ADRAS- J,” Astrocale (website), accessed February 27, 2023,
https://astroscale.com/; and “Otter is ere, On Call and Ready to Support,” Starsh Space (website), accessed
February 27, 2023, https://www.starshspace.com/.
58 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
1990s.
35
It is made up of only ve large satellites with xed positions in geosynchro-
nous orbit. A commercial reserve eet adds exibility in times of crisis as it is regu-
larly updated or upgraded without the need for additional government acquisitions.
e United States has been leveraging commercial satellite communications for
decades, but CASR would provide the means through which this could be done more
successfully. During the height of the Global War on Terror, the United States deter-
mined it required more bandwidth than was organically available to eectively ght
terrorism. e commercial industry provided the military with the surge capacity
needed, but the ad hoc approach created ineciencies that were avoidable. According
to a 2011 Government Accounting Oce report, the Department of Defense spent
over $1 billion on increased capacity by leasing commercial satellite communications
bandwidth.
36
e report showed the Department was fragmented and inecient in its
approach to sourcing satellite communications.
In a 2014 report, the Department of Defense found the average cost of commercial
satellite communication services not bought through the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA) was about 16 percent higher than those purchased through DISA.
37
Similar to how all DoD air travel must take place on CRAF- participating airlines, all
future commercial satellite communication for the Defense Department would be
purchased from participating CASR companies. CASR provides a solution to these
ineciencies as all commercial satellite communications will be coordinated, pur-
chased, and managed by a single government entity.
Today, satellite communication providers such as ViaSat, Amazon’s Kuiper System,
and SpaceX’s Starlink and Starshield are principal communication providers with
more bandwidth than the Department of Defense. As the United States faces attrition
of its organic satellite communications capabilities during a conict, the providers that
agree to participate in the reserve eet model will furnish reserve capacity. Addition-
ally, commercial companies would be allowed to use the additional capacity until the
reserve eet is activated. As a bonus to US national security, the communication pro-
viders could be called upon to deny service to adversaries of the United States.
Moreover, this surge capability enhanced with modern commercial technology
sends an important strategic message. By activating and calling up the space reserve in
a time of conict, the United States communicates to the entire world that it is mobi-
lizing its forces and bringing a larger force to bear. is capability of strategic messag-
ing provides a range of benets, including increased clarity, improved understanding,
enhanced persuasiveness, increased engagement, and improved outcomes. By eec-
tively communicating a message in a way that resonates with the target audience, stra-
tegic messaging can help to achieve US goals and objectives. In short, without ring a
35. “Enhanced Polar System,” Northrop Grumman (website), accessed August 14, 2023, https://www
.northropgrumman.com/
36. “Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to Improve Procure-
ments,” GAO [US Government Accountability Oce], July 17, 2015, https://www.gao.gov/.
37. “Defense Satellite Communications.”
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shot, the United States may be able to achieve its objective or prevent an adversary
from achieving theirs.
Challenges to CRAF and Implications for CASR
While the CASR program is modeled aer the successful CRAF program, it must
incorporate the lessons learned from CRAF operations in the air domain to yield
positive results for US space architecture. Aspects of the CRAF framework may be
challenging to transfer to the space domain, including the physics of the domain
itself, dierences in industry sectors between the air and space domains, and pro-
grammatic challenges.
Domain Physics
In the air domain, commercial aircra do not need to operate in contested areas,
and crews avoid the risk of being shot down. In contrast, satellites must overy con-
tested environments due to orbital mechanics, which puts them at risk if they are sup-
porting military operations.
Industry Sectors
e next challenge in transferring this framework to CASR is the additional indus-
try sectors that are notably dierent from the CRAF program. As mentioned, the
space domain has three distinct industry sectors instead of the one transportation sec-
tor of the air domain: launch, space, and ground. e concept of operations, rules of
engagement, and other details on how resources will be allocated—including band-
width, radio frequency bands, and geographical region—will depend on the sector
and technology type, and will require further study.
Programmatic Challenges
While the CRAF program has been a success in providing US Transportation
Command with additional capacity in times of need, three program management
challenges have emerged that have possible implications for CASR. ese challenges
include the initial failure to implement the program incentives eectively, an overreli-
ance on the commercial airlines for forward deployment, and the investment by com-
mercial industry in the wrong type of aircra.
Incentives. e rst challenge to CRAF came as many military members were not
using the prenegotiated airlines.
38
e CRAF program was designed to entice com-
mercial airlines by oering preference in providing cargo and passenger services for
the Department of Defense.
39
DoD employees use the City Pairs Program, a perk en-
joyed by CRAF airline participants, which confers preferred status to the airlines for
38. Graham, Sustaining, 30, A-33–A-34.
39. Peters, “Afghanistan Evacuation,” 1.
60 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
government travel, resulting in monetary gains.
40
Without the commitment from the
Defense Department to mandate its employees to use the City Pairs Program airlines,
however, passenger travel volume eroded. is issue is compounded in peacetime
when military personnel are not traveling overseas, thereby further reducing the ticket
purchases from the airlines. Learning from the early mistakes of the CRAF program,
the CASR program must oer and follow through with compelling incentives to entice
the commercial industry to join CASR.
Overreliance on Commercial Airli. While commercial airlines bring a great
amount of additional capacity, operating in a military environment produces compli-
cations. For one, as a 2003 Institute of Defense Analysis report notes, civilian aircrews
must volunteer for missions and may choose not to y into hostile areas.
41
e same
report also found these crews oen lack the training for military missions. Moreover,
commercial airlines’ radio systems were not designed to communicate with military
equipment, which caused communication diculties and lack of proper supervision
of operations.
42
e most recent activation of CRAF to support the Afghanistan evac-
uation in 2021 faced similar challenges as the all- volunteer aircrews struggled with the
decision of whether to participate or not.
43
Additionally, the Air Force’s overreliance on commercial partnerships led to a de-
crease in its own organic eets’ ability to respond to major military engagements. e
commercial reserve eets oered a false sense of capacity. During Desert Shield in
1990, Military Airli Command relied heavily on the commercial eet for several
thousand airli sorties and could not have achieved the movement of personnel and
cargo without the activation of CRAF.
44
Like the CRAF program, CASR shares the risk of overreliance on the commercial
industry and thereby of becoming dependent on factors beyond its control. For ex-
ample, if SpaceX Chief Executive Ocer Elon Musk suddenly decided not to support
a particular conict, he could remove SpaceX’s spaceli service from the US Space
Force. is would result in the service losing one of its two launch partners and crip-
pling its ability to deliver assets to space.
To avoid the noted interoperability challenges of the CRAF program, the Space
Force and US Space Command will need to conduct wargame exercises for CASR
participants to enrich the commercial partners’ understanding of military strategic
thinking and the nature of future conicts. ese wargames can also be used to
discover capability gaps, identify communication barriers, and decipher appropri-
ate levels of command- and- control authorities. For example, an outcome from the
40. Military Readiness: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, But Incentives May Need Re-
vamping, GAO 03-278 (Washington, DC: GAO, December 30, 2002), https://www.gao.gov/.
41. Graham, Sustaining, 28.
42. Graham, 26; Crackel, History; and Peters, “Afghanistan Evacuation,” A-32.
43. Joseph Hostetler, “CRAF Program Ocially Activated: Big 3 Airlines and More Tapped to Aid in
the Kabul Crisis,” e Points Guy, August 22, 2021, https://thepointsguy.com/.
44. Crackel, History, 219.
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2015 Schriever Wargame highlighted the value of commercial companies and their
ability to bolster US resiliency.
45
Shortage of commercial aircra. e third challenge for the CRAF program is in-
sucient passenger and cargo aircra availability. e airline industry has oen been
encouraged to buy wide- body aircra capable of carrying large cargo, but for the most
part the airlines ignored these requests.
46
Commercial equities, not CRAF require-
ments, drive what sort of aircra are needed. e historical trends illustrate the dier-
ence between the Air Force’s desired number of aircra for passenger and cargo deliv-
ery and the actual number of available aircra from the commercial partners. e
target requirement and actual number of aircra rarely met, and at times the number
of available aircra fell short of the goals of the CRAF program.
Fortunately, the nascent CASR program has a major advantage over the CRAF pro-
gram in that it can oer many more incentives to its commercial partners. is does
not preclude CASR from the risk of a shortage in the appropriate number or types of
space systems required for US space architecture. is risk may be mitigated only if
US policymakers, Space Systems Command leadership, and the commercial space
industry work together to oer the right kind of incentives to secure the right type of
commercial assets required for national security. Combined, these additional benets
oer compelling nancial and regulatory incentives for companies to participate in
CASR and contribute to the overall success of the program.
CASR Industry Incentives
Priority for Future Contracts
First, the opportunity to gain priority for future DoD contracts is a signicant in-
centive for companies to voluntarily join CASR, with priority source selection criteria
being a key consideration. Source selections for DoD contracts are highly competitive
and involve substantial capital, oen leading to protests or lawsuits to contest the re-
sults, as exemplied by the recent legal action taken by SpaceX to claim a nearly
billion- dollar contract.
47
With the potential to earn contracts worth billions of dollars,
the allure of joining CASR may prove to be irresistible to companies.
Fast Pass to the Industry
Second, there are other potential areas that merit exploration, including the pos-
sibility of waivers to streamline licensing processes with the Federal Communications
45. Joan Johnson- Freese, Spacewarfare in the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2017), 98–99.
46. Graham, Sustaining, 229.
47. Alan Boyle, “SpaceX Files Lawsuit against the Federal Government—But Asks to Keep the Details
under Wraps,” GeekWire, May 17, 2019, https://www.geekwire.com/.
62 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
Commission and Federal Aviation Administration, as well as priority range schedul-
ing and infrastructure support.
Early access to spectrum auctions through the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration could serve as a signicant motivator for participation.
e organization plays a pivotal role in managing spectrum usage, including identify-
ing additional spectra for commercial utilization. As space companies heavily rely on
the radio frequency spectrum for bandwidth, which directly impacts revenue genera-
tion, having access to additional spectra becomes crucial to meet growing resource
demands, avoid interference, and ensure reliable service. By joining CASR, smaller or
newer companies could establish a stable revenue stream, provided they meet the re-
quirements of the program.
Security Support
ird, there are supplementary advantages to be considered that may further entice
prospective CASR members. Given China’s lack of distinction between commercial
and state actors, companies providing support to the United States through CASR
would necessitate robust protection measures, including standard National Security
Agency encryption support and intelligence information. CASR participants could be
given security clearance and access to US Space Command’s Commercial Integration
Oce, which oers classied intelligence and facilities.
48
As a result, commercial
companies would have the information needed to help safeguard their assets from
nefarious actors.
Participation in Safety Standards
Fourth, like ships traversing international waters, CASR participants could incor-
porate transponders on future CASR spacecra. e space environment is becoming
more congested each year. Objects in low-Earth orbit are traveling at 17,000 miles per
hour and pose a signicant navigational hazard to every other object in a similar orbit.
e Space Force relies on its own external sensor for space situational awareness
rather than transponders from the spacecra.
49
e private sector has already shown
interest in working together to develop norms for safe, predictable, and responsible
space actions.
50
ese transponders could function as a beacon and report satellite
locations, thereby increasing situational awareness, safety, and attribution.
Additionally, CASR members could consider using modular bus designs for future
spacecra. Leveraging modular spacecra designs could establish industry standards
48. eresa Hitchens, “SPACECOM Plans New, Unied ‘Commercial Integration Oce’ to Work with
Private Firms,” Breaking Defense, March 3, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/.
49. Space Situational Awareness: DOD Should Evaluate How It Can Use Commercial Data, GAO-23-
105565 (Washington, DC: GAO, April 24, 2023), https://www.gao.gov/.
50. Johnson- Freese, Spacewarfare, 146.
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for refueling, upgrading, and servicing, thereby enhancing the Department of
Defense’s resilience.
Environmental Standards
Fih, disposal considerations or complete exemption of liability could be granted
to companies operating under the auspices of CASR. e Environmental Protection
Agency regulates companies dumping pollutants into the ocean. Similarly, the US
government regulates satellite service and orbital debris mitigation. Companies oper-
ating in space must plan to deorbit if in low-Earth orbit, maneuver to a stay- away or-
bit if in medium-Earth orbit, or super- sync if in geosynchronous Earth orbit, all be-
fore their satellites have reached their end- of- life.
In 2022 the Federal Communications Commission adopted a stricter ve- year time
frame for deorbit for satellites in low-Earth orbit.
51
ese new norms will inevitably
begin a new global standard for space debris mitigation, increasing the cost to eld a
new satellite. CASR satellites should be exempt from the new ve- year disposal rule if
activated and utilized under CASR direction. Some exemptions may not be necessary
since assets could be refueled, repaired, or disposed of by other CASR- contracted ser-
vice vehicles.
Industry Recognition
Sixth, establishing goodwill, credibility, and a strong brand for a company is crucial
in today’s business landscape. As such, marketing costs are a signicant part of many
business strategies. At the 2023 CASR Forum, executives expressed that with the re-
cent Russian invasion of Ukraine, patriotism is on the rise and companies want to
work with the US military.
52
To encourage companies to join the CASR program, the
Department of Defense should provide recognition through public statements, media
coverage, or other means. is prestige could generate greater awareness for a edg-
ling company seeking to enhance its marketing eorts compared to what it could
achieve on its own. Moreover, larger companies could reallocate some of their market-
ing budgets, beneting from the positive image and public support associated with
touting their patriotic service.
Indemnication
Finally, and most importantly, indemnication must be included in the CASR pro-
gram. Indemnication encompasses the contractual obligation of the government to
51. Je Foust, “FCC Approves New Orbital Debris Rule,” SpaceNews, September 29, 2022, https://
spacenews.com/.
52. Chad Malone, moderator, “Application of Launch Providers,” presentation at the Commercial
Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR) Forum, George Mason University, Arlington, VA, February 10,
2023; and Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Considers Public- Private Partnerships to Respond to Crises,” Space-
News, February 20, 2023, https://spacenews.com/.
64 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
US Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
cover the loss of a company’s assets, including potential revenue loss. Fortunately, this
is supported by precedent.
53
Commercial industry leaders at the 2023 CASR Forum,
representing diverse space companies ranging from launch providers to satellite op-
erators, concurred that the assurance of indemnication is critical and expressed ea-
gerness to participate in CASR.
54
Conclusion
e policy implications of creating a Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve
program are numerous. e United States will enhance its national security and de-
fense readiness by increasing its resilience, capacity, and ability to respond to a crisis.
Yet policy will determine if the program is successful. Policymakers will need to deter-
mine the extent to which the CASR program is exercised through wargames and in-
clude commercial partners to work out capability gaps, identify communication barri-
ers, and decide appropriate levels of command- and- control authorities.
e Civil Reserve Air Fleet program struggled with managing the correct balance of
its air assets. In implementing CASR, both policymakers and military leaders must de-
termine the minimum and maximum resources required of each specic space sector:
spaceli, space, and ground. is may include, but is not limited to, launch services, sat-
ellite communications, orbital services for debris removal or life extension missions,
ground command and control, space object surveillance and identication, and space-
based situational awareness. Additionally, policymakers and military leaders will need to
carefully consider the incentives the CASR program may present to commercial part-
ners. Incentives which oer advantages to commercial companies for future government
contracts are likely to be fraught with disputes, which oen end in lawsuits.
Next, the government agencies oering incentives will all require individual in-
struction. e National Telecommunications and Information Administration will
require a policy to oer radio frequency spectrum incentives to CASR partners. Simi-
larly, the Federal Communications Commission and Federal Aviation Administration
will need policies to streamline the licensing process for space activities. e National
Security Agency requires a policy directing them to adequately provide encryption
protocol to CASR participants. e CASR participants may need an exemption from
all the above agencies’ debris mitigation standards, and policymakers should create a
program to hire orbital debris removal companies if necessary.
Moreover, civilian and military leaders may need to develop public aairs guidance
to openly praise commercial participation. Creating a unied approach will ensure the
proper amount of goodwill is garnered for each participating company and praise is
distributed fairly. Finally, and crucially, DoD policymakers should enact indemnica-
tion using the Department’s CRAF regulation for indemnication as precedent.
53. DoD Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 52.250-1 Indemnication Under Public Law 85-804,
https://www.acquisition.gov/.
54. Malone, “Launch Providers.”
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If in the inevitable event that conict extends into the space domain, the United
States must be prepared. Just as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program achieved success in
the aviation realm, the potential implementation of the Commercial Augmentation
Space Reserve program holds the promise of enabling the US Space Force to harness the
strengths of the commercial space sector. is amplied collaboration between govern-
ment and commercial industry will bolster US resilience and exibility in and through
space. e CASR initiative exploits the escalating technological landscapes and the ever-
evolving array of commercial solutions. Policymakers and military leaders must work
with the commercial space industry to harness the burgeoning technological landscape
and create the CASR program needed to prepare for future space conict. Æ
66 ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER
Spacepower and Strategy
OFFENSIVE
DOMINANCE IN
SPACE
briaN r. GooDMaN
e US Space Force’s competitive endurance framework may exacerbate oense-defense
balance problems in space. Applying concepts of realism, the security dilemma, and of-
fense-defense balance to the notion of competitive endurance supports a new theory of
oense dominance in the space domain. Specically, advances in military technology,
space mobility and logistics, and space domain awareness provide an advantage to attack-
ers and increase the probability of conict in space. By prioritizing defense- focused tech-
nology development, defense- centric doctrine and tactics, and greater information-
sharing, the Space Force can oset the factors driving increased advantage to the oense
and decrease the likelihood of conict.
I
ntegrated deterrence, the centerpiece of US national security policy, operates on
relatively straightforward logic: prevent conict by making the cost of attack pro-
hibitively high either by minimizing an attack’s ecacy or punishing an attacker.
1
e 2022 National Defense Strategy denes the former as deterrence by denial and the
latter as deterrence by direct cost imposition.
2
Escalation control is closely linked to
deterrence: if deterrence succeeds, then competition will remain stable and conicts
will not escalate; if conditions destabilize or escalate, deterrence has failed.
To this end, the Space Force has begun developing strategies, concepts, doctrines,
and policies for achieving deterrence and avoiding escalation in space. is process
entails, in part, asking questions such as, In what ways does current US space strategy
aect deterrence and escalation dynamics? What are the various factors that impact
stability and security? What are the ways in which this occurs? A theory of oensive-
dominance in space helps explain how Space Force policy, reected in its competitive
endurance framework, might impact deterrence and escalation to make conict and
Major Brian Goodman, USSF, is a Department of the Air Force fellow and holds a master of public administra-
tion from the Harvard Kennedy School and a master of science in ministerial leadership from Amridge University.
1. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
2. Lloyd J. Austin III, National Defense Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense [DoD], October 22, 2022), https://media.defense.gov/.
Goodman
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 67
escalation in space more or less likely. is theory reveals how oense- defense balance
problems—where the cost an oensive military force must pay is weighed against the
defensive investment necessary to prevent an opponent’s victory—incentivize conict
in the space domain.
The Importance of Theory
e social sciences, including international relations (IR) and military strategic
studies, depend on theory to make scholarship applicable to policymakers.
3
Absent
theory, unspoken, perhaps faulty, assumptions ourish and threaten policymakers
with illusory solutions. For example, in US Space Force doctrine, space mobility and
logistics is dened as the movement and support of military equipment and personnel
to, from, and through the space domain.
4
One may assume that increasing the avail-
ability of space launches will improve the US Space Force’s ability to reconstitute
forces aer an attack in space, thereby decreasing an attack’s ecacy and increasing
domain stability.
While it seems logical at rst read, is this cause- and- eect relationship between
launch capacity and domain stability correct? One’s answer depends on their theoreti-
cal framework. e above assumption operates under the notion of deterrence theory:
lowering the probability of an attack by signaling the ability to successfully degrade an
adversary’s space mission via rapid reconstitution should be stabilizing. Under a dier-
ent theory, however, increased space mobility and logistics capabilities will destabilize a
world where improved mobility favors oensive action, as detailed below. Aer all,
what assurances do adversaries have that US investments in these capabilities will only
be used to reconstitute satellite constellations and not rapidly deploy orbital weapons?
Ultimately, the perceptions of nations in the international system, shaped by their
theoretical frameworks, will determine if increased space mobility and logistics capa-
bilities will, in fact, improve or diminish space stability.
5
eory is therefore important
because it establishes an intellectual scaolding for policy assessments.
Competitive Endurance
Competitive endurance, rmly nested in the framework of integrated deterrence of
the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, articulates the Space Force’s
“assumptions, logical conclusions, and guiding principles” for mission success.
6
e
3. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Leaving eory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Test-
ing Is Bad for International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (September 1,
2013), https://doi.org/.
4. John W. Raymond, Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, Space Capstone Publication (Washington,
DC: US Space Force [USSF], June 2020).
5. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, new ed. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2017).
6. B. Chance Saltzman, CSO Note to Guardians (C- Note #15), Subject: Competitive Endurance, July 7,
2023, https://www.spaceforce.mil/.
68 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Oensive Dominance in Space
Space Force designates competitive endurance as the means of achieving “space superi-
ority when necessary while also maintaining the safety, security, stability, and long- term
sustainability of space.” e concept is actualized through three core tenets: 1) avoiding
operational surprise, 2) denying rst- mover advantage, and 3) conducting responsible
counterspace campaigning.
7
Missing from the logic are the theoretical underpinnings that link the nature of the
international system to the Space Force’s desire for the stability achieved through the
notion of competitive endurance. is article completes the formulation by analyzing
the Space Force’s competitive endurance framework using principles of oense-
defense balance theory to illuminate the service’s conceptual foundations. Oense-
defense balance oers two analytical advantages. First, it provides a solid theoretical
foundation with a wide explanatory range and prescriptive richness.
8
Second, prin-
ciples of oense- defense balance underwrite the logic of some elements of Space Force
policy, such as competitive endurance’s emphasis on avoiding surprise.
Realism, the Security Dilemma, and Offense- Defense
Balance
A comprehensive analysis of competitive endurance requires an overview of exist-
ing international relations theory germane to this notion, particularly realism, the se-
curity dilemma, and oense- defense balance.
Realism
For realists, in an anarchic world that lacks a superordinate authority to provide a
security guarantee, nations engage in power- seeking behaviors to ensure stability and
the promotion of national interests—such interests are the primary driver of state ac-
tions in global aairs.
9
As Ukraine experienced in the spring of 2022, there was no
external guarantor of the nation’s territorial sovereignty aer the Russian invasion.
Other states in the international system are extremely reluctant to challenge Russia
and its nuclear arsenal directly.
10
Inevitably, this system produces conicts between nations and, occasionally, war.
is condition, in turn, produces fear and suspicion in states because they can never
be assured that danger, violence, and war are not soon coming. reats to a state’s
existence are ever- present, and states can only be condent in their own eorts to
7. Saltzman, C- Note #15.
8. Stephen Van Evera, “Oense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security 22, no. 4
(1998), https://doi.org/.
9. Kenneth Neal Waltz, eory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010); and
Waltz, Man, the State and War: A eoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
10. Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad, and Alexandra Stark, Understanding the Risk of Escalation in the
War in Ukraine (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 21, 2023), https://doi.org/.
Goodman
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 69
minimize the risk of being dominated or destroyed by other states. e resulting power-
seeking—as opposed to power-maximizing—behavior ensures security and survival.
Security Dilemma
As states compete for relative power, a dilemma emerges within the international
system. is security dilemma exists because states can never be sure of other states’
intentions as they pursue power—particularly military power. Rational states within
an anarchic international system will seek to protect themselves from outside aggres-
sion, and military power provides eective means of defense. Yet given the uncer-
tainty and fear inherent in the international system, states can never be condent that
weapons acquired by a rival state will be used exclusively for self- protection and not
for aggression or coercive threats.
11
erefore, one state’s investment in defensive military power will incentivize a rival
state to make its own investment in military power.
12
e rival nation’s response and
subsequent increase in military power intensies the state’s threat perception and en-
courages additional investment in military power, intensifying the spiral and produc-
ing an arms race between the two states. In turn, the armament spiral produced by the
security dilemma will culminate when a dispute between the states eventually emerges
that triggers war.
13
Note that conict need not be intended or desirable, as illustrated by the now infa-
mous “false alarm” incident of November 1979, when a mistaken use of an exercise
tape caused US missile warning systems at the Pentagon, Strategic Air Command, and
North American Aerospace Defense Command to falsely indicate a Soviet ballistic
missile attack on the United States.
14
Accidents, errors, or miscommunications are all
that is needed to push preexisting tensions resulting from a security dilemma into ac-
tive military conict.
Offense- Defense Balance
is dreary outlook prompted noted political theorist Robert Jervis to ask a rhetorical
question, “Why are we not all dead?”
15
In answer, he observes that the standard security
model is insuciently nuanced to explain the behavior of states in the real world and
oers oense- defense balance theory as a remedy. e oense- defense balance reects
11. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, e Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World
Politics (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Robert Jervis, Cooperation under the Security
Dilemma (Los Angeles: Center for Arms Control and International Security, University of California, Los
Angeles, 1977).
12. Jervis, Perception.
13. John A. Vasquez, e War Puzzle Revisited, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 110
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
14. “False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks Put U.S. Forces on Alert in 1979–1980,” National Secu-
rity Archives, March 16, 2020, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/.
15. Jervis, Cooperation, 170.
70 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Oensive Dominance in Space
the amount of resources a state must invest in oense to oset a rival state’s investment
in defense.
16
is balance can be expressed as a ratio, where the cost an oensive mili-
tary force must pay (X) is related to the defensive investment (Y) necessary to prevent
victory. erefore, if state A invests $3 million in military technology to overcome
state B’s defensive investment of $1 million, then the oense- defense balance can be
expressed as 3:1.
Jervis oers two variables for oense- defense balance. First, he contends a measure
of distinguishability exists between some oensive and defensive capabilities. For ex-
ample, land mines are better understood as defensive weapons, while little defensive
rationale exists for weapons such as aircra carriers. erefore, states can provide for
their security while minimizing the security dilemma by investing in military technol-
ogy, which is primarily defensive in nature and recognized as such by rivals. Second,
Jervis contends the oense- defense balance inuences the probability of conict. En-
vironments where it is easier for one state to destroy military forces and acquire terri-
tory than to defend their own are oense- dominant; defense dominance is the inverse.
High oense-defense ratios make conict less likely. In contrast, low oense-defense
ratios make conict more likely because “when the oense has the advantage over the
defense, attacking is the best route to protecting what you have . . . and it will be hard for
any state to maintain its size and inuence without trying to increase them.”
17
While oense- defense balance can be measured in terms of economic investment,
a separate question exists regarding the causes of relative oensive and defensive
dominance. What factors or conditions tilt an environment’s balance in favor of the
oense or defense? Extant literature has reached a consensus about two: military tech-
nology and geography.
Regarding military technology, IR scholars identify two major areas that incline an
environment to oensive advantage.
18
First, improvements in mobility favor the of-
fense because a force cannot attack if it cannot move, while defense can be accom-
plished while holding a position. As one study notes, “Nearly all historical advances in
military mobility—chariots, horse cavalry, tanks, motor trucks, aircra, mobile bridg-
ing equipment—are generally considered to have favored the oense, while major
countermobility innovations—moats, barbed wire, tank traps, land mines—have fa-
vored defense.”
19
Second, improvements in repower generally favoring the defense can be seen by
inverting the logic—attackers are more susceptible to repower since they must move
and, therefore, expose themselves. us improvements in mobility favor the oense and
render an environment more susceptible to conict by decreasing the oense- defense
16. Sean M. Lynn- Jones, “Oense- Defense eory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (June 1,
1995), https://doi.org/.
17. Jervis, Cooperation, 211.
18. Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is the Oense- Defense Balance and Can We Mea-
sure It?,” International Security 22, no. 4 (1998), https://doi.org/.
19. Glaser and Kaufmann, 63.
Goodman
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 71
balance ratio. Conversely, improvements in countermobility and repower increase the
oense- defense balance ratio, making conict less likely. Continuing the previous ex-
ample, if state B adds a $1 million countermobility system that raises state A’s cost to
attack by $10 million, the new oense-defense balance can be expressed as 11:2, indicat-
ing a further advantage to the defense.
Geography inuences the oense- defense balance through three causal mecha-
nisms. First, rugged terrain slows movement, strains logistics, and strengthens defense
more than easier terrain. Second, terrain that provides cover where defenders can hide
strengthens the defensive balance. ird, greater distances favor the defense over
shorter distances, given the logistical and economic diculty of an inherently oen-
sive requirement to project power.
20
The Offense Dominance of the Space Domain
According to Stephen Van Evera, “ ‘oense dominant’ means that conquest is fairly
easy; ‘defense dominant’ means that conquest is very dicult.” Like Van Evera, this
article maintains defending is usually easier than conquering and uses “ ‘oense domi-
nant’ broadly, to denote that oense is easier than usual, although perhaps not actually
easier than defense.”
21
As discussed above, oense- defense balance theory holds that conict is more likely
in oense- dominant systems. Applying oense dominance in space suggests that given
anarchic international systems consistent with realism-rooted security dilemmas, the
likelihood of conict in space is increasing over time due to three causal factors.
First, advances in military technology have made negating a satellite or its mission
far less expensive than constructing and elding one. Second, military technology that
enables increased mobility and maneuver in space is quickly developing. ird, a mul-
tinational emphasis on improved satellite identication and tracking has eroded the
ability of space systems to leverage the opacity of the space domain as an eectual
cover. In the following section, this article will outline a theory of oensive dominance
in space, supported by present trends that indicate an increased degree of oensive
dominance in the domain in the future.
is foundational theory thus enables strategists to bridge the gap between broader
IR concepts and competitive endurance. While space as an arena for geopolitical con-
ict represents an evolution in warghting domains, the central tenet of oense-
defense balance and the implications of military technology and geography still apply.
22
In fact, an argument can be made that space is more sensitive to changes in the oense-
defense balance, given that space systems are experiencing exponential growth in tech-
nological innovation.
20. Glaser and Kaufmann.
21. Van Evera, “Oense,” fn 1, 5.
22. Brad Townsend, Security and Stability in the New Space Age: e Orbital Security Dilemma, Space
Power and Politics (London: Routledge, 2020).
72 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Oensive Dominance in Space
Advances in Military Technology
Classication issues make quantitative comparisons of advancing military technol-
ogy’s impact on the oense- defense ratio challenging in unclassied settings; never-
theless, some generalizable examples are available. e venerable GPS provides a clear
glimpse into how unbalanced the cost ratio of attack to defense has become.
According to the Government Accountability Oce, the latest generation of GPS
Block IIIF satellites are procured at approximately $497 million per unit.
23
Operation-
ally, the GPS constellation requires a minimum of 24 operational satellites to maintain
worldwide navigation services 95 percent of the time.
24
e cost of the GPS Block IIIF
constellation is calculated to be approximately $11.9 billion by extrapolating the cost
per satellite to the minimum necessary constellation. While GPS jamming is limited
to a geographic region, oensive electronic warfare systems capable of negating the
GPS mission can be procured relatively inexpensively.
For example, a recent experiment revealed that eective jamming techniques can
negate a GPS- enabled unmanned aerial vehicle at close ranges with a $420 soware-
dened radio platform.
25
Extending to operationally relevant ranges requires only sig-
nal amplication, typically costing on the order of tens of thousands of dollars.
Another example of the strong oense- dominant nature of the space environment
was the US Air Force’s destruction of an earth observation satellite in 2008, worth
“hundreds of millions,” with a Standard Missile-3 at a total cost of between $40 and
$60 million.
26
Even a conservative oense- defense calculation produces a ratio of
1:4—a gure extremely favorable to the oense.
e lesson of both examples is that very expensive satellites can be negated using
very inexpensive counterspace weapons, producing an environment increasingly
tilted toward oensive dominance as states develop kinetic and electronic warfare
arsenals. Given the technical constraints that prohibit transitioning all Space Force
missions to small, proliferated satellite constellations, one should expect this condi-
tion to persist for the foreseeable future.
e relative ease of destroying compared to defending space systems is also becom-
ing more pronounced. According to open- source data, the number of satellites oper-
ated by the United States’ main competitors, China and Russia, has increased by ap-
proximately 70 percent between 2019 and 2021.
27
is includes signicant
23. “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment,” Government Accountability Oce, June 8, 2023, https://
www.gao.gov/.
24. “GPS Space Segment,” GPS.gov, accessed December 14, 2023, https://www.gps.gov/.
25. Renato Ferreira et al., “Eective GPS Jamming Techniques for UAVs Using Low- Cost SDR Plat-
forms,” Wireless Personal Communications 115, no. 4 (2020): 2705–727, https://link.springer.com/.
26. Jamie McIntyre, “Attempt to Shoot Down Spy Satellite to Cost up to $60 Million,” CNN, February
15, 2008, https://www.cnn.com/; and Andrea Shalal- Esa, “Expensive New U.S. Spy Satellite Not Working:
Sources,” Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/.
27. Challenges to Security in Space 2022: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion
(Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, March 2022), https://www.dia.mil/.
Goodman
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 73
investments in counterspace weapons research and development, deployment, and
operations. Neutral and partner nations of the United States have reached the same
conclusion and have increased spending on antisatellite (ASAT) weapons accordingly.
Among the numerous examples are India’s 2019 direct- ascent ASAT missile test and
the United Kingdom’s investment of $1.6 billion in military space capabilities.
28
Ad-
ditionally, regional powers such as Iran and North Korea have recognized the oen-
sive imbalance and have increased their development of ASATs in recent years.
29
Cumulatively, recent increases in global ASAT development can be viewed as an in-
ternational consensus on the space domain’s oensive dominance. Were it easier to de-
fend a satellite, states would be developing protective technologies in greater propor-
tions. One can expect this space arms race to continue and accelerate in accordance with
the predictions of the security dilemma and oense- defense balance theory.
Increased Space Access and Mobility
As mentioned earlier, attacking forces must be able to relocate while defenders can
dig into fortied, static locations. erefore, advances in mobility and maneuver favor
the oense. US Joint doctrine denes the task of maneuver as military operations to
“place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the exible application of
combat power.”
30
Military operations in space are no dierent. While the principles of
mobility and maneuver have endured over the history of war, they assume a new char-
acter in the space domain.
In space, concepts of mobility and maneuver manifest as the “ability to resource,
apply, and leverage spacepower in, from, and to the space domain.”
31
Principles of ma-
neuver are fundamentally applied in space through operations and technology to in-
crease a state’s ability to launch new satellites into space, reposition satellites once in
orbit, and resupply operational satellites with fuel or technology updates. Spacefaring
nations are increasingly investing signicant resources into advancing all three of
these applications, which, in turn, further shis the balance in space to the oense.
Advancements in spaceli technology have rapidly increased the rate at which
states can launch satellites. According to data compiled by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the number of global space launches have steadily risen from 50
in 2000 to 182 in 2022.
32
is rise corresponds to the decreasing economic cost of
launching satellites. For example, the cost of a heavy launch to low- Earth orbit in 2004
28. Brandon Weeden and Victoria Samson, Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assess-
ment (Broomeld, CO: Secure World Foundation, April 2023).
29. Kiseok Kang, “Extended Space Deterrence: Providing Security Assurance in Space,” Journal of
Strategic Security 16 (July 1, 2023), https://doi.org/.
30. Joint Campaigns and Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Sta, June 18, 2022), III-37.
31. Raymond, Spacepower.
32. “Space Environment: Total Launches by Country,” Aerospace Security, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), July 24, 2023, https://aerospace.csis.org/.
74 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Oensive Dominance in Space
was $11,600 per kilogram in the United States. By 2018, that price had fallen to $1,500
per kilogram, with future projections anticipating additional price decreases.
33
Ad-
vancements in China and India have produced similar results.
34
Increasing the launch
capacity of a state produces a corresponding increase in the amount of military space-
cra, including orbital ASAT systems, that can be deployed to the space domain in a
given time.
For historical context, this situation is analogous to the problems of US power pro-
jection in World War I. In 1917, the US Army faced a daunting problem transporting
a force of 500,000 men to Europe, which required a signicant increase in logistical
capacity to mobilize quickly and eciently. e US Army solved its mobilization
problem during the war by reappropriating civil and commercial ships.
35
In 2023, mil-
itary space forces face similar bottlenecks to mobilizing technology and deploying
satellites from Earth to space. erefore, spacefaring nations are increasing the num-
ber of transports to orbit, now through technological advancement instead of the asset
reappropriation of 1917. e result is identical in both cases: more combat power in a
theater of operations increases the oensive capability of a deployed force.
is relationship between space mobility and oensive capacity can be demonstrated
historically. e military space community underwent a signicant paradigm shi in
January 2007 when China tested a direct- ascent kinetic ASAT missile on one of its own
malfunctioning weather satellites.
36
Before 2007, the United States and Russia were the
only major states involved in militarizing space. China’s ASAT test was the rst instance
of a US competitor’s ability to apply principles of mobility to project combat power into
space directly from the Earth. China’s direct-ascent ASAT missile ended US policymak-
ers’ view of space as an uncompetitive and uncontested environment.
37
Since 2007, an additional 10 nations have developed military space programs as part
of their national security strategies.
38
Furthermore, according to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the number of nations with active space programs has grown from 2 in 1957 to
94 in 2023.
39
Space was prohibitively distant for most nations in the twentieth century,
33. omas G. Roberts, “Space Launch to Low Earth Orbit: How Much Does It Cost?,” Aerospace
Security, September 1, 2022, https://aerospace.csis.org/.
34. “China’s Long March Rocket Launch Opportunity Opens Auctions for 1st Time,” Global Times,
July 9, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/; and Nivedita Bhattacharjee, “India’s First Private Rocket Com-
pany Looks to Slash Satellite Costs,” Reuters, November 26, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/.
35. “e American Expeditionary Forces - A World at War,” Library of Congress, accessed December 18,
2023, https://www.loc.gov/.
36. Shirley Kan, China’s Anti- satellite Weapon Test, RS22652 (Washington, DC: Congressional Re-
search Service, April 23, 2007).
37. Todd Harrison et al., “e Evolution of Space as a Contested Domain,” in Escalation and Deterrence:
In the Second Space Age, ed. Todd Harrison et al. (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2017), http://www.jstor.org/.
38. Kari Bingen, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Makena Young, Space reat Assessment 2023 (Washington,
DC: CSIS, April 2023), https://csis- website- prod.s3.amazonaws.com/.
39. Central Intelligence Agency, “Reference - Space Programs,” World Factbook, accessed December
18, 2023, https://www.cia.gov/.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 75
both literally and technologically. Today, nearly any global economy may have realistic
aspirations of accessing space.
Yet, a nation’s increased access to space is indistinguishable from its increased abil-
ity to deploy space forces to the operational environment. In oense- defense balance,
maneuver is the ability to “move, supply, and concentrate forces for battle.”
40
US Joint
doctrine further denes maneuver as “deploying forces into an operational area” and
the ability to “deploy, shi, regroup, or move joint and/or component force formations
within the operational area by any means or mode.”
41
Taken together, these denitions
reveal that increasing spaceli capacity can be properly understood as simultaneously
increasing space maneuver and mobility, a condition favoring the oense as evidenced
by the Space Force’s tactically responsive space concept.
42
Space mobility and maneuver are also being increased by government- sponsored
advances in in- space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) technologies.
43
While ISAM has a wide array of technical applications, the role of satellite refueling in
orbital mobility and maneuver is germane to this discussion. Currently, satellites are
limited in their ability to maneuver by fuel constraints. While all modern mobilization
equipment—including ships, aircra, and trucks—requires fuel, satellites are
uniquely hindered by an inability to be refueled. erefore, military space planners
must be extremely judicious about when and how to maneuver an orbital weapon
system. Yet future ISAM advancements that permit on- orbit satellite refueling remove
the incentives for operationally constraining mobility and maneuver.
In addition to maneuver implications, the dual- use nature of on- orbit servicing
technology presents additional security dilemma problems. States can never be sure
whether another state’s repair satellite will be weaponized against their space forces.
44
As one spacepower theorist explained, “If I can tighten a screw on my satellite, I can
loosen a screw on yours.”
45
Taken together, increased global space launch capacity and
ISAM technology maturation increase orbital mobility and maneuver capabilities and,
consequently, the space domain’s oensive dominance.
Space Domain Awareness
Under oense- defense balance theory, environments that provide defenders places
to hide favor the defense. Historically, space has been a highly opaque setting, giving
40. Glaser and Kaufmann, “Oense- Defense Balance,” 62.
41. JP 3-0, III-37.
42. See Aaron Blore, “Responsiveness Is Not Operational: Aligning Strategy in the Newest Service,”
Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower 2, Special Edition (Winter 2023), https://www
.airuniversity.af.edu/.
43. In- Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing [ISAM] Interagency Working Group, National
Science & Technology Council, ISAM National Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, April 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
44. Amir Lupovici, “e Dual- Use Security Dilemma and the Social Construction of Insecurity,” Con-
temporary Security Policy 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2021), https://doi.org/.
45. Nathaniel Lee, conversation with the author, June 9, 2019.
76 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Oensive Dominance in Space
space systems ample opportunity to hide among gaps in sensor coverage. e domain’s
impenetrability made the military tasks of nding, xing, and tracking satellites techni-
cally dicult. Calculating satellite locations and velocity vectors is prone to mathemati-
cal errors, which increase position uncertainty and thus severely hinder ASAT weapons
targeting.
46
e opacity of space is also unsettling for policymakers since they can
never be sure that an unknown threat does not lurk in obfuscated terrain.
Accordingly, the Space Force has increased its emphasis on improving space do-
main awareness (SDA) capabilities, resulting in the rst tenet of competitive endur-
ance—avoiding operational surprise. According to the Space Force’s chief of space
operations, avoiding operational surprise means “space forces must be able to detect
and preempt any shis in the operational environment that could compromise the
ability of the joint force to achieve space superiority,” and this “requires an enhanced
level of space domain awareness.”
47
e SDA enhancements have driven signicant investment in global terrestrial
sensor coverage and the development of several satellites designed to nd and track
objects in space. In 2015, the US military announced initial operational capability of
the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program. In 2020, the US military
established a space surveillance radar system in the Pacic Ocean, and in 2022, the US
Space Force and the Australian Department of Defence nalized the deployment of an
optical satellite tracking telescope in Australia.
48
US leadership has also produced a
multinational, multisector SDA data- sharing agreement where satellite-tracking data
is shared among 117 government, civil, and commercial entities.
49
While improving space domain awareness capability is a clear imperative for the
Space Force, space strategists should think carefully before assuming that increased
SDA capabilities will automatically produce a more stable space domain. One cumula-
tive eect of improved SDA is reducing the available locations for unknown defensive
systems that constrain attacks. Said dierently, increases in SDA capability reduce the
uncertainty which acts as a restraining force on leaders’ decisions to attack. Addition-
ally, improvements in SDA increase a military’s ability to target on- orbit space sys-
tems, eectively lowering the cost of attack by increasing the probability of kill. Both
factors favor oense over defense.
46. Aubrey Poore, Jerey Aristo, and Joshua Horwood, eds. Covariance and Uncertainty Realism in
Space Surveillance and Tracking (Washington, DC: Air Force Space Command Astrodynamics Innovation
Committee, June 17, 2016), https://apps.dtic.mil/.
47. B. Chance Saltzman, “Guardians in the Fight,” keynote address, Air & Space Forces Association
(AFA) Warfare Syposium, Aurora, CO, March 7, 2023, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/.
48. SpOC [Space Operations Command] Sta Writer, “U.S. Space Surveillance Telescope in Australia
Achieves Initial Operational Capability,” Space War: Your World at War, September 30, 2022, https://www.
spacewar.com/; “Swinging for the Space Fence,” USSF, April 7, 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/; and
“Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program,” USSF, accessed December 18, 2023, https://
www.spaceforce.mil/.
49. USSPACECOM Public Aairs, “USSPACECOM Adds Portugal – a Strategic NATO Ally – to SSA
Data Sharing Cadre,” USSPACECOM, July 15, 2020, https://www.spacecom.mil/.
Goodman
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 77
A reading of Clausewitz might support the notion that increases in SDA capability
remove the advantages of surprise typically perceived as critical to the oense.
50
Re-
moving the oensive advantage of surprise means increases in SDA capability actually
favor the defense. Yet these objections are misplaced for two reasons.
First, there is little justication for the presumption that a force’s ability to nd, track,
and target adversary satellites eliminates the adversary’s potential for strategic surprise.
Unknown payloads on known satellites provide an eective means of achieving surprise.
For example, Russia’s deployment of a suspected nuclear satellite has ignited fear and
insecurity worldwide. e possibility of a devastating unwarned attack from a satellite
with a possible nuclear payload was sucient enough for congressional leadership to
characterize the situation as a “grave national security threat.”
51
Here, awareness of the
subject satellite’s location is insucient to ameliorate fear of strategic surprise. Surface-
to- space antisatellite missiles, hypersonic weapons, fractional orbital bombardment sys-
tems, and cyber weapons all provide additional examples of technologies adversaries can
utilize to generate surprise despite advancements in SDA capability.
Second, the advantage of surprise is more relevant at the tactical level of war and
less eective at the strategic and structural levels of analyses. “History did not show
cunning to be a signicant trait,” argues Clausewitzean scholar Antulio Echevarria.
“Nor did it show surprise to be strategically signicant, as a rule.”
52
Clausewitz himself
observed this in On War: “Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply because in
tactics time and space are limited in scale. erefore in strategy surprise becomes
more feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm.”
53
Taken together, these two factors can lead one to reasonably conclude SDA ad-
vancements will not signicantly impact a state’s ability to generate strategic surprise,
and even if they did, such impacts would not signicantly impact the strategic and
structural conditions that are the topic of this article. erefore, increases in SDA ca-
pability will not restrain oensive forces but will inhibit defenders, as argued above.
Competitive Endurance in an Offensive Dominant System
e Space Force’s theory of success, competitive endurance, has two primary ob-
jectives: space superiority and the stability of the space domain. Given the security
dilemma and space’s oensive dominance, the service will likely discover that com-
petitive endurance’s two objectives are in opposition to each other. Developing the
capability necessary to achieve space superiority will destabilize the space domain be-
cause US rivals can never be sure of America’s benign intent.
50. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1989).
51. Christian Davenport et al., “U.S. Ocials Say Russia Has Deployed a Nuclear Weapon in Space,”
Washington Post, February 15, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
52. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “7 Principles of Strategy,” in Clausewitz and Contemporary War, ed. Antu-
lio J. Echevarria II (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 165, https://doi.org/.
53. Clausewitz, On War, 198.
78 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Oensive Dominance in Space
Consider the US reaction to China’s testing of a satellite grappling capability. In
2021, China’s SJ-21 satellite attached to a defunct Chinese navigation satellite and
towed it to a disposal orbit. As argued earlier, this capability is a clear example of dual-
use technology. e SJ-21 could be used as benign space debris cleanup or to attack a
US satellite. Viewed through the lens of realism and compounded by uncertainty with
regard to China’s intentions, the United States had little choice but to interpret the SJ-21
as a threat. As General James H. Dickinson, former US Space Command commander
observed, “Whether it’s directed energy, whether it’s direct ascent . . . or SJ-21s, those
kinds of capabilities provide, or can provide, a layer of capabilities that we need to be
concerned about.”
54
Unsurprisingly, the United States’ rivals have expressed nearly
identical concerns about the X-37, the US- developed space plane.
55
Conversely, actions the Space Force might take to maintain the space domain’s sta-
bility will likely undermine the service’s ability to achieve space superiority. One of the
few ways a state can reassure a rival is by using costly signals, such as disarmament,
because costless signals are easily dismissed. Yet, such signals in an oense- dominant
system are dangerous because of the environmental incentives to attack.
56
In the space
domain, such costly signals will preclude the Space Force from operationalizing the
capability needed to ensure the Joint Force has access to space- enabled weapons, if
needed. Additionally, costly signals are strongly disincentivized because the United
States cannot trust rival powers to reciprocate.
Although these aims seem ultimately unreconcilable as discussed, there is a way
forward for Space Force decisionmakers. e Space Force should consider three para-
digmatic courses in pursuing competitive endurance to minimize instability while
retaining the ability to achieve space superiority.
Invest in Technologies Favoring Defense
Central to ideas of oense- defense balance is the principle of distinguishability be-
tween oensive and defensive weapons in some cases.
57
While current Space Force
thinking can be interpreted as doubtful of such distinguishability, the service should
consider how future acquisitions impact the oense- defense ratio through the mecha-
nisms of mobility and repower. According to oense- defense balance theory, high
lethality/low maneuverability weapons with limited range are better understood as
defensive systems that disincentivize attack by increasing the cost attackers must pay
while decreasing the attacker’s probability of success. Examples from other domains
54. Cambrie Eckert, “JUST IN: SPACECOM Prepared to Defend U.S. Assets,” National Defense, July
19, 2023, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/.
55. Brent M. Eastwood, “908 Days in Space: Why China and Russia Fear the X-37B Space Plane,”
MSN, May 12, 2023, https://www.msn.com/.
56. Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the
Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security 31, no. 2 (October 1, 2006), https://doi.org/.
57. Jack S. Levy, “e Oensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A eoretical and Histori-
cal Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1984), https://doi.org/.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 79
that can be applied to space, albeit with limitations, include concepts of point fortica-
tion and defense identication zones with appropriate enforcement capabilities.
Develop Defense- centric Doctrines and Tactics
e companion of the inherent capabilities of weapons is the doctrine and tactics
that govern their operation. As a historical example, Napoleon’s conceptions of ma-
neuver warfare and rapid mobility were not predetermined by the technology of the
age—he was working with the same arsenals other states possessed. Napoleon’s devel-
opment of oensive doctrine and tactics that could then be applied to available weap-
ons made him distinct. As one scholar notes, “e oensive or defensive character of
a weapons system must be dened by both its intrinsic characteristics and the tactical
doctrine which determines its use.”
58
As the Space Force develops and codies its operational doctrine and tactics, this ar-
ticle recommends the service develop and publish doctrine at the operational level (3-
10X) specic to protection as a dened Joint function. Operational doctrine should call
out defensive approaches to space superiority. e Joint function of “protection” is an
obvious place for the service to start. Operational doctrine will signal both internally
and externally the value the Space Force places on defense and stability and will also in-
form the downstream tactical doctrine used by space operators.
Provide Transparency in Counterspace Strategy and General
Capabilities
Minimizing uncertainty in rival states is a third critical element of addressing the
tension between the two objectives in competitive endurance. Unfortunately, one of
the unintended consequences of the Space Force’s development of highly classied
space systems is increasing uncertainty and fear among the United States’ strategic
competitors, thereby exacerbating the existing space security dilemma. While calls for
reforming the classication architecture are not new, and while signicant barriers to
declassication justiably exist, the Space Force should seek to increase transparency
when possible. As General John Hyten, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Sta noted, “You can’t deter people if everything you have is in the black [classied].”
59
Ultimately, nations who better understand each other will be less susceptible to the
misperceptions that drive security spirals and instability.
60
e Space Force can con-
tribute to this dynamic by reinvigorating discussions about selective declassication,
especially of defensive weapons, and ensuring continued open- source access to ser-
vice doctrine.
58. Levy, 226.
59. Robert Fahs, “Gen. Hyten Finds Over- Classication of Space Information Undermines National
Security, Promises Reform,” Transforming Classication (blog), National Archives of the United States,
December 1, 2020, https://transforming- classication.blogs.archives.gov/.
60. Charles L. Glaser, “e Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997), https://doi.org/.
80 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Oensive Dominance in Space
Conclusion
e Space Force’s competitive endurance strategy, aimed at achieving space superi-
ority while maintaining stability, faces inherent paradoxes as actions to enhance space
superiority may instead destabilize the domain. As technology advances and space
becomes more accessible, the space domain’s oensive dominance grows, amplifying
the security dilemma. e Space Force’s commitment to competitive endurance
should be guided by these considerations to ensure a secure and stable space environ-
ment for the benet of all spacefaring nations. Addressing the challenges posed by the
oensive dominance of space necessitates a reasoned approach grounded in estab-
lished international relations theory. Failure to connect military strategy to theoretical
foundations threatens the ability of policymakers and planners to execute the goals of
competitive endurance. Æ
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 81
Narratives in Conflict
DECODING THE
ADVERSARY
Strategic Empathy in an Era of
Great Power Competition
roberT s. hiNCk
seaN CulleN
Eective strategy requires strategic empathy. Yet what strategic empathy is and how to
practice it remain unclear. As critics warn, the concept is vague and can lead to overly sen-
timental policymaking. Proponents, however, maintain that strategic empathy is necessary
to avoid strategic failure and can reduce the potential for spiraling conict and miscalcula-
tion. is article claries the concept, including its linkage to strategy, and oers the
framework of strategic narratives as a means for employing strategic empathy so that strat-
egists can develop the necessary mindset to succeed in an era of great power competition.
R
etired Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster routinely exhorts US policymakers
to employ strategic empathy to better understand how foreign countries be-
have.
1
He claims strategic empathy is necessary to avoid strategic failures
caused by American hubris and narcissism: “We should reject narcissistic tendencies,
adopt a reasoned approach to foreign policy based on strategic empathy, and sustain
national security and defense strategies that acknowledge the agency that rivals, ad-
versaries, and enemies exercise over the future.”
2
Dr. Robert Hinck serves as an associate professor of leadership and director of research at the Leadership and In-
novation Institute, Air War College. He is the lead author of The Future of Global Competition: Ontological
Security and Narratives in Chinese, Iranian, Russian, and Venezuelan Media (Routledge, 2022).
Lieutenant Colonel Sean Cullen, USAF, serves as the chief, Strategic Assessments Division, Headquarters Air Force.
He holds a master of military strategic studies from the Air War College, a master of philosophy in military strategy
from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a master of military operational art and science from the Air
Command and Staff College, and a master of business administration from Trident University International.
1. H. R. McMaster, “e Retrenchment Syndrome: A Response to ‘Come Home, America?,’” Foreign
Aairs 99, no. 4 (2020); McMaster, Battlegrounds: e Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: Harper
Collins, 2020); McMaster, “How China Sees the World: And How We Should See China,” Atlantic, May
2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/; and McMaster, “Developing Strategic Empathy: History as the Foun-
dation of Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy,” Journal of Military History 84, no. 3 (2020).
2. Hearing on Global Security Challenges, Before e Senate Armed Services Committee, 117th Cong. 5
(2021) (statement of retired Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, US Army), https://www.armed- services
.senate.gov/.
82 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decoding the Adversary
McMaster’s argument for empathy is not entirely novel. As one scholar recently
noted, “Empathy is not a new concept in international relations or strategy.”
3
Indeed, in
1966, 1984, and 1991, a US Information Agency research ocer argued for “realistic
empathy” to better understand the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Iraq, while former Secre-
tary of Defense Robert McNamara’s rst lesson from his reections on the Vietnam War
was to “empathize with your enemy.”
4
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also
exhorts in his memoir that US failures in Afghanistan resulted from policymakers being
“profoundly ignorant about our adversaries and about the situation on the ground.”
5
Applying strategic empathy in future planning is essential. Aer all, military
strategy requires “astute analysis of friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy interests
and will.”
6
Further, Joint doctrine discussing the information environment argues,
“the Joint Force must change how it views, plans, and executes operations” by devel-
oping “the ability to understand the perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that
drive behaviors.”
7
e need for strategic empathy is especially acute given the 2022
National Defense Strategy’s focus on deterrence. As one political scientist explains,
three decades of research on deterrence emphasizes one crucial fact: “It is the percep-
tions of the potential aggressor that matter, not the actual prospects for victory or the
objectively measured consequences of an attack.”
8
Despite the calls for strategic empathy and evidence of its importance, what it is
and how to practice it remain unclear. To address these issues, this article argues stra-
tegic empathy concerns itself with understanding the interests and motivations of oth-
ers in order to shape their behavior in support of one’s national interests. is process
is enacted through employment of strategic narratives and analysis of others’ narra-
tives. Political actors, whether individuals or a collective, use these narratives to dene
and mobilize political communities toward their future goals.
In this regard, strategic narratives provide a useful entry point from which foreign
observers can attain information regarding the interests, motivations, and future
policy directions of others. Such narratives also indicate how such information can be
used to shape foreign behavior in ways aligned with one’s own strategic objectives.
Taken together, approaching strategy through strategic empathy requires one actor,
3. Claire Yorke, “Is Empathy a Strategic Imperative? A Review Essay,” Journal of Strategic Studies 46,
no. 5 (2023): 2, https://doi.org/.
4. Robert McNamara, In Retrospect: e Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 2017);
Ralph K. White, “Misperception and the Vietnam War,” Journal of Social Issues 22 no. 3 (1966); White,
“Empathizing with Saddam Hussein,” Political Psychology 12, no. 2 (1991); and White, Fearful Warriors: A
Psychological Prole of US- Soviet Relations (New York: Free Press, 1984).
5. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 589.
6. Strategy, Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta [CJCS],
2019), vi.
7. Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment, Joint Publication (JP) (Washington,
DC: CJCS, 2022), 19.
8. Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 7,
https://www.rand.org/.
Hinck & Cullen
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 83
via strategic narratives, to consider—although not necessarily accept—the needs and
concerns of others and to be willing to adapt one’s own behavior and messaging to
resonate with foreign audiences. Dening strategic empathy, including its linkage to
strategy and international politics, helps clarify what strategic narratives are and how
they function to achieve strategic empathy.
Empathy and Security Studies
Broadly speaking, empathy is the “art of stepping imaginatively into the shoes of
another person, understanding their feelings and perspectives, and using that under-
standing to guide your actions.”
9
Empathy is thus action- oriented and includes both
cognitive and aective dimensions. e cognitive dimension, known as “perspective
taking,” is the practice of conscious, deliberate attempts to understand how others
perceive and experience the world. In contrast, empathy’s aective dimension focuses
on attempts to align one’s feelings with others by understanding their emotional states
and how those emotions factor into their behavior.
10
Empathy is distinct from concepts like sympathy or compassion. Whereas sympathy
and compassion both imply a prosocial and benevolent attitude toward others, empathy
does not inherently require such positive regard.
11
In other words, one can empathize
with another person’s situation, mindset, and/or emotions without sharing, agreeing, or
approving of their perspective.
12
Indeed, the practice of empathy requires one to main-
tain a distinction between the self and other.
13
Failure to do so not only risks introducing
egocentric biases and inaccuracies regarding others’ perspectives but can also cause neg-
ative interpersonal outcomes when linked to perceptions of self- threat.
14
Empathy can be applied at both the micro and macro levels. One can engage in
empathy to understand an individual’s mindset, such as that of political leader Rus-
sian President Vladmir Putin. Or one can engage in empathy for a generalized
other—a grouping of individuals with shared experiences, values, cultural back-
grounds, and other factors, such as Russians more broadly. Both instances require at
least some knowledge of the subject. Research shows it is easier to empathize with
those more similar to ourselves and harder to empathize with those with whom we
9. Roman Krznaric, Empathy: Why It Matters, and How to Get It (New York: Perigee, 2014), x.
10. Yorke, “Empathy.”
11. Ute Frevert, Emotions in History: Lost and Found (Budapest: Central European University Press,
2011), 150, 178; White, Fearful Warriors, 9; and Krznaric, Empathy, ix.
12. Matt Waldman, Strategic Empathy: e Afghanistan Intervention Shows Why the U.S. Must Empathize
with Its Adversaries (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2012), 2, https://static.newamerica.org/.
13. Amy Coplan, “Understanding Empathy: Its Features and Eects,” in Empathy: Philosophical and Psy-
chological Perspectives, ed. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5.
14. Claudia Sassenrath, Sara D. Hodges, and Stefan Pfattheicher, “It’s All about the Self: When Perspec-
tive Taking Backres,”Current Directions in Psychological Science25, no. 6 (2016).
84 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decoding the Adversary
have greater dierences.
15
Consequently, US strategists will likely nd it easier to
empathize with culturally congruent nations than with more culturally divergent
nations or nonstate actors.
Strategic Empathy
Strategy requires empathy. According to omas Schelling, strategic situations are
those whereby “the best course of action for each player depends on what other play-
ers do.”
16
Accordingly, the most fundamental solution concepts in game theory as-
sume a player’s ability to view the game from another’s perspective.
17
Beyond strictly
rationalist perspectives of strategic behavior, humanists argue empathy is critical in
understanding the human landscape within which strategy achieves its desired ends.
18
Empathy, then, is foundational to all theories of strategic behavior, including perspec-
tives from idealism (constructivism), liberalism, realism, feminism, and neo- Marxism
with a core thread of international relations research associating the absence of empa-
thy with policy failures and greater insecurity.
19
Analytically, the term strategic empathy is best understood as a more focused
subcategory of empathy. As stated, strategic empathy entails one’s attempt to under-
stand another actor’s aective and cognitive perspectives of a situation in order to
cra a response that advances one’s own national interest. If practiced correctly,
strategic empathy is a crucial factor in gaining information about an adversary or
ally’s motivational thinking with emotional considerations as important as cognitive
considerations.
20
Yet the strategic goal does not end in information gathering. Gaining insight into oth-
ers’ worldviews achieves strategic outcomes only when that information is applied: it
must be used to design one’s behavior in a manner such that the targeted other draws the
desired conclusions from it.
21
In other words, strategic empathy ensures one’s strategic
behavior aligns with the other’s perceptions in order to inuence that other’s behavior in
15. Peter Goldie, “How We ink of Others’ Emotions,”Mind & Language14, no. 4 (1999); Goldie,e
Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Amy Coplan, “Will
the Real Empathy Please Stand Up? A Case for a Narrow Conceptualization,”Southern Journal of Philoso-
phy49, no. 1 (2011).
16. omas C. Schelling, e Strategy of Conict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 3.
17. Tania Singer and Ernst Fehr, “e Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy,” American
Economic Review 95 no. 2 (2005).
18. Yorke, “Empathy.”
19. Joshua D. Kertzer, Ryan Brutger, and Kai Quek, “Perspective Taking and the Security Dilemma:
Cross- national Experimental Evidence from China and the United States,” October 1, 2023, World Politics
(forthcoming), https://jkertzer.sites.fas.harvard.edu/; and Yorke, “Empathy.”
20. John D. Grover, Strategic Empathy as a Tool of Statecra(Washington, DC: Center for the National
Interest, 2016), http://cni.org/; and Joshua D. Kertzer and Dustin Tingley, “Political Psychology in Inter-
national Relations: Beyond the Paradigms,” Annual Review of Political Science 21 (2018).
21. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1976).
Hinck & Cullen
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 85
ways supportive of one’s national interests. Mere comprehension of others’ interests falls
short of achieving one’s strategic outcome if not combined with action.
For example, when the Carter administration normalized relations with China,
progress occurred only when National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski un-
abashedly labeled the Soviet Union a threat to global security while sharing US in-
telligence on Soviet missile locations with Chinese leaders. In contrast, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance’s prior negotiations with Chinese ocials failed due to his mea-
sured discussion of US- Soviet relations. Despite both US ocials’ knowledge of the
Sino- Soviet split and China’s interest in combatting Soviet inuence, only Brzezinski
was able to communicate US policy in a manner resonant to Chinese leaders, in-
cluding his usage of more emotive descriptions of Soviet character and interests.
22
Obstacles to Empathy
In the realm of international politics, understanding other actors is easier said than
done. As classical realism notes, the anarchical structure of the international system
breeds uncertainty and incentivizes actors to misrepresent private information to oth-
ers.
23
Consequently, failures of empathy frequently lead to security dilemma thinking
whereby actions taken by one state to augment its own security leads others, in re-
sponse, to increasingly fear for their own security, resulting in spiraling conict.
24
In addition to structural challenges posed by the international environment, hu-
man factors can make empathy harder to employ. McMaster highlights one of these
areas by discussing the problems of hubris and narcissism. Focusing on US foreign
policy decision- making specically, McMaster asserts that US beliefs in American
superiority and past military dominance lead policymakers to ignore the wants and
needs of others, overemphasize US agency, and discount others’ abilities to shape the
strategic environment.
25
e United States is not alone when struggling to empathize with others. Leaders
of other nations inaccurately focus too heavily on their own perceptions of threat
while discounting their adversaries’ sense of vulnerability.
26
Studies show rational and
moral thought processes are inhibited when humans are dealing with emotionally
charged issues.
27
During conict situations, practicing empathy is more dicult when
22. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Collins, 1985), 197–219.
23. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: e Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw- Hill,
1985); and James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995).
24. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978); Jervis,
“Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20, no. 3 (1968); and Jervis, Perception.
25. McMaster, Battlegrounds.
26. Janice G. Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: e Misperception of reat,” Political Psychol-
ogy 9, no. 2 (1988).
27. Grover, “Strategic Empathy”; Karla McLaren, e Art of Empathy: A Complete Guide to Life’s Most
Essential Skill (Boulder, CO: Sounds True, 2013), 272–74; and John Garnett, “e Causes of War and the
Conditions of Peace,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, ed. John
Baylis et al. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 81.
86 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decoding the Adversary
opposing parties demonize the other, fueling in- group/out- group mentalities that re-
inforce negative stereotyping and superiority dierentiation, which then prompt
greater egoistic behavior.
28
Despite these challenges, an aspect of international relations research suggests em-
pathizing with others helps prevent and manage conict. One analysis argues empathy
is crucial to breaking out of the security dilemma and can generate greater apprecia-
tion for the causes of fears in others, thereby mitigating actions that would otherwise
lead to greater feelings of insecurity or threat.
29
Studies have found that putting one-
self in another’s shoes is “pivotal” to the de- escalation of spiraling conict and that
empathy can serve as an “antidote” to the overestimation of one’s importance, mediat-
ing the prevalence of enemy images and narratives of enmity that do not reect the
realities and complexities of the situation.
30
As a recent study on cross- national empa-
thy shows, prompting individuals to see international issues through the eyes of other
states can increase domestic support for international cooperation.
31
Yet a more nuanced analysis suggests the practice of empathy can have a dark side
as well. In competitive situations, engaging in perspective taking can accentuate per-
ceptions of conict, “akin to pouring gasoline on a re.”
32
If actors perceive each other
as having opposing goals, perspective taking can make cooperation less likely by
heightening awareness of conicts of interest and reducing trust.
33
Moreover, actors
with strong emotional attachments to their in- group identity who engage in perspec-
tive taking of a hostile out- group may see the out- group as more of a threat to their
own self-identity when social identity is involved.
34
When nationalism comes into
play, individuals deriving their self- esteem from membership within their national
community may become more prejudicial toward a hostile out- group when asked to
engage in perspective taking.
35
While these studies demonstrate the complexities of empathetic thought processes
in international politics, they fall short in explaining how strategic empathy is en-
acted. Practitioners are thus le with instructions to improve their perspective- taking
skills without consideration as to what ends to apply them toward.
36
is position
28. Garnett.
29. Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth, e Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World
Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
30. Joshua Baker, “e Empathic Foundations of Security Dilemma De- escalation,” Political Psychol-
ogy 40, no. 6 (2019); and Yorke, “Empathy.”
31. Don Casler and Dylan Groves, “Perspective Taking through Partisan Eyes: Cross- national Empa-
thy, Partisanship, and Attitudes toward International Cooperation,” Journal of Politics85, no. 4 (2023).
32. Jason R. Pierce et al., “From Glue to Gasoline: How Competition Turns Perspective Takers Un-
ethical,” Psychological Science 24, no. 10 (2013).
33. Kertzer, Brutger, and Quek, “Perspective Taking.”
34. Mark Tarrant, Ra Calitri, and Dale Weston, “Social Identication Structures the Eects of Per-
spective Taking,” Psychological Science 23, no. 9 (2012).
35. Kertzer, Brutger, and Quek, “Perspective Taking.”
36. Allison Abbe, “Understanding the Adversary: Strategic Empathy and Perspective Taking in Na-
tional Security,” Parameters 53, no. 2 (2023).
Hinck & Cullen
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 87
seeks to improve the quality of information for information’s sake alone, focusing on
immediate, tactical interactions among interlocutors rather than strategically shaping
the security environment. Yet approaching strategic empathy through the framework
of strategic narratives not only mitigates misperceptions but also oers a framework
to inuence foreign actors’ perceptions and behaviors.
A Lens for Achieving Strategic Empathy
Storytelling has long been a central mechanism by which humans understand others’
worldviews. Stories—via books, movies, or other storytelling media—present a cast of
characters with various motives unveiled by the narrative’s plotlines and scenes of ac-
tion. Audiences lose themselves in well- delivered stories, nding their own attitudes and
intentions changed.
37
Over time, stories form one’s own understanding of the world, in-
cluding their and others’ places within it. For these reasons, assessing foreign actors’
strategic narratives oers a useful entry point into understanding and shaping the strate-
gic worldviews undergirding their foreign policy behavior and military strategies.
Scholars of international relations increasingly recognize the power of strategic
narratives in international politics. According to one analysis, political actors use stra-
tegic narratives as a communication tool to give determined meaning to the past,
present, and future in their pursuit of some political goal.
38
Such narratives operate on
three levels: 1) international system narratives describing how the world is structured;
2) national narratives describing the story of the state, including its values, goals, and
identity; and 3) issue narratives describing why a certain policy is needed or disputed.
Strategic narratives serve multiple strategic functions. First, narratives about the
state help unite domestic audiences toward collective action by dening a shared
identity. Stories about a nation’s history, founding principles, moral integrity, and cul-
tural prestige all supply the ontological foundation of a state. is foundation explains
who constitutes the “we” (present), which allows the collective to progress by estab-
lishing not only what “once was” (past) but also what “ought to be” (future).
39
In the
US context, these foundational myths include American democratic exceptionalism
and beliefs in the universal value of individual rights. When activated, these values
enable the United States to pursue a global agenda. When in doubt, or during times of
division, US policy turns inward.
37. John Deighton, Daniel Romer, and Josh McQueen, “Using Drama to Persuade,” Journal of Con-
sumer Research 16, no. 3 (1989); Richard J. Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological
Activities of Reading (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); and Tom van Laer et al., “e Extended
Transportation- Imagery Model: A Meta- analysis of the Antecedents and Consequences of Consumers’
Narrative Transportation,” Journal of Consumer Research 40, no. 5 (2014).
38. Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication
Power and the New World Order (New York: Routledge, 2014).
39. Jelena Subotić, “Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change,” Foreign Policy Analy-
sis 12, no. 4 (2015).
88 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decoding the Adversary
Second, strategic narratives make international politics intelligible. Comprehend-
ing the overwhelming complexity of the world necessitates cognitive shortcuts.
40
Nar-
ratives provide key sensemaking functions by connecting events together within a
larger cause- eect plotline, explaining why certain agents act in the manner reported.
On the international level, this includes characterizing one’s allies and enemies, rein-
forcing one’s own identity through contrasts to others, and describing routine ways in
which international agents treat each other in pursuit of state interests. Such narrative
contrasts are evident in the case of the Cold War when US leaders referred to the So-
viet Union as an “evil empire”; in US policy following the 9/11 terrorist attacks
through the global war on terrorism; and, most recently, in US descriptions of strate-
gic competition with China as a battle between autocracy and democracy.
Over time, national identity narratives and stories about the international system
sediment within society, forming cultural cognitive boundaries enabling and con-
straining the activities of political actors.
41
States form national security cultures de-
rived in part by their national mythologies, narrative constructions of past events, and
relationships with historical friends and foes.
42
Although strategic narratives can adapt and change, eectively doing so requires
the new narrative elements to be interpreted within the previous ones to preserve a
sense of before and aer.
43
Prominent strategic narratives can therefore imbue state
policy with enduring master frameworks shaping future policy behaviors in unana-
lytical and nonreexive manners.
44
Russia’s anti- Western foreign policy can be read as
a legacy of the Cold War while the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative of rejuvenat-
ing China’s strength is rooted in a “century of humiliation” and deeper sense of Chi-
nese civilizational importance. us it is possible to identify a country’s narrative tra-
jectory and future policy pathways, making assessment of others’ strategic narratives a
fertile ground to engage in strategic empathy.
45
Military Understanding through Narrative
Narratives play a crucial role in military operations. Joint Publication 3-04, Informa-
tion in Joint Operations, states “narratives are an integral part of campaigns, operations,
40. Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Di-
lemma,”European Journal of International Relations12, no. 3 (2006).
41. Janet Hart, “Cracking the Code: Narrative and Political Mobilization in the Greek Resistance,” So-
cial Science History 16, no. 4 (1992).
42. omas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Peter J. Katzenstein, e Culture of National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Brent J. Steele,Ontological
Security in International Relations: Self- identity and the IR State (London: Routledge, 2008).
43. Felix Berenskoetter, “Parameters of a National Biography,” European Journal of International Rela-
tions 20, no. 1 (2014); and Subotić, “Narrative.”
44. James V. Wertsch, “e Narrative Organization of Collective Memory,” Ethos 36, no. 1 (2008).
45. Robert S. Hinck et al., e Future of Global Competition: Ontological Security and Narratives in
Chinese, Iranian, Russian, and Venezuelan Media (New York: Routledge, 2022).
Hinck & Cullen
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 89
and missions.”
46
As one scholar explains, “Military strategy is situated in broader politi-
cal and public spheres that are linked by storytelling.”
47
Narratives and military strategy
work together to inuence adversaries by uniting perceptions and understandings of
security, interests, action, and intent. Narratives’ strategic impacts stretch across the con-
tinuum of competition by setting, shaping, and contesting the information environment
prior to and during conict.
Approaching strategic empathy through narrative analysis has multiple practical
and theoretical benets for strategists. First, viewing empathy as a narrative compe-
tency best explains how one comes to empathetically understand others and helps
avoid egocentric biases. Rather than attempting to understand others’ actions by ex-
amining their current mental states, a narrative approach can uncover the why of such
actions by placing them within a deeper contextual plotline attuned to others’ histori-
cal and cultural experiences. Narratives oer a “form or structure” that helps one
frame their understanding of others’ behaviors. By understanding others’ actions
through narratives, “we start to see others engaged in their actions, not simply in
terms of the immediate and occurrent context,” and “we start to see them as engaged
in longer- term projects (plots) that add meaning to what they are doing.”
48
Second, pursuing strategic empathy through narrative understanding contributes
toward a more accurate conceptualization of warfare. Citing Carl von Clausewitz, one
philosophy scholar explains, “War is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate
matter,” with treatment of it as such “bound to lead to one mistake aer another.”
49
Incorporating empathy thus helps balance the military’s “customary predisposition”
toward physical dynamics of warfare including its human elements.
50
Whereas physical sciences rely on etic understandings of the world, or knowledge
produced through only observable behavior, empathy concerns itself with emic un-
derstandings, or knowledge of the meanings and interpretations that drive human
behavior.
51
Although an etic understanding of warfare is necessary, by itself it is insuf-
cient. Empathy marks an epistemic necessity to warfare, aligned with Clausewitz’s
human conceptualization of it, by establishing understandings of others’ symbolic
perceptions of their strategic situations.
52
Analysis of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine illustrates the problems of an
overly etic approach to war. Focusing on Russia’s overwhelming materiel advantage,
46. Information in Joint Operations, JP 3-04 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2022), II-5.
47. Nick Blas, “Beyond Storytelling: Strategic Narratives in Military Strategy,” Æther: A Journal of Stra-
tegic Airpower & Spacepower 2, no. 1 (2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
48. Shaun Gallagher, “Empathy, Simulation, and Narrative,” Science in Context 25, no. 3 (2012): 371.
49. Kevin Cutright, “e Empathetic Soldier,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27, no. 2
(2019); and Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 149.
50. Cutright, 279.
51. Robert H. Lavenda and Emily Ann Schultz, Core Concepts in Cultural Anthropology, 3rd ed. (Bos-
ton: McGraw- Hill, 2010), 43.
52. Cutright, “Empathetic Soldier.”
90 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decoding the Adversary
strategists believed that Kyiv would quickly fall. Instead, facilitated by Ukrainian Pres-
ident Volodymyr Zelensky’s leadership,the invasion of the capital ignited Ukrainian
nationalism and led to stout resistance.
Evaluating Strategic Narratives
While strategic narratives can help unveil other actors’ views of the strategic land-
scape, as with empathy, misreading them risks miscalculation. Avoiding the traps of
incorrectly applying strategic empathy onto others’ strategic narratives requires a brief
consideration of what makes strategic narratives eective. Strategic narratives achieve
a persuasive eect not through factual accuracy but by the degree to which they reso-
nate with audiences. is resonance comes from the story’s coherence and delity.
Narrative coherence describes whether the story makes internal sense—whether
the characters and their motives and actions ow as expected, with audiences needing
sucient detail or characterization of the agents involved to be able to draw desired
conclusions from the story. Narrative delity reects whether a story has external
validity—whether it rings true to audiences by aligning with their life experiences,
values, and previous outcomes witnessed.
53
Narrative delity thus is both a resource and constraining factor for elites when
constructing strategic narratives. At any given time, multiple narratives circulate
among various social institutions, including those constructed by media and govern-
mental structures.
54
Elites then activate and deactivate certain narrative elements over
others to garner support for specic policy agendas. For the story to dene audiences’
social reality such that they support or act toward the intended goal, however, a criti-
cal mass of social actors must accept it as common sense.
55
Eective narratives there-
fore must fulll the audience’s need for meaning and purpose while maintaining some
level of credibility.
As all political communities possess their own political myths and narrative ori-
gin stories, the persuasiveness of a strategic narrative relies on the degree to which
such stories can claim universality and cohere with others’ strategic narratives.
56
Narrative persuasion then is grounded in empathy and achieves transnational ef-
fects by invoking shared political values and emotions. Eective international nar-
ratives can coax nations into supporting foreign campaigning, such as when the
53. Walter R. Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: e Case of Public Moral
Argument,” Communications Monographs 51, no. 1 (1984).
54. Margaret R. Somers and Gloria D. Gibson, “Reclaiming the Epistemological ‘Other’: Narrative and
the Social Construction of Identity,” in Social eory and the Politics of Identity, ed. Craig Calhoun (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994).
55. Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press, 2015); and Charlotte Epstein, e Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an
Antiwhaling Discourse (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).
56. Olivier Schmitt, “When are Strategic Narratives Eective? e Shaping of Political Discourse
through the Interaction between Political Myths and Strategic Narratives,” Contemporary Security Policy
39, no. 4 (2018).
Hinck & Cullen
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 91
United Kingdom and France used Alliance narratives in 2011 to garner American
support for military intervention into Libya.
57
ey can also be used by adversaries
to undermine such commitment, such as Russia’s usage of strategic narratives in the
2014 Ukraine conict.
58
Toward a Framework for Assessing Strategic Narratives
Given the strategic function of narratives and the inner grammar of their construc-
tion, analyzing how foreign actors construct and project narratives about the interna-
tional environment can reveal meaningful insight into their national interests and key
levers of support or contestation. Due to their public nature, strategic narratives oer
one of the most available entry points into empathizing with others. An analysis of
strategic narratives begins rst by identifying prominent speeches, media coverage of
elite rhetoric, and/or countries’ strategic documents. Next, a descriptive examination
of the core elements of the narrative is required—that is, strategists must identify the
actions, agents, scenes, instruments, and motives provided in the story and how these
elements operate at issue, national, or international levels.
ird, strategists must evaluate the narrative’s logic, setting aside their own cultural
and cognitive biases in an attempt to understand how and why the narrative serves
some purpose for the political actor(s) involved. If some element of the narrative
seems absurd, factually incorrect, or too alien to comprehend, the strategist should
seek further understanding from regional experts or other sources of information.
Finally, only aer the strategist achieves a sucient understanding of the other’s
narrative should they begin to consider how their own objectives align or conict with
others’. In doing so, strategists seek ways to articulate their interests in a manner intel-
ligible to others such that the target audience’s behavior is shaped either in coopera-
tive support of the strategist’s interests—the logic of so power and attraction—or
through the target audience’s recognition and acceptance of the strategist’s deterrence
messaging—the logic of hard power.
As strategists analyze foreign actors’ strategic narratives and articulate their own,
they must bear in mind the intersubjective nature of international aairs. While strat-
egists may focus their inquiry on one specic foreign actor, they must not eschew the
interests and roles of other countries or political actors in interpreting and reinforcing
perceptions of global aairs. Although countries’ capabilities vary, building coalitional
support for one’s narrative, or reducing that of a competitor’s, can multiply the persua-
sive impact of a strategic narrative such that it achieves a critical mass of support from
strategic stakeholders, resulting in greater narrative dominance.
As such, when analyzing others’ narratives and reecting upon one’s own interests,
strategists need to consider the degree of coherence and delity their depiction of
57. Laura Roselle, “Strategic Narratives and Alliances: e Cases of Intervention in Libya (2011) and
Economic Sanctions against Russia (2014),” Politics and Governance 5, no. 3 (2017): 103.
58. Maria Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2015), 7, https://www.understandingwar.org/.
92 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decoding the Adversary
world aairs may hold for multiple audiences. e more insular one’s interests are, or
the more specic one articulates those interests, the less space others may have to
share in the story, reducing the narrative’s strategic impact. Enactment of strategic
empathy is thus a two- way process, with the pursuit of one’s interests bounded by the
target audience’s wants and needs; this requires not only an ability to articulate one’s
interests eectively but also a willingness to, at times, adjust one’s policy or behavior
so that it aligns with others.
Consideration of others’ narratives is especially important in a post- Cold War era
as globalization continues to both connect and fragment political communities along
cultural and economic fault lines. Unfortunately, two decades of US policy has largely
ignored others’ interests while emphasizing cosmopolitan values that have little reso-
nance for developing nations. Evidence of this comes from global debates over Russia’s
2022 invasion of Ukraine. Instead of viewing the conict as an aront by Russia to the
global order, media narratives and political speeches from Middle Eastern countries
and the Global South characterized it as merely a war between Russia and the West.
In both cases memories of the past inuenced the perception of the present. For
Arabic nations, European countries’ warm welcome of Ukrainians eeing Russia’s on-
slaught was contrasted to the plight of Syrian refugees rejected by Europe. For those in
the Global South, the story was but another example of imperialism at work with
weaker nations le to bear the burden of higher food and energy costs.
59
While such
narratives are only partially correct—German Chancellor Angela Merkel initially wel-
comed many Syrians at political cost—they demonstrate the latent eects of ignoring
others’ material needs, which US competitors like Russia and China actively highlight
to discredit the current global order.
Enacting Strategic Empathy
At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin warned that the world had reached
a “decisive moment” where it needed to “seriously think about the architecture of
global security.”
60
In doing so, he projected an international system narrative rebuking
the Western- led order as deeply “awed,” lacking “moral foundations,” and leading to
a “world in which there is one master, one sovereign”—a world that is “pernicious”
for “all those within this system” to which Russia would actively contest.
61
is speech marked the start of Russia’s revisionist trajectory, followed by Russia’s mili-
tary invasions of Georgia in 2008, interventions on behalf of Bashar Al- Asad in Syria, and
annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014. roughout this period, Moscow increasingly
projected identity narratives lauding Russia’s military capability and economic resiliency,
59. Colum Lynch, “e West Is With Ukraine. e Rest, Not So Much,” Foreign Policy, March 20, 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/; and Neil MacFarquhar, “Developing World Sees Double Standard in West’s Ac-
tions in Gaza and Ukraine,” New York Times, October 23, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/.
60. Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security
Policy,” February 10, 2007, Munich, Germany, transcript, http://en.kremlin.ru/.
61. Putin.
Hinck & Cullen
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 93
demonized the West, and anointed itself as the champion of conservative religious
values—all of which granted the nation a greater sense of agency and purpose.
62
While critical of such claims, the West largely fell victim to Russia’s narratives. West-
ern societies not only turned inward, succumbing to Russia’s antiglobalist agenda by
pursuing isolationist policies and increased questioning of NATO’s relevance, but also
ceded to Russia’s security claims. Most notably, in 2014, a Foreign Aairs analysis con-
tended that the 2014 Ukraine crisis was “the West’s fault.”
63
Although this analysis of
Russian interests held weight, the conclusion—blaming the West while excusing Rus-
sian aggression—marked a sympathetic approach toward Russian interests grounded in
an etic understanding of the structural dynamics of international politics rather than
one of strategic empathy. Such analysis not only neglects the desires and agency of other
nations, but also weakens Western resolve while emboldening Russian behavior.
Although Moscow eventually fell victim to its own strategic narcissism, prevention
of future conict and the pursuit of US national interests are best served not by sym-
pathizing or ignoring competitors’ interests but by enacting strategic empathy. is
includes a mixture of hard and so power eorts to articulate the rules of the interna-
tional system in ways resonant to others and a willingness by the United States and
partner nations to defend them. Successful strategic empathy thus requires the study
and assessment of others’ security challenges as a means for aligning other actors’ will
in support of US national security; it includes the evaluation of competitor, partner,
Ally, and neutral nations’ identities and interests as a means to shape regional and
global information spaces in ways that dissuade aggression by others.
Fortunately, some evidence of this approach can be seen with current US policy
toward China. e US narrative of strategic competition provides space both for co-
operative and competing engagements with others. Engagement with regional parties
helps raise the costs of China’s aggression while solidifying others’ commitment to-
ward a rules- based regional order. Such eorts will need to continue, including greater
investments into narrative persuasion backed with meaningful action to solidify ex-
pectations and routinize cooperative behavior. In the Asia- Pacic region, this means
the United States and its Allies must create alternative, multilateral economic oppor-
tunities while highlighting the deleterious consequences of China’s mercantilist poli-
cies. e United States must also continue to link Beijing’s support for Moscow to
maintain commitment from European nations to rethink their interests with China,
including the use of their collective bargaining power to set fairer trade practices and
reduce domestic dependencies on Chinese trade.
Ultimately, China’s dangerous attempts to remake the international order must be
shown as such. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s narrative vision of the “China Dream,”
oers key leverage points to inuence China’s future trajectory, in particular its con-
tinued ability to deliver economic growth and regain the sense of the loss of prestige
62. Hinck et al., Future.
63. John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: e Liberal Delusions at Pro-
voked Putin,” Foreign Aairs 93, no. 5 (2014).
94 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Decoding the Adversary
and cultural leadership. In both cases, the United States’ ability to demonstrate Xi’s
lack of progression toward such goals can shi Chinese leaders’ strategic calculus
through eorts to link Xi’s policies to a declining security environment and reduced
moral authority, evident in a coalescence of competing forces, a distasteful partner-
ship with Russia, and weakening domestic growth.
Finally, while characterizing the US- China relationship as a battle between democ-
racy and autocracy may be an alluring identity narrative, reframing the competition
as one over economic growth, rather than values, avoids discrediting the entirety of
China’s leadership with such a narrative likely more resonant to developing nations
lacking the luxury of ideological considerations. Taken together, arming how far
China has come while noting how far it could fall if it pursues its militarism can re-
frame its future actions, but only if the United States commits to doing so. Successful
strategy toward China, then, requires more than just an understanding of what China
wants; it requires US strategists to act upon and communicate this understanding in
such a way to keep the world’s second largest economy from turning away from the
very system that enabled its growth.
Conclusion
As the United States reenters a period of great power competition, this one character-
ized by its relative power decline, strategic empathy becomes increasingly critical for
strategy practitioners. e distinct advantage of empathy in its capacity to deepen our
understanding of the adversary can potentially unveil vulnerabilities and avenues for
maintaining a competitive advantage, while identifying areas for cooperation as well.
e strategic empathy framework detailed above enables one to detect disruptions
through analysis of others’ strategic narratives. Built upon layered analysis, this under-
standing facilitates the juxtaposition of varying narratives, which reveal others’ inherent
power structures, objectives, and underlying strategic logics. is in turn gives insights
into the core values and interests of others and assists in identifying pivotal shis that
may call for deeper scrutiny. Beyond these strategic utilities, the framework aids in gaug-
ing the eectiveness of campaigns that can challenge others’ narratives.
Regardless of the geopolitical backdrop, the universal truth remains: there is an ever-
present benet in comprehending others more deeply and authentically. By harnessing
insights oered by strategic empathy through a narrative framework, one can navigate
the intricate web of great power competition and ensure their strategies are not just reac-
tive but also forward- thinking and transformative, leading to continuing advantage. Æ
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 95
Ethics and Warfare
MORAL INJURY
Wounds of an Ethical Warrior
DouGlas e. luMpkiN
philip N. sTewarT
Joel D. korNeGay
Moral injury disproportionately aects uniformed service members. When unaddressed, it
can cause personal devastation and impair readiness. Yet moral injury is not a problem to
be solved; rather, it functions as a check on military institutions. By understanding moral
injury as an expected result of humans at war and as a feature of the ethical warrior, leaders
can increase readiness and build more resilient service members. ose who embrace their
inner humanity and accept the risk to warn others of moral and ethical dangers should be
supported, not ostracized. Shiing the conversation from elimination to preparation, mili-
tary branches can create a culture where warriors can better align moral principles with
their chosen profession of military service and deal with moral injury more eectively.
F
or as long as there have been wars, humans have carried the scars of battle. In
the past few decades, the concept of moral injury (MI) has been engaged to as-
sist service members with understanding the internal wounds they encounter.
An examination of moral injury, including the continuum along which moral wounds
occur, the ways in which service members carry these wounds, the manner in which
unresolved moral concerns project onto others—particularly the unit—and the ways
in which moral injury has been cognitively conned into existing military paradigms
challenge the military to reexamine the phenomenon as both an inevitable and inher-
ent feature of humanity.
Given the enduring nature of war and the complex moral dilemmas that military
personnel encounter, a thorough understanding of MI will result in improved out-
comes for individuals and will foster a more resilient force.
Major Douglas Lumpkin, USAF, DMin, is an instructor at the Air Force Chaplain Corps College, Air University.
Captain Philip Stewart, USAF, DTheol, is the unit chaplain for the 9th Mission Support Group, Beale Air Force
Base, California.
Lieutenant Colonel Joel Kornegay, USAF, DMin, is the staff chaplain for the Defense Intelligence Agency, Wash-
ington, DC.
96 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
Moral Injury Examined
Moral injury is the “psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral, and social im-
pact of perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress one’s
deeply held moral beliefs.”
1
e key word in this denition is transgress, derived from
the Latin terms trans and gradi, meaning “to step over.” e morally injured person
has drawn a line in the sand. Life on one side involves behaving as a moral being act-
ing in good faith in the world. Life on the other side involves perpetrating, failing to
prevent, or bearing witness to things a moral being abhors. e individual has
“stepped over” over this line, having violated their deepest convictions. ey may have
a valid justication for their actions—an ethical dilemma, a mandatory order, or un-
fortunate circumstances—but they cannot reconcile the event internally. Moral injury
diers from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the conceptual understanding of
the wound and the agent. One study notes,
PTSD, by its nature as a clinical construct, implies guilt and shame to be
pathological. Moral injury, in contrast, frames guilt and shame as normal re-
sponses by a moral agent with an active conscience attempting to reckon with
the moral complexity of combat deployment, which may or may not include
the direct experience of warfare.
2
Moral injury has also been described as the “eects of the dierence between the
way things are and the way things should be.”
3
Many Americans are raised with rudi-
mentary ethical structures formed by families, schools, community groups, and reli-
gious organizations; oen simple platitudes prevail. During initial military training, a
simplistic understanding of the world can continue uncontested by the service com-
ponents. Core values are emphasized as the fundamental building blocks of each
branch, and many service members’ worldviews are not challenged with critical re-
ection. What remains for most recruits is a highly curated, optimistic, and unrealistic
understanding of the world in which they are entering.
1. Brett T. Litz et al., “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and Inter-
vention Strategy,” Clinical Psychology Review 29, no. 8 (December 2009): 697, https://doi.org/.
2. Chris J. Antal, Peter D. Yeomans, and Dana S. Kaminstein, “Transforming Veteran Identity through
Community Engagement: A Chaplain- Psychologist Collaboration to Address Moral Injury,” Journal of
Humanistic Psychology 63, no. 6 (November 2023): 803, https://doi.org/.
3. Douglas E. Lumpkin, “Moral Injury: A Chaplain’s Perspective” (lecture, Basic Chaplain Course, Air
Force Chaplain Corps College, Maxwell AFB, AL, January 21, 2021).
Lumpkin, Stewart & Kornegay
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 97
Figure 1. Continuum of moral injury
At some point, many service members will face a situation that does not easily
align with their preconceived notions of how the world or the American military sys-
tem functions. Perhaps it is when they witness combat for the rst time, or when a
trusted leader betrays shared values. For many, it is in that same moment of experi-
encing a potentially morally injurious event that they begin to seriously reect on
their “default” beliefs about how the world ought to work.
4
e cultural background for many Americans, especially those raised in the United
States, has not necessarily prepared them to grapple with complex moral situations. So-
ciety seldom contemplates morally complicated questions such as, “Is it ethical to kill a
child to keep your battle buddies alive?” And while most service members will intui-
tively recognize the dilemma between their expectations and their current reality, very
few will have received moral injury training or completed the deep self- reection that
may potentially oset the dissonance created by potentially morally injurious events.
4. James W. Fowler, Stages of Faith: e Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981).
98 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
Furthermore, MI wounds are not identical but instead vary in severity on a con-
tinuum consisting of three levels: (1) moral pain, (2) moral distress, and (3) acute
moral injury.
5
Moral Pain
Moral pain is a common occurrence when an individual’s experience does not
align with their understanding of what is right or good. Generally, individuals have
the conceptual and community resources to address this type of challenge.
Moral Distress
If moral pain remains unreconciled, however, moral distress can occur, resulting in
increased sorrow and anxiety. is is particularly common in complex situations, such
as when an individual is faced with the dilemma of choosing between two irreconcil-
able “right” or “wrong” options or when shared values are betrayed by a trusted leader.
Acute Moral Injury
Any form of unresolved moral distress may escalate into acute MI, resulting in po-
tentially serious physical, mental, and spiritual consequences.
6
As MI may occur in a
variety of ways, it is important to note that events rarely fall into simplistic categories,
such as a singular transgression of moral expectation. It is compelling to classify indi-
viduals as either perpetrators, victims, or witnesses. Yet people seldom see their com-
plex situations in such clear- cut terms. For instance, if someone suers harm from a
leader, they may also feel anger toward themselves for supporting or continuing to
participate in the same system.
In one moral injury narrative, a female service member reports providing sexual
favors for a unit commander in exchange for protection from regular exposure to
enemy action. e member’s distress was multifaceted, concerning their own sexual
exploitation (as “victim”), their complicity in exposing other service members to dan-
ger (as “perpetrator”), and their inaction to the exploitation of others (as “silent wit-
ness” to systemic abuse). All three personas exist and overlap within the broader
framework of MI.
Moral Injury Carried
Military members who hold mismatched expectations between their ideal of how
their world should work and how the world is currently functioning and who lack a
complex moral framework are highly susceptible to moral injury. Psychiatrist Jonathan
5. Philip Stewart, presentation to Invisible Wounds Initiative, via teleconference, Headquarters US Air
Force, Washington, DC, September 21, 2021.
6. “Hard Truths and the Duty to Change”: Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the
Military (Washington, DC: DoD, June 2, 2021), 10, 22.
Lumpkin, Stewart & Kornegay
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 99
Shay coined this term in the mid-1990s aer an extended process of attempting to help
Vietnam veterans reintegrate into society.
7
Moral injury is so intrinsically tied to the mil-
itary that the bulk of the research deals specically with service members and veterans.
ose who participate in war are at a heightened risk of developing maladaptive be-
haviors. Combat exposure is particularly signicant as it “raises stakes and generates ex-
treme situations so reliably.”
8
Relationship issues, anger, and an increase in “multiple
mental health symptoms” are all connected to the taking of a life in combat.
9
e “atroci-
ties of war” have a direct eect on “hazardous alcohol use and drug abuse symptoms.”
10
Furthermore, the risk of committing morally injurious actions “that fall within the
rules of engagement” increases in relation to “combat exposure and deployment
length.”
11
A United Kingdom study of veterans treated by military clinicians found
high levels of moral distress—a precursor to MI—among their veteran patients.
12
Exposure to morally injurious events increases the risk of suicide in post-9/11 vet-
erans. Betrayal, the longest- studied and most frequently cited trigger for moral injury,
doubles the risk for a suicide attempt during a member’s time in service. Likewise,
women who acknowledge betrayal have over 50 percent higher risk for suicide both
during and aer separation from the service.
13
Suicide, while an extreme outcome,
serves as a strong indicator of the profound impact service members suer when ex-
periencing betrayal, either perceived or real.
Betrayal is also a prominent concern of personnel impacted by sexual violence. A
DoD commission concluded that individuals who experienced military sexual trauma
felt a sense of betrayal from the perpetrators of the assault, their chain of command,
and the overall system that was meant to provide support following the traumatic
event.
14
Betrayal is a strong predictor of moral dissonance, and repeated minor trans-
gressions can rise to the level of acute MI.
15
7. Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Scrib-
ner, 1994).
8. Joseph McDonald, Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts (Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publish-
ers, 2017), 23.
9. Shira Maguen et al., “e Impact of Reported Direct and Indirect Killing on Mental Health Symp-
toms in Iraq War Veterans,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 23, no. 1 (February 2010): 89, https://doi.org/.
10. Allison R. Battles et al., “Moral Injury and PTSD as Mediators of the Associations between Morally
Injurious Experiences and Mental Health and Substance Use,” Traumatology 24, no. 4 (December 2018):
253, https://psycnet.apa.org/.
11. Sheila Frankfurt and Patricia Frazier, “A Review of Research on Moral Injury in Combat Veterans,”
Military Psychology 28, no. 5 (June 9, 2016): 321, https://doi.org/.
12. Victoria Williamson, Neil Greenberg, and Dominic Murphy, “Moral Injury in UK Armed Forces
Veterans: A Qualitative Study,” European Journal of Psychotraumatology 10, no. 1 (2019): 4, https://doi.org/.
13. Shira Maguen et al., “Moral Injury and Peri- and Post- Military Suicide Attempts among Post-9/11
Veterans,” Psychological Medicine, published online January 17, 2022, 5, https://doi.org/.
14. “Hard Truths,” 10, 22.
15. Elizabeth G. Epstein and Ann B. Hamric, “Moral Distress, Moral Residue, and the Crescendo Ef-
fect,” Journal of Clinical Ethics 20, no. 4 (2009); Henk ten Have and Mario do Céu Patrão Neves, “Moral
Residue,” in Dictionary of Global Bioethics (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, May 28, 2021); and Jill Horning,
“e Moral Consequences of Context” (thesis, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, 2015).
100 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
Counterintuitively, geographic proximity to hostilities does not aect risk. e
technology of remotely piloted aircra permits crews to be thousands of miles physi-
cally removed from their target while maintaining a close cognitive and empathic
connection.
16
Pilots and sensor operators are separated merely by the screen distance,
approximately eighteen inches, from the perpetration of violence. Remote warriors
“kill an enemy combatant, see the horror of his body being blown apart or his blood
spewing everywhere, watch his heat signature escape from his body as he dies, and
watch those that come to mourn his death—all in zoomed- in high- denition color.”
17
Likewise, Intelligence Community professionals, who appear even further removed
from hostilities, can also experience moral injury. As part of their routine duties, ana-
lysts examine violent content through images, audio, and video, and clandestine op-
erators depend upon lies and deception to thwart enemy objectives. Such situations
can lead to moral distress, violating the notion that one should always act with integ-
rity and speak the truth in all circumstances.
For individual service members, the impacts of unaddressed MI can be devastat-
ing. “e capacity for trust” in others is impaired, and they may experience an ele-
vated level of despair.
18
If a rigorous eort is not undertaken to confront the disso-
nance, it will continue to haunt the morally injured person, and they will persist in
behavior that “undermine[s] their own well- being and engagement in life.”
19
Moral Injury Projected
e profound individual toll associated with unresolved MI can lead to a awed
assumption by those who observe it. Rather than embracing the systemic nature of
the problem, leaders are apt to assume the service member alone will bear the brunt.
is is an understandable assumption, as one of the leading indicators of MI is isola-
tion. Personnel “experience a withdrawal,” removing “themselves from their support
systems and society in general.”
20
Yet the impacts of MI are rarely contained within
the sphere of an individual human being and frequently extend to both the family and
the military unit.
Leaders are frequently shielded from the specic details of their subordinates’
home life as individuals attempt to maintain autonomy and separation between their
personal and professional duties. Insofar as individuals wish to maintain this separa-
tion, it is reasonable to assume leadership may be unaware of severe moral injury until
16. Dave Blair and Karen House, “Avengers in Wrath: Moral Agency and Trauma Prevention for Re-
mote Warriors,” Lawfare (blog), November 12, 2017, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/.
17. Kenneth Wayne Phelps III, On Killing Remotely: e Psychology of Killing with Drones (New York:
Hachette Book Group, 2021), 206–7.
18. Jonathan Shay, “Moral Injury,” Psychoanalytic Psychology 31, no. 2 (April 2014): 182, https://
psycnet.apa.org/.
19. Frankfurt and Frazier, “Review,” 322–23.
20. MaryCatherine McDonald, “Haunted by a Dierent Ghost: Re- inking Moral Injury,” Essays in
Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2017): 5, https://doi.org/.
Lumpkin, Stewart & Kornegay
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 101
the member’s readiness is disrupted by the symptoms. If the fallout from maladaptive
social behavior, relationship complications, and mental health concerns begin to over-
whelm the member’s ability to cope, those who are experiencing instability in the
mental, spiritual, and social domains will progress until they are unable, unwilling, or
unqualied to meet their work mission requirements.
Physical ailments are also a symptom of moral injury. Research indicates suerers
associated not just mental anguish with their untreated moral wounds but also
chronic, physical pain.
21
One clinical psychologist explains “bodily pain” is “more fa-
miliar than ‘trauma pain,’ ” and service members “nd it easier to focus upon, and to
complain about physical pain than to connect with the various forms of the distress-
ingly subtle, indenable, and incomprehensible forms of psychological pain.”
22
By classifying their symptoms as physical pain, service members are permitted to
exert seeming autonomy over the situation and can engage in a nonstigmatized
form of treatment.
23
Pain is also a useful rationale for further isolation and avoiding
additional triggers or other potentially morally injurious situations. Regardless of
which factors are exhibited, an inability to accomplish the mission might be a po-
tential sign of one of the three forms of wounds experienced along the continuum
of moral injury.
When MI persists over an extended time frame, what initially appeared to be issues
with personal readiness or discipline in the member can present in an increasingly
severe symptomology. A chaplain recounts this phenomenon aer accompanying a
collection team at the site of a rotary wing crash, where all souls aboard were lost. e
decision by the team leader to y a training mission, despite weather warnings, haunts
the rescuers with a sense of systemic, moral betrayal to this day:
I keep in touch with [members of] the search and rescue team. . . . Many of
them exited the service shortly aer, and I do not believe that is a coinci-
dence. Some just waited for their enlistments to run out, but others began to
have signicant issues that did not seem to match their previous work ethic.
ings just began to happen to these men and women as they processed that
21. Hannah M. Hinkel et al., “Moral Injury and Chronic Pain among Military Veterans in an Inte-
grated Behavioral Health Clinic,” Psychological Trauma: eory, Research, Practice, and Policy 15 (2023):
140–43, https://doi.org/; Rachel L. Boska et al., “Understanding Moral Injury Morbidity: A Qualitative
Study Examining Chaplain’s Perspectives,” Journal of Religion and Health 60, no. 5 (October 2021): 3090–
99, https://doi.org/.
22. Renos K. Papadopoulos, Moral Injury and Beyond: Understanding Human Anguish and Healing
Traumatic Wounds (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 4.
23. See Pinky Dharmshaktu, Vandana Tayal, and Bhupinder Singh Kalra, “Ecacy of Antidepressants
as Analgesics: A Review,” Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 52, no. 1 (January 2012): 6–17, https://doi.org/;
and Gregory T. Carter and Mark D. Sullivan, “Antidepressants in Pain Management,” Current Opinion in
Investigational Drugs 3, no. 3 (March 2002): 454–58, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/.
102 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
event. Some of them did not have the capacity, ability, resources, or support
they needed to handle it in a good way.
24
e shock of handling human remains, especially “for those who are unaccus-
tomed or unprepared . . . is one of the most consistent predictors of long- term
distress.”
25
Feeling that those sacrices were unnecessary turned this tragedy into a
morally injurious event. Barring comprehensive, force- wide engagement on MI,
members are required to either hide symptoms, depart service, or face discharge aer
destructive outcomes manifest.
A further impact on the military organization is unit eectiveness in combat. One
former commander for a remotely piloted aircra squadron explains that “causing
moral injury is a tactic of the enemy.”
26
With advances in emergency medical care and
the increase in troop safety aorded by technology, battleeld casualties are far less
frequent than in previous conicts. As a potential adversary looks for new ways to in-
ict wounds on troops, they leverage the moral framework of American service mem-
bers as a tactic to create psychiatric and spiritual casualties. Methods such as employ-
ing human shields or establishing ghting positions in hospitals or religious sites can
be seen as a purposeful tactic to reach this end state. e desired outcome is to push
the combat operator into a moral extreme.
On one end of the spectrum, the service member hesitates to engage for fear of vio-
lating their own standards or facing society’s moral consequences. On the other, they
allow anger to cloud their interpretation, outright dismissing the rules of engagement
and employing an ends- justies- the- means ethic, up to the committing of war crimes
and atrocities. Both outcomes can be exploited.
In the narrative below, a veteran explains how a morally injurious situation quickly
modied his moral framework on the battleeld:
In Iraq, one of their biggest tactics was . . . female suicide bombers. So, there
was a school there for special needs girls . . . anywhere from 10–15 years old,
and they would take them out of the school and rig those explosives and tell
them to walk. . . . at changed my moral compass. . . . I have no problem
shooting guys in the face. You know, it’s like, ahh, that’s the reason. . . . I [real-
ized] I do not have any issues, that I can sleep real good at night knowing I
shot these guys in the face. . . . at’s tough.
27
24. Philip N. Stewart and Douglas E. Lumpkin, “Bearing Witness: A Phenomenological Analysis of the
Intersections between Service Members, Military Chaplains, and Potentially Morally Injurious Events,” in
Moral Injury Research, Discussions, and Support Methods, vol. 2, ed. Susan Watson and Daniel L. Roberts
(Robbins, NC: Moral Injury Support Network for Servicewomen, Inc., 2023), 53–54.
25. Litz et al., “Moral Injury,” 696.
26. David Blair, “Understanding Remote Warfare: Cognitive Distance vs. Physical Distance” (lecture,
SOCOM 2019 Moral Injury Symposium, Washington, DC, August 6, 2019).
27. McDonald, “Haunted,” 15.
Lumpkin, Stewart & Kornegay
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 103
In the same story, both extremes play out. On one hand, this combat veteran ex-
presses a personal animosity toward the injustice he is witnessing. Unchecked, these
feelings can lead to vigilantism. Per the interviewer, however, the statement, “at’s
tough,” was not about the young women who were being targeted, but rather that the
veteran was “surprised and troubled by his lack of shame or guilt.”
28
e injured are tormented by a world that lacks moral boundaries. Moral injury is
not just an individual concern. A frequent refrain to describe veterans across multiple
generations of combat is “the war followed them home.” is is just as true for the
military units as it is for the families who express these sentiments. ose who do not
or are not able to process their experiences can only internally contain the suering
for so long. At some point, the ripple eects will be noticed by all those around, in-
cluding the military organizations they serve.
Moral Injury Confined
e phenomenon of moral injury has the potential to hamper unit eectiveness
through hesitancy to act in morally ambiguous situations, through shis in unspoken
organizational ethos, and through transgressions which range from minor up to full
dereliction of ethics, while causing readiness issues for individuals and their families.
erefore, it is important for leaders to confront the causes and eects of MI. Fur-
thermore, commanders have their own moral responsibility to fulll, namely, return-
ing the nation’s sons and daughters to life as a civilian aer their time of service is
completed. When facing a crisis of this magnitude, military leaders may be tempted to
treat MI with an “identify, diagnose, and eliminate” methodology. To mediate the ef-
fects of MI on the force, two systems are oen proposed as potential solutions: mili-
tary medicine or education and training.
Military Medicine
e military medical system specializes in caring for the wounds of combat. In recent
decades there has also been a heightened focus on PTSD and traumatic brain injury.
ese maladies have been categorized as “invisible wounds,” considered the “signature
injuries” of the Global War on Terror.
29
Simultaneously, veterans have voiced a growing
awareness of their own moral injuries. Given the presence of occasional overlapping
symptoms, some in the medical community have integrated MI treatment as a compo-
nent of the existing invisible wounds framework.
30
28. McDonald, 12.
29. National Council on Disability, Invisible Wounds: Serving Service Members and Veterans with
PTSD and TBI (Washington, DC: March 4, 2009), https://les.eric.ed.gov/.
30. Philip Held et al., “Using Prolonged Exposure and Cognitive Processing erapy to Treat Veterans
With Moral Injury- Based PTSD: Two Case Examples,” Cognitive and Behavioral Practice 25, no. 3 (August
2018): 17–18, https://doi.org/.
104 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
ough convenient to group these wounds into a similar category, this simplica-
tion leads to problematic conclusions. By implementing a medical model, a service
member may assume they are broken and must be xed; there is signicant concern
that pathologizing moral injury could lead to it being seen as a “stain on the service
member’s or veteran’s moral character.”
31
Commanders may also assume someone
honestly wrestling with moral complexity is unt for the mission. is is a dangerous
precedent, leading to moral and spiritual health being used as a go/no- go indicator for
readiness. is behavior will likely drive further stigma and ensure that dissonance
will be le to fester.
Moral injury experts question “the ecacy of the psychiatric paradigm when used
as a sole or in some cases even a primary resource for approaching unusual forms of
veteran distress such as those oen associated with MI.”
32
Traumatic experiences need
not be regarded as dysfunctions, but rather as unfortunate but vital components of a
person’s story, capable of producing development and even personal growth as that
person engages in the exploration and processing of dicult situations.
Training and Education
Similarly, the military’s training infrastructure is another compelling system in
which to employ a solution for MI. It is robust, exists at every stage of the personnel
life cycle, and excels at distributing military- specic information to large groups of
people. Yet top- down directed training also presents both legal and perception hur-
dles. As morality signicantly overlaps religious and spiritual issues, treading too far
into this territory is constitutionally dangerous. Similarly, those “struggling with
moral conict may perceive justications coming from military commanders, psy-
chologists, and chaplains, even when well- intentioned, as a form of betrayal, and con-
sequently lose trust and develop a sense of alienation.”
33
Furthermore, there are “a variety of moral injuries suered” and a “variety of
repair[s] . . . [as] each experiences war dierently.”
34
Mass training is bound by time
constraints and a need for uniformity, neither of which address important needs for
those with moral concerns. While some eective preventative work can be done, such
as training leaders on ethical decision-making, this is not a sucient substitute for
intentional development of individual members’ abilities to critically reect on moral
and ethical matters.
31. Erika Ann Jeschke, “Marooning Moral Injury,” Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Space-
power 2, no. 3 (Fall 2023), 75, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/.
32. David W. Alexander, “Dening and Dierentiating Moral Injury’s Key Features,” Mental Health
and Addiction Research 3, no. 3 (2018): 6, https://doi.org/.
33. Tine Molendijk et al., “Contextual Dimensions of Moral Injury: An Interdisciplinary Review,”
Military Psychology 34, no. 6 (November 2, 2022): 747, https://doi.org/.
34. Nancy Sherman, Aerwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2015), 10.
Lumpkin, Stewart & Kornegay
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 105
While it is vital to introduce the general concepts of moral injury, traditional mili-
tary training methods are unlikely to produce any further practical benets. MI is
messy and individualized. A deeper understanding of the subject and methods for
healing would remain beyond the extent of what most service- wide training programs
could provide.
Moral Injury Reexamined
Medical and military training models have signicant limitations, and leaders oen
resort to the familiar “nd, x, and nish” methodologies to address battleeld issues.
As a result, these factors contribute to assumptions that impede the military’s capacity
to confront the complexities of MI. e greatest misconception is that moral injury
can be completely prevented. Yet the injury is as old as war itself, and warriors have
recorded its eects as long as writing has been a mode of communication.
35
e only
way to eliminate MI in combat is to eliminate warfare completely. erefore, the most
ecacious step toward reducing the impact is for the nation’s leaders to carefully con-
sider the physical, mental, and spiritual burdens placed on their warriors before or-
dering them into combat.
As former President Jimmy Carter has said, “War may sometimes be a necessary
evil.”
36
Violence, death, and destruction are the core ingredients of combat. No matter
how justiable its cause, military members will be injured, the innocent will be harmed,
and lives will be lost. Yet, if we acknowledge the existence of a “necessary evil,” that re-
quires inicting harm to prevent greater harm, it implies that some actions taken by hu-
mans as a result of inherently good human characteristics—courage or the desire to
protect others—result in individual harm done while providing increased safety to oth-
ers. e ability to experience MI embodies this feature of humanity.
Moral injury, when best understood and when processed in a meaningful way, is
more akin to a guardrail than a disease. ose who face MI should not be seen as
weak or broken. Rather, this feature of their humanity should be embraced, as an out-
right positive display of the character required in which to conduct a ght justly.
ose who embrace their inner humanity may function as the proverbial canary in a
coal mine, warning others of dangers, while placing themselves at risk.
For example, while the incident still would have occurred, an individual raising their
moral distress regarding the actions of Kilo Company, ird Battalion, First Marine
Regiment, in Haditha on November 19, 2005, would not only have made a signicant
dierence in the months that followed, but also expressing this distress may have
changed the narrative relayed to the public surrounding US involvement in Iraq.
37
35. Shay, Achilles, 6.
36. Jimmy Carter, “Nobel Peace Prize Lecture” (lecture, Nobel Peace Prize, Oslo, Norway, December 10,
2002), https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/.
37. William Langewiesche, “Rules of Engagement,” Vanity Fair, March 26, 2007, https://www.vanity
fair.com/.
106 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
While an enemy might try to leverage foundational morals against the force, it re-
mains true that a well- developed human conscience is the strongest tool of diplomacy
available, increasing overall eectiveness of a force in the information warghting
function for internal, ally and partner, and even enemy recipients of a prevailing nar-
rative. Moral warriors should be educated and cultivated. Leaders ignore these voices
at their peril.
Furthermore, experienced warriors must act as safety valves for future generations.
When expressed, MI is the root of the nation’s conscience, acted out in a human form.
By reecting upon the folly of their own experiences, veterans may spare the nation’s
sons and daughters from moral and physical harm.
Great leaders and tacticians understand this role of moral injury. It explains how
William Tecumseh Sherman can say, “I am sick and tired of ghting. . . . Even success
the most brilliant is over dead and mangled bodies. . . . It is only those who have never
heard a shot, never heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded and lacerated (friend
or foe), that cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation.”
38
And later,
as then US Army Chief of Sta Dwight Eisenhower said, “I hate war as only a soldier
who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity.”
39
It
is through the means of moral humans that nations should execute warfare, and like-
wise, be constrained by those same individuals.
Moral Injury Embraced
If the ability to be morally injured is not a weakness but rather a necessary feature
of a healthy and ethical human conscience, then leaders at all levels must understand
and embrace this uniquely human phenomenon inside of military formations. e
discussion of disorienting experiences and healthy processing of traumatic events
should be modeled by leaders, and service members must receive opportunities to
explore these concepts without fear of retaliation. Likewise, military leaders must inte-
grate the inevitable consequences of using moral beings as a weapon system into a
foundational understanding of the force. Yet this is not necessarily intuitive to military
leaders nor support agencies, which both rely on existing models to inform their
thinking on this issue.
One applied behavioral ethicist advises leaders to view their organization’s moral
network as a human immune system. is paradigm places moral injury in an appro-
priate frame of understanding. Like the body, service members become exposed to
harmful events which may produce MI; such is the nature of living. ey will need to
know how to respond to those events. ey will need to build immunity to those
things which intend to do them harm.
40
It is for this reason that inoculations can build
38. B. H. Liddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American (New York: Da Capo Press, 1993), 402.
39. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address before the Canadian Club” (Canadian Club, Ottawa, Canada,
January 10, 1946), https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/.
40. Marc- Charles Ingerson and Douglas E. Lumpkin, “Developing Moral Agility: Parallels from the
Human Immune System,” preprint, submitted February 20, 2023.
Lumpkin, Stewart & Kornegay
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 107
qualied, controlled immunity without direct exposure to an agent that would other-
wise result in catastrophic consequences. Intense exposure to moral- injury- inducing
events can overload the moral immune system, but cautious inoculation can train the
moral immune system to react rightly to potentially morally injurious events.
A human’s immune system contains three lines of defense against harmful elements:
• e barrier immune system is the most eective layer of defense, keeping patho-
gens outside of the organism. A primary representation of this feature is the
skin, which forms a shield that blocks harmful entry.
• A more generalized defense is the innate immune system. At this level, the body
uses uniform tactics to quickly respond to and counter pathogens. is one-
size- ts- all approach does not always work and may require a more advanced
tactic from the adaptive immune system.
• e adaptive immune system is the last resort when a pathogen has not been han-
dled by the other defensive mechanisms. As the most specialized layer, it recog-
nizes harmful characteristics and builds immunity to any future encounters.
When the body’s lines of defense function, both independently and in tandem,
they enhance the system’s ability to maintain overall health. Understanding this lay-
ered approach can oer valuable insight into determining the most eective areas for
the military enterprise to focus its eort on developing immunity against the most
adverse eects of MI. In applying the insight of this analogy to the military context,
the service components can strengthen their three lines of defense to combat the po-
tential dangers of MI.
Ethical Image Barrier
e initial component of the human immune system analogy is the barrier layer. In
the same fashion that one’s skin presents a certain image of the body to the world, the
United States military also presents an image to the public. e skin layer for the mili-
tary is the presentation and discussion of common values and norms of military ser-
vice—the profession of arms as a shared value and the explicit and implicit narratives
that accompany this.
To demonstrate an image of an authentically moral force would further curb the
negative eects of MI. In this system, standards for moral and ethical choices remain
high. Service members seek a nuanced understanding of complex world events and
opposing forces without resorting to dehumanizing tactics. Recruits are equipped
with this knowledge before they raise their hand to join, and it continues with them as
part of their formation. ose who would violate those norms are prewarned that it
will not be tolerated and considered a failure to adapt. (Incidentally, this is the image
the military purports to exhibit, but it does not do this in practice.) While this is a no-
ble aspiration, the dicult work in this phase of immunity is ensuring the actions
throughout the organization always meet up with the aspirations. If this layer does not
provide adequate, genuine protection, the system will be overrun by harmful eects.
108 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
Indeed, organizational culture is a protective factor with regard to moral injury.
From the unit to the service level, the authenticity of leadership and organizational
culture have a profound impact on the potential for morally injurious events to occur
and on the reactions of members to these events.
Replicated Innate Moral Values
e second insight from the human immune system concerns the innate immu-
nity level. Something is innate when it is inherited or an essential component. e
most important task for embracing moral injury involves building the knowledge
and acceptance of this peculiar military- centric phenomenon into the DNA of every
troop. It is crucial to provide ethics training that encompasses both specic career
elds and warfare in general. Morally complex scenarios should be inserted into ex-
ercise and training scenarios to build repetitions of this moral muscle in junior of-
cers and enlisted members.
Leaders at every level should strive to model moral thinking in their decision-
making. Furthermore, when betrayal or ethical violations have occurred inside an or-
ganization, leaders should seek to deal with the behavior as transparently as possible.
Shay argues when leaders are “expert, ethical, and properly supported,” many cases of
MI can be completely avoided.
41
Troops “who reported better leadership were more
likely to report following the rules of engagement” and a staggering “30% of soldiers
and Marines reported that their commanding ocers did not clearly disavow unnec-
essary harm to noncombatants.”
42
Additionally, one scholar compellingly argues com-
manders and judge advocates can also prevent MI by “decisively- engag[ing] risk areas
at the embryo stage” as it “might lead to legal issues if le unaddressed.”
43
All service
members are essential to this process.
Rituals have also been shown to play an important role in the processing of MI.
44
e military has a long history of welcoming ritual and imbuing it with meaning for
the force. Expanding opportunities in this realm would prove a useful addition to the
military structure. Events in which service members from past wars impart hard-
earned knowledge to future generations would be incredibly useful.
Likewise, purposeful engagements between civilians and military members, in
which a realistic view of warfare could be shared, would do a great deal to assist per-
sonnel who feel disconnected from the country that sent them to war. Other modern
rituals will also need further development. For instance, a squadron that has a 24-
hour stateside mission has a sign over its front door that reads, “Welcome to the
AOR,” and personnel tap that sign on their way into the building. Conspicuously
missing is a similar ritual for members to be reminded that when they leave for the
41. Shay, “Moral Injury,” 183.
42. Frankfurt and Frazier, “Review,” 321.
43. Erik D. Masick, “Moral Injury and Preventative Law: A Framework for the Future,” Military Law
Review 224 (2016): 267.
44. Molendijk et al., “Contextual Dimensions,” 5.
Lumpkin, Stewart & Kornegay
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 109
day, they are crossing back over from being people of war to people of peace in their
families and communities. Creating scenarios to accept and process moral injury as a
regular part of military life is a crucial step in moving forward, toward a culture that
supports the well- being of service members who have experienced MI.
Specialized Adaptive Interventions
e nal measure of strengthening the MI immune system exists at the adaptive
level. For the body, this stage is where previous exposure allows a targeted and specic
response to a pathogen. Specialized cells undergo a maturation process so they can elim-
inate unwanted intrusions and produce antibodies that mark the harmful substances.
e parallel for the military requires a specic determination and maturation process for
specialized individuals, who could recognize the signs and symptoms of MI.
e chaplain corps is a key resource in this eort. e 72-hour master’s level edu-
cation required for incoming chaplains includes extensive study in morality, spiritual-
ity, ethics, and grief. is prerequisite training, along with their experience in pastoral
care and counseling, makes chaplains a uniquely qualied resource for MI care.
Similarly, experienced warriors who have faced and processed their own moral in-
juries are prime candidates for recognizing and guiding other service members
through a process of integration. What both chaplains and these experienced warriors
share is the ability to function as a “benevolent moral authority.”
45
is is a key ingre-
dient, as veterans consistently report that discussion of morally injurious events “with
friends, colleagues or family members was considered cathartic”; however, those con-
versations alone do not help “to resolve their moral dissonance.”
46
Alongside the right personnel, addressing MI also requires engagement in the con-
texts in which it is most likely to occur. is includes, but is not limited to, post-
deployment, aer the loss of comrades, during human remains collection, aer the
betrayal of a leader, in response to accidents and natural disasters, and prior to the
conclusion of military service. Training, equipping, and deploying chaplains and ex-
perienced warriors to situations in which potential morally injurious events are likely
to occur is vital to combat the harmful eects of unprocessed trauma. Using this
three- tiered model of (1) an ethical image as a barrier, (2) highly replicated innate
moral values, and (3) specialized adaptive intervention techniques, the military sys-
tem can better protect itself against the harmful eects of MI.
Conclusion
Acknowledging moral injury as a normal occurrence for an ethical warrior may be
operationally dicult when a commander or a unit is faced with readiness concerns and
45. Litz et al., “Moral Injury,” 701.
46. Victoria Williamson et al., “e Impact of Trauma Exposure and Moral Injury on UK Military
Veterans: A Qualitative Study,” European Journal of Psychotraumatology 11, no. 1 (December 31, 2020): 6,
https://doi.org/.
110 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Moral Injury
the devastating eects of acute moral injury on those who are suering. Yet the ability to
endure damage to the soul serves as a vital check mechanism within human warriors
and protects the militaries they serve. Implementing recommendations from the immu-
nity model of MI can improve the overall well- being of units and individuals.
Rigorous training on ethical and moral fundamentals, particularly in small group
settings, enables personnel across the force to replicate principled character traits.
Recognizing when MI is present or likely to occur allows chaplains, specialists, and
experienced warriors to impart knowledge to younger generations. Likewise, unques-
tionable ethical conduct at all levels of leadership sets a standard for the institution as
a whole. Leaders must be prepared to meet these challenges with their personnel, en-
suring they are equipped to make appropriate moral and ethical judgments in the
most complex situations. Æ
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 111
Ethics and Warfare
LETHAL TARGETING
THROUGH US
AIRPOWER
A Consequentialism Perspective
DaviD J. kriTz
shaNe a. sMiTh
What model provides a framework for determining a proportional amount of good for
lethal targeting? Employing a qualitative, comparative case study approach, this article
argues that a consequentialist approach can assess proportional good, aiding ethical
decision- making in lethal targeting. e model derived from this analysis provides another
means for policymakers to assess the ethical employment of airpower and spacepower.
is consequentialist perspective enriches the lethal targeting discourse within foreign
policy, complementing existing theories and oering insights into ethical decision- making
in these circumstances.
T
he employment of lethal targeting, once rare, grew signicantly aer Septem-
ber 11, 2001. is politically motivated action is intended to eliminate a per-
ceived threat. Yet the consequences of lethal targeting extend far beyond the
immediate situation, impacting the broader geopolitical landscape. ese conse-
quences underscore the need to address its ethical and practical challenges.
1
is article addresses a crucial question: What model provides a framework for
determining a proportional amount of good for lethal targeting—that is, how does
one determine whether the ends justify the means of a targeted killing? Employing a
qualitative, comparative case study approach, this article argues a consequentialism
ethics approach can assess proportional good, aiding ethical decision- making in tar-
geting. e argument emerges from two case studies that apply consequentialism’s
“weighing machine” of positive versus negative outcomes to analyze each case. e
model derived from that analysis provides another means for policymakers to evalu-
ate the ethical employment of airpower and spacepower.
Dr. David Kritz is the assistant department chair and an associate professor of intelligence studies at the American
Military University.
Dr. Shane Smith is a lecturer, leadership coach, and capstone adviser for Aerospace & Defense Programs, Haslam
College of Business, University of Tennessee.
1. Michael C. Haas and Sophie- Charlotte Fisher, “e Evolution of Targeted Killing Practices: Autono-
mous Weapons, Future Conict, and the International Order,” Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 2
(2017).
112 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Lethal Targeting through US Airpower
Of special note, the article is concerned with ethics, not legality, presuming compli-
ance with international law and the Department of Defense Law of War Manual. e
authors also recognize the extensive doctrine- based processes and procedures the ser-
vices and combatant commands employ for target development, vetting, and valida-
tion, based on their professional experiences. Concepts like noncombatant privilege,
collateral damage, object of attack, military necessity, distinction, military objective,
and proportionality are deeply ingrained in the article’s approach.
2
At no point in this article should the reader conclude the authors assert a violation
of noncombatant privilege, for example. Employing the consequentialist philosophical
lens of a proportional amount of good, the article instead seeks to add to this rich
body of work by going beyond legality to explore the ethical terrain, contemplating
what is morally justied and prudent.
An Ethical Framework
Just War Theory
Originating from classical and Christian philosophical traditions, just war theory
delves into the ethical considerations surrounding warfare and encompasses both jus
ad bellum, or right to war, and jus in bello, or right in war. Jus ad bellum addresses the
criteria for justifying the decision to engage in war, including principles like just
cause, legitimate authority, and proportionality, while jus in bello focuses on the
moral constraints guiding the conduct of war, emphasizing principles of discrimina-
tion and proportionality.
3
is theory, championed by scholars such as omas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius,
serves as a moral compass for policymakers, military leaders, and individuals navigat-
ing the complexities of armed conict, aiming to reconcile the demands of justice
with the realities of international relations. By linking the decision to engage in con-
ict with the responsibility to conduct it justly, just war theory serves as a guiding
principle for the profession of arms, aiming to achieve objectives while upholding
ethical standards.
4
is article applies the theory to the realm of targeting using the
lens of consequentialism.
2. Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Washington, DC: Oce of General Counsel, Depart-
ment of Defense [DoD], updated July 2023), 50–70, https://media.defense.gov/; and Targeting, Air Force
Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-60 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, November 12, 2021),
8–9, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/.
3. Nico Vorster, “Just War and Virtue: Revisiting Augustine and omas Aquinas,” South African Jour-
nal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (2015): 55, 60–62; Gregory Reichberg, omas Aquinas on War and Peace (Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), viii; and Steven Forde, “Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War,”
American Political Science Review 92, no. 3 (1998): 644–45.
4. Eric Patterson, “Just War in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Just War eory aer September
11,”International Politics42, no. 1 (2005): 118; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and Seth Lazar, “War,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, May 16, 2016,https://plato.stanford.edu/.
Kritz & Smith
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 113
Consequentialism
Jeremy Bentham is oen regarded as the founding gure of modern consequen-
tialism with his development of utilitarianism, which prioritizes maximizing happi-
ness or pleasure and minimizing pain as the ultimate moral principle. John Stuart
Mill further rened utilitarianism, emphasizing qualitative distinctions between
pleasures and the importance of individual liberties. Henry Sidgwick contributed
signicantly to consequentialist thought by exploring the complexities and chal-
lenges of utilitarian reasoning.
5
Consequentialism is a broader ethical theory than utilitarianism. It evaluates the
morality of actions based on their consequences, with the principle that the right ac-
tion is the one that leads to the best overall outcome. Utilitarianism is a specic form
of consequentialism that focuses on maximizing overall utility or happiness as the
standard for determining the rightness of actions. us, utilitarianism is a subset of
consequentialism, with its emphasis on maximizing utility being one approach within
the broader framework of consequentialist ethics.
6
In the realm of security studies and lethal targeting, consequentialism ethics oers
a compelling framework for evaluating the moral dimensions of military actions.
Consequentialism is rooted in the principle of maximizing the overall good or utility.
It focuses on the outcomes or consequences of an action rather than its intrinsic moral
nature. is approach hinges on evaluating the balance between positive and negative
outcomes, questioning whether the ends justify the means.
e ethical scrutiny of lethal targeting operations under a consequentialist lens
spurs a thorough examination of whether such actions are the most ethical ways to
achieve the desired results. As such, consequentialism prompts decisionmakers to as-
sess the potential benets and harms of lethal targeting operations, considering fac-
tors such as civilian casualties, long- term strategic objectives, and the broader impact
on societal well- being. As a guide to ethical decision-making, consequentialism
navigates the complex landscape of national security and armed conict by prioritiz-
ing the net positive outcomes of military actions.
7
5. Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism (London: Progressive Publishing Company, 1890), 5–20; John Stu-
art Mill, Utilitarianism (Toronto: Ryerson University Press, 2022), 14–38; and Henry Sidgwick, e Meth-
ods of Ethics (London: Macmillan and Co., 1874), 1–14.
6. Daniel Jacobson, “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: e Case of John Stuart Mill,” Philo-
sophical Review 117, no. 2 (2008): 159–70; and Martin Peterson, “From Consequentialism to Utilitarian-
ism,” Journal of Philosophy 100, no. 8 (2003): 403.
7. Lukasz Kiraga and Andrzej Dzikowski, “Ethical Concerns of the Veterinarian in Relation to Experi-
mental Animals and In Vivo Research,” Animals 13, no. 15 (2023): 2476; Ronald P. Dempsey, Elizabeth E.
Eskander, and Veljko Dubljević, “Ethical Decision- Making in Law Enforcement: A Scoping Review,” Psych
5, no. 2 (2023): 576; and Yakov Ben- Haim, “Robust- satiscing Ethics in Intelligence,” Intelligence and Na-
tional Security 36, no.5 (2021).
114 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
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Lethal Targeting
Lethal targeting, or targeted killing, has been dened as “the intentional, premedi-
tated, and deliberate use of lethal force, by a state or its agents acting under color of
law, against a specic individual who is not in the perpetrator’s custody.”
8
Lethal tar-
geting has been viewed as an ethically ambiguous action.
9
e ethical ambiguity arises
from various factors, including the potential for civilian casualties, a lowered bar for
the tolerance of the use of force, the uncertainty surrounding the identication of tar-
gets, the legality and proportionality of the action, and the broader geopolitical conse-
quences.
10
As such, critics argue lethal targeting can violate principles of just war the-
ory, such as proportionality and discrimination, by causing harm to noncombatants
or targeting individuals without due process.
11
Additionally, the secretive nature of some lethal targeting operations and the lack
of transparency in decision- making processes exacerbate the ethical ambiguity sur-
rounding this practice.
12
Yet proponents of lethal targeting argue it can be justied as a
means of preventing imminent threats and protecting national security interests.
13
Supporters also highlight lethal targeting’s deterrent eect, lower cost in terms of
money and lives, and the inconsistent track record of other foreign policy actions such
as sanctions.
14
ese pro and con considerations highlight the complex ethical consid-
erations involved in assessing the morality of lethal targeting actions. US doctrine for
lethal targeting states “lethal action should be taken in an eort to prevent terrorist
8. Philip Alston, “Statement of UN Special Rapporteur on U.S. Targeted Killings without Due Process,”
ACLU (website), August 3, 2010, https://www.aclu.org/.
9. omas Ward, “Norms and Security: e Case for International Assassination,” International Secu-
rity 25, no. 1 (2000): 106; and Simon Frankel Pratt, “Crossing O Names: e Logic of Military Assassina-
tion,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no.1 (2015): 3, 8.
10. James I. Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, e Ethics of Drone Strikes: Does Reducing the Cost of Conict
Encourage War? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2015), vii–x,
2–6, 40; and David L. Perry, Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation
(Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 5–11.
11. John Lango, “Nonlethal Weapons, Noncombatant Immunity, and Combatant Nonimmunity: A
Study in Just War eory,” Philosophia 38, no. 3 (2010); Neil C. Renic, “Justied Killing in an Age of Radi-
cally Asymmetric Warfare,” European Journal of International Relations 25, no. 2 (2019); and Matthew
Strebe, “And the President Droned On: Just War eory and Targeted Killings,” Episteme 25, no. 1 (2014):
37–40, 43–49.
12. Ward, “Norms,” 124–25.
13. Perry, Partly Cloudy, 5–11.
14. Neta C. Crawford, “Blood and Treasure: United States Budgetary Costs and Human Costs of 20
Years of War in Iraq and Syria, 2003–2023,” Watson Institute International & Public Aairs at Brown Uni-
versity, March 15, 2023, https://watson.brown.edu/; Meghann Myers, “Wars in Iraq and Syria Cost Half a
Million Lives, Nearly $3T: Report,” Military Times, March 17, 2023, https://www.militarytimes.com/; Pratt,
“Crossing O Names,” 8; and Risa A. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?,”
Security Studies, 11, no. 4 (2002).
Kritz & Smith
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 115
attacks against U.S. persons only when capture of an individual is not feasible and no
other reasonable alternatives exist to eectively address the threat.”
15
Proportionality versus Proportional Amount of Good
It is important to note the dierence between the DoD Law of War Manual deni-
tion of proportionality and how this article uses proportional amount of good. e
manual denes proportionality as “the principle that even where one is justied in
acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive.”
16
In contrast,
“proportional amount of good” in consequentialism pertains to the ethical assessment
of actions based on their ability to maximize overall well- being, considering the mag-
nitude of positive outcomes relative to any negative consequences, without direct ref-
erence to military objectives or collateral damage.
17
Comparative Case Studies
In the United States, where human agents remain responsible for targeting decisions
and execution, understanding the human and social dimensions of this process be-
comes crucial. Examining the research question in this way leads to valuable insights
into what constitutes a proportionally good outcome in the context of lethal targeting.
e in- depth analysis of two contrasting case studies reveals the complexities of
lethal targeting as seen through a consequentialist lens. Each represents a dierent
scenario that military personnel encountered when conducting targeting operations.
e rst, the June 7, 2006, strike against Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, represents a long-
tracked, high- value target pursued with dedicated resources over time. In contrast, the
August 29, 2021, strike targeting suspected Islamic State- Khorasan (ISIS- K) militants,
later revealed to be civilians, unfolded amid the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan,
highlighting the challenges of rapid decision- making in uid situations.
Al- Zarqawi Strike
Born in the Jordanian city of Zarqa in 1966, Abu Musab al- Zarqawi became the
symbol of anti- American and anti- Shia resistance in post- invasion Iraq. He took the
helm of al- Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the precursor to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-
Sham (ISIS), drawing jihadists from around the world to Iraq. e reign of al- Zarqawi,
who operated under the cloud of a $25-million American bounty, saw a signicant
surge in suicide bombings. He marshaled a core of approximately 1,200 ghters, in-
cluding ex- Iraqi military and intelligence personnel, orchestrating not only beheadings
15. “Procedures for Approving Direct Action against Terrorist Targets Located outside the United
States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” redacted, declassied document, US Department of Justice, May 22,
2013, https://www.justice.gov/.
16. DoD Law of War Manual, 60.
17. Oscar Horta, Gary David O’Brien, and Dayron Teran, “e Denition of Consequentialism: A
Survey,” Utilitas 34, no. 4 (2022): 368–70.
116 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
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and attacks on coalition forces but also an agenda to cripple Iraqi governance and ig-
nite a Sunni- Shia civil war, leaving a trail of thousands dead in its wake.
18
Al- Zarqawi’s ability to evade death or capture over the years advanced his standing
among jihadists. Narrowly escaping coalition forces twice over 18 months appeared to
embolden him. At his demise, analysts tied the militant leader to jihadists in approxi-
mately 40 countries.
19
e air strike that killed al- Zarqawi occurred shortly aer 6 p.m. on June 7, 2006, at
a safe house in a palm forest 1.25 miles outside Hibhib, approximately 30 miles north
of Baghdad. Aer receiving a tip from Jordanian intelligence, American ocials vec-
tored two F-16s conducting a standard counterimprovised explosive device patrol to
the location, dropping one GBU-12 laser- guided 500-pound bomb followed by a
GBU-38 joint direct attack munition.
20
Reports indicated that six people died in the air strike, including al- Zarqawi, his
spiritual adviser, chief courier, 16-year- old wife, and one child. When coalition forces
arrived on the scene at 6:40 p.m., al- Zarqawi was still alive, but attempts to treat him
proved unsuccessful, and he died on the scene. e air strike occurred aer weeks of
intelligence work focused on tracking the spiritual adviser and chief courier, which
began based on tips from informants.
21
e air strike’s reverberations rippled through the militant ranks, sowing discord
and suspicion. Al- Zarqawi’s lieutenants, afraid of betrayal, interrogated their men in a
desperate hunt for informants.
22
Analysts saw this internal turmoil as a sign of AQI’s
vulnerability, with the New York Times calling the announcement of his death a “major
watershed in the war.”
23
Al- Zarqawi, with his “star power” and role as an “important
cheerleader for Islamic militants in Iraq,” was considered a critical gure, and his
death dealt a severe blow to the morale and cohesion of the group.
24
18. George Michael, “e Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” Defence Studies 7, no. 3
(2007): 338–39, 343, 345, 348; and Donald J. Reed, “On Killing al-Zarqawi—Does United States Policy
Know Its Tools in the War on Terror?,” Homeland Security Aairs 2, no. 2 (July 2006): 3.
19. Michael, 338, 345, 348; and John F. Burns, "U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse," New York
Times, June 8, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/.
20. Combined Operations Center, American Forces Press Network, “Air Force F-16 Airstrike Kills al-
Zarqawi,” USAF, June 9, 2006, https://www.af.mil/; Jim Garamone, “Zarqawi Air Strike Shows Aerial Flex-
ibility, General Says,” US Air Force (USAF), June 16, 2006, https://www.af.mil/; Scott Macleod et al., “How
ey Killed Him,” TIME Magazine, June 11, 2006, and Peter Chambers, “Abu Musab Al Zarqawi: e
Making and Unmaking of an American Monster (in Baghdad),” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37, no.
1 (2012): 40.
21. Chambers, 40; Burns, "Safehouse,"; and Macleod et al.
22. Macleod et al., “ey Killed Him.”
23. Burns, “Safehouse."
24. Macleod et al., “ey Killed Him”; “Will It Make a Dierence? e Death of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi,” Economist 379, no. 8481 (June 10, 2006): 43; Burns; and “Coalition Forces Kill Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi,” USAF, June 8, 2006, https://www.af.mil/.
Kritz & Smith
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 117
For coalition forces, the killing resonated as a moral victory and a psychological
boost.
25
In this vein, e Economist declared it “America’s single biggest scalp in nearly
ve years of ghting Islamist terror,” a potent symbol of resilience in the face of brutal
tactics.
26
Similarly, al- Zarqawi’s demise served as a stark message to remaining jihad-
ists: the Americans were a powerful foe, capable of taking down even the most notori-
ous gures.
27
Moreover, the elimination of the man estimated to be responsible for
over 6,000 deaths oered a much- needed boost for both the Bush and al- Maliki ad-
ministrations in the United States and Iraq, respectively.
28
Conversely, not all analysts saw al- Zarqawi’s death as a turning point for the better.
Skeptics pointed to the decentralized nature of the Iraqi insurgency, arguing that
removing one node would not cripple the network. ey warned martyrdom could
elevate al- Zarqawi into a powerful recruiting tool, inspiring the next generation of
jihadists. Furthermore, his foreignness alienated some within the insurgency, who did
not consider al- Zarqawi their leader. His brutal tactics, oen targeting civilians, had
also backred, creating distance from elements of the resistance. For these analysts, his
removal risked galvanizing support for the jihadists’ cause rather than diminishing it.
29
Osama bin Laden’s response was swi. Within a week, he tapped Abu Hamza al-
Muhajir, an Egyptian, to ll the void le by al- Zarqawi. Aer that, the organization
that would ultimately become ISIS put in place a process of succession embedded in
its newly formed concept of a protostate structure to promote the long- term legiti-
macy of the leader and the organization.
30
Applying a consequentialist lens. An analysis of the targeted killing of al- Zarqawi
applying a consequentialist framework examines the air strike’s intended and unin-
tended consequences to assess its ethical justiability.
e US objective in targeting al- Zarqawi was multifaceted. Primarily, it aimed to
eliminate a prominent terrorist leader responsible for signicant violence and instability
in Iraq. In terms of intended consequences, planners hoped his death would disrupt
AQI’s operations, demoralize its members, and potentially deter future acts of terrorism.
e strike also aimed to send a message of resolve to insurgents and bolster Iraqi morale.
In terms of positive consequences, the strike temporarily reduced the levels of in-
surgent violence, disrupted al- Qaeda leadership, and generated a symbolic victory.
Al- Zarqawi’s death led to a short- lived decline in AQI’s attacks and overall violence in
25. Michael, “Legend,” 348; and Reed, “On Killing,” 2.
26. “Will It Make a Dierence?”
27. Daniel Byman, “What Zarqawi’s Death Means for the Insurgency,” Brookings, June 8, 2006, https://
www.brookings.edu/.
28. Burns, “Safehouse”; Michael, “Legend,” 348–49.
29. Reed, “On Killing,” 2; “Will It Make a Dierence?”; Byman, “Zarqawi’s Death”; and Michael, 350–51.
30. Michael, 348; and Haroro J. Ingram and Craig Whiteside, “Generation Killed: e Challenges of
Routinizing Global Jihad,” War on the Rocks, August 18, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/.
118 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
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Iraq.
31
is outcome suggests the strike achieved its primary objective of mitigating
immediate terrorist threats. Removing a charismatic and inuential leader like al-
Zarqawi caused temporary disarray within AQI, potentially hindering its operational
capacity and recruitment eorts.
32
e successful targeting of a high- prole individual
boosted American morale and demonstrated the United States’ commitment to com-
bating terrorism on a global scale.
In terms of negative, unintended consequences, the strike resulted in the deaths of
innocent civilians, a violation of the principle of noncombatant immunity. is out-
come raises ethical concerns about the proportionality of the action and the potential
for long- term resentment. Another negative consequence of the strike, increased or
sustained levels of violence, suggests the long- term impact of the killing of al- Zarqawi
might be ambiguous. While violence initially dipped, AQI eventually recovered and
even escalated its attacks under new leadership. e strike, as part of the broader Iraq
War, contributed to the destabilization of the country, creating a power vacuum and
breeding ground for future extremist groups.
33
Of note, this last unintended consequence bears signicant negative weight and raises
questions about the wider geopolitical ramications of the action. e power vacuum
created aer al- Zarqawi’s death and the broader intervention in Iraq contributed to the
rise of ISIS, a more brutal and global threat than AQI. is repercussion illustrates the
complex ripple eects of military interventions. e civilian casualties and perceived
disregard for Iraqi sovereignty fueled anti- American sentiment in the region, hindering
long- term eorts to foster cooperation and counterterrorism initiatives.
34
Overall, the strike against al- Zarqawi demonstrates the complex nature of conse-
quentialist analysis in complex situations. While the intended consequences prior to
the strike seem to align with the ethical principle of maximizing good, the negative
unintended consequences resulting from the strike raise signicant ethical concerns
and highlight the inherent risks of such actions. Despite those concerns, the implica-
tions of removing a known senior terrorist leader with international signicance from
the battleeld compels a denitive moral judgment: the good outweighed the bad.
31. Reed, “On Killing,” 1–9; and Stephanie S. Kostro and Garrett Riba, “Resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraq:
Eect on Security and Political Stability,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 4, 2014,
https://www.csis.org/.
32. Kostro and Riba; Kenneth Katzman, Iraq and al Qaeda, RL32217 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service [CRS], 2007), 10; Exploiting Disorder: al- Qaeda and the Islamic State (Brussels: Interna-
tional Crisis Group [ICG], March 14, 2016), 16, https://www.crisisgroup.org/; and Iraq aer the Surge I:
e New Sunni Landscape (Brussels: ICG, April 30, 2008), 2, 11–12, 16–19, https://www.crisisgroup.org/.
33. Brian Fishman, “Aer Zarqawi: e Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” Washington Quar-
terly 29, no. 4 (2006): 25; and Peter Galbraith, Unintended Consequences: How War in Iraq Strengthened
America’s Enemies (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 1–5.
34. Jenna Pitchford, “e ‘Global War on Terror,’ Identity and Changing Perceptions: Iraqi Responses
to America’s War in Iraq,” Journal of American Studies 45, no. 4 (2011); and Amy LeBlanc, "Embedded
Journalism and American Media Coverage of Civilian Casualties in Iraq," (Master's thesis, Universitetet i
Tromsø, 2013), 30.
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ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 119
ISIS- K Strike
August 2021 witnessed a frantic race against time as coalition forces orchestrated
their withdrawal from Afghanistan. e Taliban’s rapid oensive threatened the Af-
ghan government, culminating in its capture of Kabul on August 15. Adding to the
turmoil, on August 26, amid the thousands desperately seeking escape at Hamid Kar-
zai International Airport (HKIA), Abdul Rahman al- Logari, a member of ISIS- K, det-
onated a suicide bomb, killing 13 American service members and 169 Afghans.
35
In the wake of this attack, roughly 60 threat streams emerged, pointing toward fur-
ther ISIS- K attacks at HKIA.
36
Yet the concentration of coalition forces at the airport
hampered their ability to eectively assess the veracity of these threats. Faced with the
converging risks of the recent attack, the advancing Taliban, and the barrage of infor-
mation, American forces adopted a heightened state of vigilance, perceiving Kabul as
a complex and interconnected “threat landscape.”
37
In this tense atmosphere, American personnel launched an air strike on August 29
against a suspected ISIS- K target believed to be preparing to launch another attack
against HKIA. On that day, six MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial systems tracked a
white Toyota Corolla that was suspected of being part of an imminent threat to per-
sonnel conducting evacuation activities at the airport. e Reapers monitored the ve-
hicle for over eight hours aer it arrived at a target area of interest approximately three
kilometers from the airport.
38
As operators tracked the vehicle, various actions reinforced the perception of its
ties to the plot to attack HKIA. ese actions included driving in a manner associated
with countersurveillance techniques, picking up and dropping o adult males, retriev-
ing a package in a black bag from a building, and carefully loading canisters into the
trunk. Believing the car might be a vehicle- borne improvised explosive device posing
an imminent threat to ongoing evacuation eorts at HKIA, the US military authorized a
self- defense strike. At 4:53 p.m., an AGM-114 Hellre missile using a delayed fuse
struck the vehicle, killing three adults and seven children.
39
35. Clayton omas, U.S. Military Withdrawal and Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan: Frequently Asked
Questions, R46879 (Washington, DC: CRS, September 17, 2021), 9–13; Derek Gregory, “Midnight’s Vic-
tims,” Area Development and Policy 8, no. 4 (2023): 5, 10; “Deadly US Drone Strike in Kabul Did Not Break
Law, Pentagon Says,” BBC, November 3, 2021 https://www.bbc.com/; and Charles Savage et al., “New De-
classied Video Shows U.S. Killing of 10 Civilians in Drone Strike,” New York Times, January 19, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/.
36. Anna Coren et al., “US Military Admits It Killed 10 Civilians and Targeted Wrong Vehicle in Kabul
Airstrike,” CNN, September 17, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/; and David Vergun, “Air Force Ocial Briefs
Media on Deadly Drone Strike in Kabul,” DoD, November 3, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/.
37. Gregory, “Midnight’s Victims,” 10, 20–21.
38. Gregory, “Midnight's Victims,” 1, 6, 10, 12; and Savage et al., “Declassied Video.”
39. Savage et al., “Declassied Video”; Azmat Khan, “Military Investigation Reveals How the U.S.
Botched a Drone Strike in Kabul,” New York Times, January 6, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/; Vergun,
“Air Force Ocial”; and Gregory, 1, 6, 10–14.
120 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
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Poststrike reporting and investigations revealed that those targeted were unali-
ated with ISIS- K. e driver, Zemari Ahmadi, was identied as an employee of an
American aid organization. e Toyota was a company- owned car used to ferry em-
ployees and complete company activities. e black bag that operators saw retrieved
was a laptop, and the canisters were determined to be water jugs needed due to incon-
sistent service at homes. Furthermore, the secondary explosion initially attributed to
detonating explosives was determined to be from a nearby propane tank. Finally, op-
erators missed the presence of children in the compound.
40
An Air Force investigation concluded that the August 29th air strike did not violate
US law or the law of armed conict. Investigators attributed the incident to conrma-
tion bias and communication breakdowns, exacerbated by several contributing fac-
tors. ese included the chaotic withdrawal environment, the overwhelming volume
of threat streams, the recent attack at HKIA, operator stress, the absence of coalition
forces in the city, and perceived time constraints that limited thorough analysis. Of
note, one day later, ISIS- K militants attempted an attack on HKIA using rockets red
from a white Toyota Corolla, approximately 200 meters from the location struck on
August 29, highlighting the complex and evolving threat landscape.
41
Applying a consequentialist lens. e August 2021 incident presents a poignant case
study for consequentialist analysis, raising critical questions about the ethical implications
of targeted strikes and the complexities of decision- making in wartime environments.
Analysis of the case reveals few indicators of potential positive consequences. For
one, the intended goal of neutralizing an imminent threat at the airport holds merit
within a consequentialist framework, aiming to maximize lives saved and minimize po-
tential harm.
e resulting negative consequences, however, are far more apparent. First, the tragic
loss of 10 innocent lives, including children, constituted a devastating violation of the
principle of noncombatant immunity and represents the most signicant negative con-
sequence. is violation casts a profound shadow on the justications for the strike.
Second, as a second- order eect of the casualties, the incident signicantly eroded
trust in American operations among the Afghan civilian population and the interna-
tional community, potentially hindering future cooperation and counterterrorism ef-
forts. is long- term consequence carries substantial negative weight. e civilian ca-
sualties and subsequent revelations further tarnished the American image on the
world stage, raising concerns about the United States’ commitment to human rights
and the principles of just war theory.
42
is reputational damage has tangible negative
consequences for geopolitical relations and global standing.
40. “Transcript: Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby and Air Force Lt. Gen. Sami D. Said Hold a Press
Brieng,” DoD, November 3, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/; Coren et al., “US Military”; Savage et al.; and
Gregory, 1, 8.
41. Khan, “Military Investigation”; “Transcript”; and Gregory, 8.
42. Sayed Salahuddin, “Airstrikes Kill Scores of Afghan Civilians-Ocials,” Reuters, August 9, 2007,
https://www.reuters.com/.; and Savage et al., “Declassied Video.”
Kritz & Smith
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 121
Finally, these civilian casualties fueled resentment and distrust toward the United
States, potentially creating fertile ground for the recruitment and growth of extremist
groups.
43
is unintended consequence highlights the potential long- term ramica-
tions of such actions. Additionally, events like this one carry the potential to erode
internal morale and cause the questioning of procedures within military units.
rough a consequentialist lens, the August 29th strike presents a conundrum.
While the intended goal of preventing an attack aligns with maximizing positive out-
comes, the devastatingly negative consequences—particularly the civilian casualties
and their long- term ramications—raise serious ethical concerns and cast a shadow
on the justication for the action. Determining whether the good outweighed the bad
concerning this strike necessitates a clear reckoning with its resulting positive and
negative consequences. Despite the potential for preventing an attack, the magnitude
and gravity of the negative outcomes compel a more denitive moral judgment: the
bad outweighed the good.
Framework Emerging from Case Analysis
Based on the qualitative analysis of the two case studies, one deemed to represent a
proportional amount of good and one that did not, the researchers propose a conse-
quentialist lethal targeting assessment model to aid decisionmakers in future scenar-
ios. Once again, it is crucial to note that compliance with the Law of War Manual and
the use of robust doctrine- based processes and procedures in US actions are assumed,
with the model focusing on ethics as opposed to legality. e assessment model is
comprised of four criteria:
• Planners considered the human rights of the citizens of the target country.
• Planners determined the objectives of the decision to select lethal targeting
were just.
• Planners determined lethal targeting was necessary to obtain the just objectives
(of note: this is dierent than just cause for war, the primary normative principle
of jus ad bellum).
• Planners eliminated less ethical methods to obtain the objectives.
Discussion
Human Rights?
While not explicitly addressing human rights, consequentialist principles are in-
herently intertwined with their protection. Minimizing harm and maximizing well-
being align with human rights by prioritizing the inherent value and dignity of all
individuals. us, the ethical ramications of targeted strikes cast a complex shadow,
43. “Durbin, Leahy Urge President Biden to End Lethal Force Outside of War Zones, Revise Nation’s
Counterterrorism Policies,” September 27, 2021, US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, https://www
.judiciary.senate.gov/
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Lethal Targeting through US Airpower
particularly when scrutinized through the lens of consequentialism. e examination
of the two case studies reveals the delicate dance between prioritizing immediate
threats and the long- term well- being of civilians in recipient countries.
Some consideration for Iraqi citizen’s human rights is evident in the targeted strike
against al- Zarqawi. American ocials publicly framed the strike against al- Zarqawi as
necessary to protect Iraqi civilians from AQI violence, emphasizing its aim to disrupt
the group’s operations and leadership. Choosing al- Zarqawi, a gure responsible for
signicant civilian casualties, could be interpreted as aiming to minimize future harm
to civilians inicted by his leadership.
44
Yet the strike targeting suspected ISIS- K militants in Afghanistan presents a con-
trasting case. While aimed at a perceived imminent threat, the location within a popu-
lated area inherently carried a risk to civilians. is decision raises concerns about
prioritizing immediate threat mitigation over civilian safety. e strike eroded trust in
American operations and fueled anti- American sentiment, potentially hindering fu-
ture cooperation and counterterrorism eorts in Afghanistan. is long- term negative
consequence contradicts one of the intended positive outcomes.
Taken together, both cases support the notion that direct, repeatable procedures for
considering civilian casualties, as a reection of a broad consideration for human
rights, belong in the consequentialist model. ese procedures would include com-
prehensive risk assessments based on thorough intelligence gathering and analyses of
potential civilian harm, ensuring targeted actions are proportionate to the threat. Pro-
cedures would also explore alternative approaches that minimize civilian risk. In the
event that lethal targeting is undertaken, mechanisms would be in place that would
ensure the United States takes responsibility for unintended consequences, conducts
transparent investigations, and holds individuals accountable for failures.
Just Objectives?
In the consequentialist framework, just objectives refer to goals or aims that, when
pursued, result in outcomes that maximize overall utility or promote the greatest
good. ese objectives are assessed based on their ability to generate positive conse-
quences and minimize negative repercussions for individuals aected by the action or
decision.
45
As shown in the case studies, determining justness in cases of lethal target-
ing involves navigating a challenging equation, weighing potentially signicant posi-
tive outcomes against the risk of unforeseen negative consequences and potential vio-
lations of laws or international norms.
Eliminating al- Zarqawi, who was responsible for signicant civilian casualties and
who served as a symbol of terrorist violence, sought to disrupt AQI operations, poten-
tially saving future lives. Targeting a prominent gure like al- Zarqawi aimed to
44. Macleod et al., “ey Killed Him”; Chambers, “Abu Musab Al Zarqawi,” 40–41; Burns, “Safehouse”;
and Michael, “Legend,” 348.
45. Sidgwick, Ethics, 1–14; and Mill, Utilitarianism, 14–38.
Kritz & Smith
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 123
showcase American commitment to countering terrorism, potentially deterring future
attacks. Unforeseen negative consequences like the destabilization of Iraq and the rise
of ISIS highlight the risk of unintended harmful outcomes, even when seeking positive,
just consequences.
In the Afghanistan strike, the targeting of suspected ISIS- K militants aimed to
thwart an attack on Hamid Karzai International Airport, potentially saving American
lives and preventing civilian casualties. Protecting American personnel and facilitat-
ing troop withdrawal were key objectives, aligning with national security interests.
Preventing an attack would have undoubtedly saved lives and mitigated potential suf-
fering. Safeguarding US interests aligns with consequentialist principles of promoting
security and well- being; however, the unintended outcome of harming innocent civil-
ians violates fundamental human rights and starkly contrasts with the objective of
minimizing harm. Eroding trust in American operations also presents long- term neg-
ative consequences for counterterrorism eorts and regional stability.
Both cases present objectives aiming to maximize just outcomes. Yet crucial dier-
ences emerge. While al- Zarqawi’s role in violence was established, the intelligence re-
garding the Afghan target’s involvement in an imminent attack remained uncon-
rmed, introducing a higher degree of uncertainty in assessing the intended positive
outcome. Eliminating a high- prole leader responsible for extensive harm can be ar-
gued to be more proportionate to the intended positive outcome compared with tar-
geting individuals based on potentially incomplete intelligence. Both cases highlight
the risk of unintended negative consequences, emphasizing the need for robust as-
sessments and contingency plans.
Although determining the justness of objectives within a consequentialist frame-
work in real- world scenarios like these remains a complex task, ensuring the justness
of a potential lethal targeting action is critical and includes considerations of factors
such as certainty of threat, proportionality of action, and potential for unforeseen con-
sequences. Additionally, the ethical imperative to minimize harm remains central,
requiring constant vigilance against actions that might generate undue suering, out-
weighing any potential good.
Necessary?
Analyzing the two cases through a consequentialist framework helps illuminate the
need to include the question of necessity in the model and the challenges of determin-
ing whether such actions were demonstrably necessary to achieve just objectives.
As discussed, the strike against al- Zarqawi was intended to neutralize a high- level
threat responsible for signicant civilian casualties and a symbol of terrorist violence,
potentially saving future lives and disrupting AQI operations. Eliminating al- Zarqawi
arguably did disrupt AQI leadership and potentially reduced subsequent violence. In
terms of necessity, however, it is possible to argue that nonlethal options, like capture
or intelligence gathering, might have been pursued, potentially achieving similar out-
comes without risking civilian casualties.
124 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Lethal Targeting through US Airpower
Also as discussed, the 2021 strike in Afghanistan was intended to prevent an im-
minent attack on Hamid Karzai International Airport, potentially saving American
lives and avoiding civilian casualties. e target turned out to be a humanitarian
worker and other innocent individuals, resulting in tragic civilian casualties, contra-
dicting the objective of minimizing harm. ough when considering necessity, one
could argue that increased security measures at the airport or other security activities
could have been explored as alternative approaches with lower risks of civilian harm
and unintended negative consequences.
While both cases aimed for just objectives, crucial dierences emerge regarding
necessity. Intelligence practitioners had long pursued al- Zarqawi, whereas the infor-
mation about a white Toyota represented an emerging threat stream, introducing
greater uncertainty in assessing the necessity of immediate lethal action. Eliminating a
high- prole leader directly responsible for extensive harm can be argued to be more
proportionate to the intended positive outcome, and thus more necessary than target-
ing individuals based on potentially incomplete intelligence with the risk of causing
civilian casualties.
In evaluating the necessity of lethal targeting, particularly in intricate counterter-
rorism contexts, procedural considerations emerge. First, an ethical examination is
imperative to scrutinize the level of necessity, considering the challenges associated
with determining whether lethal measures were truly indispensable in achieving the
desired outcomes. For example, enhancing security measures or employing other
nonlethal approaches could be considered to mitigate harm and minimize unintended
negative consequences depending upon the scenario. Secondly, these cases highlight
the importance of prioritizing high- condence intelligence when evaluating the ne-
cessity of lethal targeting. Additionally, it is essential to recognize the importance of
the potential ramications of outcomes when determining the necessity of lethal tar-
geting within a consequentialist framework.
Less Ethical Methods Eliminated?
Analyzing the two cases through consequentialism reveals the complexities of assess-
ing the ethical choices made in high- stakes situations. Looking at the 2006 strike against
al- Zarqawi, some potential alternatives emerge. While challenging, capturing al- Zarqawi
for a legal trial might have yielded valuable intelligence, minimized the risk of civilian
casualties, and generated long- term positive consequences through legal precedent. En-
gaging in intensied diplomatic eorts and collaborating with regional actors to isolate
and weaken AQI through nonmilitary means could have been explored.
Yet capture and prosecution might have been signicantly more time- consuming and
fraught with logistical challenges, potentially delaying the desired outcome of disrupting
AQI operations. Diplomatic pressure, while potentially minimizing immediate harm,
might have proved insucient in dismantling a violent organization such as AQI.
More ethical approaches to the problem of the potential 2021 ISIS- K attack against
the airport also emerge. e US and its Allies and partners could have implemented
heightened security protocols and intensied intelligence gathering to pinpoint
Kritz & Smith
ÆTHER: A JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC AIRPOWER & SPACEPOWER 125
specic threats to potentially mitigate the need for immediate lethal action. As a non-
military measure, the relevant actors could have engaged in direct communication
with Taliban representatives or local intelligence sources to avert the perceived threat.
e relevant actors could have adjusted the withdrawal timeline to allow for further
investigation with a potential for a de- escalation of the situation.
Conversely, implementing stricter security measures might not have guaranteed
perfect protection against a determined attack, and relying solely on intelligence to
pinpoint specic individuals in a chaotic situation comes with inherent risks. Diplo-
matic negotiations, while potentially preventing immediate harm, might have been
misconstrued as weakness and could have emboldened the attackers or extended the
American presence in Afghanistan. Evacuation and delay might have compromised
the mission objectives, potentially eroded trust with Allies and partners, and le
American personnel vulnerable for an extended period.
Evaluating whether planners eliminated less ethical methods in these two instances
of lethal targeting is inherently challenging and open to interpretation but necessary.
While both cases oer potential alternative approaches that might have yielded dier-
ent, more positive outcomes, the relative feasibility and eectiveness of these remain
debatable. Yet the analysis highlights key considerations for planners in support of
eliminating other, more ethical approaches. ese considerations include prioritizing
robust intelligence gathering in support of thorough risk assessments, exhaustively
considering nonlethal methods and diplomatic solutions before resorting to lethal
force, and ensuring the scale of the chosen action aligns with the severity of the per-
ceived threat and minimizes harm to all individuals involved.
Conclusion
is research enriches the discourse on lethal targeting within foreign policy by
adopting a consequentialist perspective, thus complementing existing ethical theories.
By examining the anticipated and actual outcomes—negative and positive—of two
instances of lethal targeting conducted by the United States, this study seeks to discern
ethically defensible courses of action.
In a realm fraught with moral and legal complexities, the consequentialist ap-
proach—which looks at the proportional amount of good—oers a valuable tool for
evaluating specic scenarios. is consequentialist perspective emphasizes maximiz-
ing positive outcomes against threats in a national defense context. As demonstrated
by the DoD Law of War Manual and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.17, Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response, minimizing harm remains a primary objective at both the
individual and societal levels for military operations.
46
As such, it is essential to weigh
the potential consequences of civilian harm among the various options open to plan-
ners in these situations.
46. Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response, DoD
Instruction 3000.17 (Washington, DC: DoD, December 21, 2023), https://www.esd.whs.mil/.
126 VOL. 3, NO. 1, SPRING 2024
Lethal Targeting through US Airpower
e Israel- Gaza Strip bombing campaign and the release of DoDI 3000.17 in
December 2023 underscore the timeliness of this discussion. e four- element lethal
targeting assessment model oers valuable insights for civilian national security deci-
sionmakers who choose to include lethal targeting as an option and for warghters
tasked with executing such actions. By applying a critical consequentialist lens, US
decisionmakers can progress toward ethical frameworks that prioritize harm reduc-
tion and preservation of human life, promote continued reection, and facilitate
informed, open discourse about using lethal force in a world where unintended con-
sequences and unforeseen complexities are unfortunate realities of military and coun-
terterrorism operations. Æ
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