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Out at Home: Challenging the United States-
Japanese Player Contract Agreement Under
Japanese Law
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OUT AT HOME: CHALLENGING THE
UNITED STATES-JAPANESE PLAYER
CONTRACT AGREEMENT UNDER
JAPANESE LAW
INTRODUCTION
lthough it is an inherently American game, thus dubbed the
“American Pastime,”
1
baseball is no exception to globalization.
2
For years, Major League Baseball (“MLB”) scouts have traversed South
America, Latin America and the Caribbean in search of outstanding tal-
ent.
3
Moreover, players from across Asia have excelled in MLB for more
than a decade.
4
Indeed, the main reason that international players come to
MLB is to prove their skills in the world’s premiere baseball forum.
5
In-
1. Casey Duncan, Note, Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball’s United States-
Japanese Player Contract Agreement Enough to Avoid Another “Baseball War”?, 13
M
INN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 88 (2003).
2. William B. Gould IV, Globalization in Collective Bargaining, Baseball, and
Matsuzaka: Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 283,
289–90 (2007); Krikor Meshefejian, The Global Reach of America’s Pastime: Antitrust
Implications of the US-Japanese Player Contract Agreement, ILL. BUS. L.J., Oct. 5, 2005,
http://iblsjournal.typepad.com/illinois_business_law_soc/2005/10/the_love_of_the.html.
3. On Opening Day of 2004, nearly half of all MLB players were born outside of the
United States, and players from thirty-three foreign countries currently play for either
MLB teams or their minor league affiliates. MLB’s globalization is largely due to the
efforts of Major League Baseball International, the global arm of MLB, which was or-
ganized in 1989 to “focus[] on the worldwide growth of baseball” and has offices in
Beijing, New York, London, Sydney and Tokyo. The Official Site of Major League
Baseball: International, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/international/index.jsp?feature=mlbi (last
visited Apr. 14, 2008).
4. In 1995, Pitcher Hideo Nomo became the first Japanese player since the signing
of the 1967 United States-Japanese Working Agreement to play in MLB. Ichiro Suzuki
followed Nomo in 2000, becoming the first Japanese player to utilize the current Posting
System. R
OBERT WHITING, THE MEANING OF ICHIRO: THE NEW WAVE FROM JAPAN AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 97 (2004) [hereinafter WHITING,
MEANING OF ICHIRO]. Currently, the New York Yankees’ roster includes pitcher Chien-
Ming Wang of Taiwan, and the Seattle Mariners’ roster includes pitcher Cha Seung Baek
of South Korea. The Official Site of The New York Yankees: Team: Active Roster,
http://newyork.yankees.mlb.com/team/player.jsp?player_id=425426 (last visited Apr. 14,
2008); The Official Site of The Seattle Mariners: Team: Active Roster, http://seattle.
mariners.mlb.com/team/player.jsp?player_id=430657 (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
5. Gould, supra note 2, at 293–94; see Andrew F. Braver, Note, Baseball or Beso-
buro: The Implications of Antitrust Law on Baseball in America and Japan, 16
N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 446 (1996) (identifying the quality of baseball in the
United States as superior to that of Japan). Hideki Matsui, former Japanese player and
current outfielder for the New York Yankees, explained that many Japanese players come
to MLB to “help Japanese baseball enhance its reputation” and that their success is “proof
A
1070 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
ternational players are not selected in MLB’s amateur draft, but are
signed at a young age by MLB clubs and begin their careers in the minor
league system.
6
For Japanese players, however, the process is unique.
7
While under contract in Japan, a player must be posted by his team and
then bid on by interested MLB teams.
8
The result is a highly restrictive
system which unjustly limits the posted player’s mobility and market
value.
9
Most theories suggest that the United States-Japanese Player Contract
Agreement (“Posting Agreement”),
10
used for Japanese player transfers
to MLB, violates U.S. antitrust laws as codified in the Sherman Act.
11
Others posit that posting falls under the National Labor Relations Act
12
as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
13
However, the Posting
Agreement’s limitations on player mobility stem from the Nippon Pro-
fessional Baseball (“NPB”) league’s desire to keep Japanese players in
Japan.
14
Furthermore, the Posting Agreement would be largely unneces-
sary if NPB’s free agency system was less restrictive.
15
Thus, the resolu-
tion to this problem rests not in the laws of the United States, but rather
that the level of Japanese baseball is high.” Japan Today—Matsui Weighs in on Turmoil
Facing Japanese Baseball, http://www.japantoday.com/jp/shukan/243 [hereinafter Matsui
Interview] (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). Masanori Murakami, a former NPB and MLB
player, stated that MLB “is the best league” and analogized a Japanese player’s desire to
come to MLB to that of “a musician going to Carengie Hall.” Jim Caple, Dice-K 2.0,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/eticket/story?page=darvish [hereinafter Caple, Dice-K]
(last visited May 21, 2008).
6. Posting of Michael McCann to Sports Law Blog, http://sports-law.blogspot.
com/2006_11_01_archive.html (Nov. 27, 2006, 6:10pm).
7. Id.
8. United States-Japanese Player Contract Agreement, paras. 5–7, Dec. 15, 2000,
available at http://jpbpa.net/convention/2001_e.pdf [hereinafter Posting Agreement] (last
visited Apr. 14, 2008).
9. See discussion infra Part II.B.
10. Posting Agreement, supra note 8.
11. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–7 (2007); e.g., Gould, supra note 2, at 294–95
(noting possible antitrust violations).
12. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151–169 (2007); e.g., Gould, supra
note 2, at 306 (noting possible labor law violations); Elliot Z. Stein, Note, Coming to
America: Protecting Japanese Baseball Players Who Want to Play in the Major Leagues,
13
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 261, 267 (2005).
13. Gould, supra note 2, at 287; Stein supra note 12, at 267. Another theory examines
the effect of contract enforcement on the Posting System. Duncan, supra note 1, at 87–
88.
14. “The posting system was obviously designed to benefit the Japanese team owners;
it allowed them to . . . control the flow of players to the U.S.” W
HITING, MEANING OF
ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 146.
15. Duncan, supra note 1, at 97; Matsui Interview, supra note 5.
2008] OUT AT HOME 1071
in those of Japan.
16
In addition, Japanese players cannot successfully
challenge the limitations of the posting system
17
under the laws of the
United States, therefore they must do so under either Japanese antimo-
nopoly or labor laws.
18
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Posting Agreement with re-
spect to Japanese antimonopoly and labor laws and to ascertain whether
the process violates the provisions of either body of law. Part I explains
the history of baseball in both the United States and Japan, including the
development of their respective players’ unions. Part II sets forth the ten-
sions underscoring baseball relations between the United States and Ja-
pan and discusses how they led to the implementation of the current post-
ing system. Part III examines antitrust and labor issues with regards to
U.S. laws and explains why a comparable analysis under Japanese laws
is proper. Part IV uses Japanese antimonopoly and labor laws to analyze
the Posting Agreement, and Part V proposes player-friendly modifica-
tions to the current system.
I.
THE HISTORY OF BASEBALL IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
A. Major League Baseball in the United States
Although some controversy exists as to the true origins of baseball, the
Mills Commission published a report in 1907 concluding that Abner
Doubleday invented the game in Cooperstown, New York, in 1839.
19
16. In both cases, U.S. courts recognize exemptions that render such arguments inef-
fective in securing additional player rights for the Japanese players. Gould, supra note 2,
at 285 (referencing the judicially-created baseball exemption from U.S. antitrust law); id.
at 297 (referencing both the statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions from U.S. anti-
trust law). Furthermore, Japanese players lack standing as MLB players to bring an action
under either law. See discussion infra Part III.
17. The process defined in the Posting Agreement is commonly referred to as the
posting system, or posting. Geoffrey R. Smull, International Player Trades and Japan’s
Anti-Monopoly Law: A Look at the Continued Viability of the United States-Japan Player
Contract Agreement,
ASIA L. NEWS (Am. B. Ass’n, Wash., D.C.), Spring 2005, at 1,
available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/africa_eurasia/asia_pacific/spring
05newsletter.pdf.
18. Id. at 5 (discussing possible labor and antimonopoly law violations in Japan);
Braver, supra note 5, at 453–54 (discussing ripeness of posting system for challenge in
Japanese courts under antimonopoly law).
19. The Mills Commission was a panel organized in 1905 by Albert G. Spalding,
former pitcher and sporting goods entrepreneur, to end the speculation surrounding the
origins of modern-day baseball. The report was published on December 30, 1907, and the
panel consisted of former National League presidents Col. A.G. Mills, Nicholas E.
Young, and the Hon. Morgan G. Bulkeley; the Hon. Arthur P. Gorman, a U.S. Senator
and former president of National Baseball Club of Washington; George Wright and
1072 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
The original National League (“NL”) formed in 1876 and the American
League (“AL”) began operating in 1900.
20
MLB formed in 1903 when
both leagues merged.
21
In an effort to prevent players from jumping to
rival baseball leagues, the AL and NL placed renewal clauses in their
standard player contracts.
22
Players signed one-year contracts giving in-
dividual teams the option to unilaterally renew those contracts at the end
of the season for which they were signed.
23
The clause was generally
applied to the entire contract, therefore perpetually binding the player
until his team declined the option.
24
Although MLB was reluctant to
grant free agency to its players, the result was inevitable as baseball
players, like so many other employees in the United States, unionized.
25
The Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) formed in
1954 and initially protested the inadequacies of MLB’s pension fund,
26
but later lobbied for collective bargaining and alleged antitrust violations
pertaining to the reserve clause.
27
Through MLBPA’s efforts as well as
legislation
28
and various lawsuits,
29
free agency was established.
30
When
Alfred J. Reach, who were former players and prominent businessmen; and Amateur
Athletic Union president, James E. Sullivan. National Baseball Hall of Fame and Mu-
seum: History, http://web.baseballhalloffame.org/museum/history.jsp (last visited May
13, 2008).
20. Jon S. Greenwood, Note, What Major League Baseball Can Learn From Its In-
ternational Counterparts: Building a Model Collective Bargaining Agreement for Major
League Baseball, 29
GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 259, 260 (1995).
21. MLB operated as a single league format until 1969 when it divided into the AL
and NL. Id.
22. See Duncan, supra note 1, at 103–09 (discussing contract jumping in baseball
prior to free agency and later use of one-year contracts and renewable options). Addition-
ally, Major League Rule 4-A(a) allowed each MLB club to submit a list of up to forty
players to the Commissioner’s Office that they wished to “reserve” for the following
season. This rule allowed teams to secure an interest in a player on the list without fear
that another team would entice him to switch clubs. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615, 622 (8th Cir. 1976). Further, Rule
3(g) explicitly prohibited negotiations with players while they were under contract with
another team and justified the measure as preserving MLB’s competitive balance. Id.
23. Kansas City Royals Baseball, 532 F.2d at 618.
24. Id. at 624.
25. Greenwood, supra note 20, at 272–73.
26. Gould, supra note 2, at 286.
27. Id. at 286–87. MLBPA negotiated the first collective bargaining agreement in
professional baseball in 1968. Greenwood, supra note 20, at 272. For the current collec-
tive bargaining agreement between MLBPA and MLB, see 2007-2011 Basic Agreement,
Dec. 20, 2006, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Basic Agreement] (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
28. Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2007).
2008] OUT AT HOME 1073
players attain free-agent status, they enjoy the freedom of contract nego-
tiations with any MLB team.
31
Per the collective bargaining agreement,
even players yet to reach free agency may seek higher pay in salary arbi-
tration proceedings.
32
Today, MLB is considered the best baseball in the world
33
and operates
two leagues, AL and NL, with each comprised of three divisions: East,
Central, and West.
34
Each year, the divisional winners meet in the play-
offs, ultimately resulting in the AL and NL champions playing the World
Series to determine the MLB champion.
35
MLB’s talent pool is incredi-
bly diverse, with players haling from the United States, South America,
Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Canada, Taiwan, and Ja-
pan.
36
Recently, MLB extended its global interests into China, and India
is slated for MLB International developmental programs.
37
The “Ameri-
29. E.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (upholding the baseball exemption, but
finally conceding that baseball was interstate commerce and reiterating that only Con-
gress could remove the exemption); Kansas City Royals Baseball, 532 F.2d 615 (affirm-
ing arbitrator’s decision that when a team exercises the renewal option in a standard
player contract, the contract is renewable for only one year, not perpetually).
30. Free agency allows MLB players to negotiate with any and all MLB teams, gen-
erally resulting in a better contract, including a higher salary, for the player. See Green-
wood, supra note 20, at 273–74 (discussing the effects of free market competition on
player salaries). See also Alex Belth: Landmark Moments in Free-Agent History, Dec.
2, 2005, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2005/baseball/mlb/12/02/landmark.freeagency/
index.html (briefly discussing the legal battles that helped shape free agency as well as
memorable signing “firsts” in MLB).
31. The current Basic Agreement provides: “Following the completion of the term of
his Uniform Player’s Contract, any Player with 6 or more years of Major League service
who has not executed a contract for the next succeeding season shall be eligible to be-
come a free agent.” Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. XX(B)(1). “Players who . . .
become free agents under this Agreement shall be eligible to negotiate and contract with
any [MLB] Club without restrictions or qualifications.” Id. art. XX(B)(2) (emphasis
added).
32. Any player’s salary may go to arbitration if both the player and his current team
consent to it. However, if the player has accumulated at least three years of MLB service,
but less than the six years required for free agency, his salary may be submitted to arbi-
tration without the other party’s consent. In either circumstance, arbitration is “final and
binding.” Id. art. VI(F)(1).
33. Braver, supra note 5, at 446.
34. Greenwood, supra note 20, at 260–61.
35. Id.
36. The Official Site of Major League Baseball: International, supra note 3.
37. Jim Caple, Good Showing in ‘08 Olympics Will Spur Interest, Mar. 1, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2766716&type=story.
1074 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
can Pastime” has truly become an international phenomenon, and contin-
ues to expand.
38
B. Nippon Professional Baseball in Japan
Americans brought baseball to Japan in 1873,
39
and the sport quickly
became not just a game, but a way of life.
40
Baseball grew in popularity
and became an organized professional league in 1936.
41
NPB is made up
of two leagues, the Central and the Pacific, and players develop in a mi-
nor league system.
42
Like its counterpart in the United States, the Japa-
nese Professional Baseball Players Association (“JPBPA”) represents
NPB’s players in labor and salary matters.
43
Whereas the certification of
MLBPA revolutionized American baseball in the 1960s, Japan did not
have an equivalent association concerned with players’ rights until
1985.
44
When JPBPA first organized, there was little support for collec-
tive actions in Japan.
45
At the time, JPBPA had a minimal effect on the
game in Japan, as it only mustered support for minor changes to NPB.
46
In stark contrast to MLBPA, JPBPA evinced an unwillingness to strike in
38. See Jeff Passan, Revenue Stream of Consciousness, Dec. 16, 2006, http://sports.
yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-international121806&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (discussing
MLB’s international expansion and revenues).
39. Stein, supra note 11, at 267; W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 52–
53. During the Meiji Reformation, the Japanese solicited help from various countries in
establishing an army, a navy, and a solid infrastructure. American professors who were in
Japan to help establish this infrastructure were the first to introduce baseball to the Japa-
nese. Id.
40. In 1886, the First Higher School of Tokyo established a baseball team and infused
it with disciplines typically taught in Japanese martial arts. Id. at 53. Even today, when
Japanese players practice, they focus more on their “inner self” than on skills and fre-
quently push themselves towards mental limitations rather than physical ones. Id. at 52.
41. Organized in 1936, the Japan Occupational Baseball League was the first profes-
sional league in Japan. In 1939, it became the Japanese Baseball League and was re-
named Nippon Professional Baseball in 1950 after reorganization. See W
HITING, MEAN-
ING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 148–49 (discussing establishment of Japanese
professional baseball); Rising Sun Baseball: A Nippon Baseball League Primer,
http://risingsunbaseball.com/ (last visited May 13, 2008).
42. NPB teams each have one minor league, or farm, team. Greenwood, supra note
20, at 261 (stating that each NPB team has one minor league club).
43. Stein, supra note 11, at 269; Smull, supra note 17, at 2.
44. Braver, supra note 5, at 451.
45. Members of the union showed little support for its initiatives after formation and,
following comments by one owner, an entire team of players withdrew from the bargain-
ing unit. The team eventually rejoined the players’ association. Braver, supra note 5, at
451–52.
46. JPBPA negotiated a raise in the minimum league salary as well as pensions in
1988. Greenwood, supra note 20, at 278–79.
2008] OUT AT HOME 1075
order to obtain better conditions, higher pay, or even a free agency sys-
tem.
47
Although Japanese baseball is considered inferior to MLB,
48
its players
are brought up in the “besoburo”
49
way of life
50
and nonetheless become
national heroes in NPB.
51
Japanese players aim to prove the adequacy of
NPB baseball in the U.S. market, but they are also lured by the prospect
of less restrictive free agency.
52
Additionally, corruption and harsh train-
ing conditions in NPB make MLB an attractive option.
53
Although there
is documented history of players switching leagues,
54
most players
“choosing” to leave MLB for Japan are at the end of their careers and
have been released by their MLB teams.
55
The “desire” of MLB players
47. Following unionization, one JPBPA representative assured the Japanese public
that NPB players would not strike, stating that the Japanese players “would not act like
Americans.” Braver, supra note 5, at 452.
48. Paul White, Japan Frets Over Talent Exodus to North America, USA
TODAY,
Mar. 28, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-03-28-japan-effect_N.
htm. Americans are historically reluctant to accept Japanese baseball as exhibiting quality
equivalent to that of MLB. Some, including current and former MLB managers, think of
Japanese baseball as a “second-rate, Ping Pong type of game.” W
HITING, MEANING OF
ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 25. One reason for this belief is that Japanese players tend to be
smaller in both stature and physical composition than MLB players. This was minimally
acceptable for pitchers but not for position players like Ichiro Suzuki, an outfielder, who
checked-in at a mere five feet, nine inches 156 pounds prior to entering MLB. Id.
49. “Besoburo” is the Japanese word for baseball. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO,
supra note 4, at 53.
50. “Japan has imbued [besoboru] with its own philosophy: a Zen samurai emphasis
on discipline, spirit and selflessness.” Robert Whiting, Batting Out of Their League, T
IME
MAG., Apr. 30, 2001, at 24, available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/japan_
view/baseball.html [hereinafter Whiting, Batting Out of Their League].
51. See Duncan, supra note 1, at 91 (indicating playing success of Ichiro Suzuki,
Hideki Matsui, and Tsuyoshi Shinjo).
52. Matsui Interview, supra note 5.
53. When Japanese players are drafted by NPB, they nominate their preferred teams,
which induces teams to secretly pay players to make specific choices. See id. Addition-
ally, observers note that Japanese pre-season training camps are more like military acad-
emies in their strict rules and demanding workouts, which are usually all-day affairs in
freezing conditions. Whiting, Batting Out of Their League, supra note 50.
54. Eight Japanese players have left NPB via the posting system: Ichiro Suzuki,
Kazuhisa Ishii, Akinori Otsuka, Norihiro Nakamura, Shinji Mori, Daisuke Matsuzaka,
Akinori Iwamura, and Kei Igawa. Posting System, http://www.baseball-reference.com
/bullpen/Posting_System (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). Other players, such as Houston
Astros’ second baseman Kazuo Matsui, have come to MLB via free agency following the
completion of their NPB contracts. Stein, supra note 11, at
261–62.
55. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 73 (characterizing NPB as “a
lucrative market for aging major leaguers”); Whiting, Batting Out of Their League, supra
1076 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
to switch leagues notwithstanding, NPB imposes a limit of three foreign
players per team.
56
II.
THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN BASEBALL RELATIONSHIP
A. History Between MLB and NPB
Prior to World War II, the United States and Japan had a working rela-
tionship that allowed MLB players to travel to Japan.
57
The United States
sent envoys on barnstorming tours where they demonstrated the superior-
ity of U.S. baseball and fostered amicable international relations.
58
This
congenial relationship, however, was often marred by nationalist senti-
ments, as demonstrated by the case of Eiji Sawamura.
59
After compiling
an impressive pitching performance against MLB opposition, Sawamura
downplayed the pitching skill required to strike out the biggest names in
U.S. baseball.
60
He reduced the matter to three words: “I hate Amer-
ica.”
61
Assuming Sawamura’s pitching prowess translated to MLB suc-
cess,
62
it would be difficult to find a forgiving and embracing populace in
note 50 (“American players have been part of the Japanese baseball equation for years
but only in the form of minor leaguers, benchwarmers and aging stars.”).
56. NPB takes great pride in its Japanese players’ skills and the league’s overall level
of play and therefore limits the amount of direct American influence in the sport. In 1999,
one NPB team manager publicly stated a desire to have an all-Japanese team. Whiting,
Batting Out of Their League, supra note 50. Similarly, Yu Darvish, a half-Iranian and
half-Japanese pitcher, was only pursued during NPB’s amateur player draft by one team
because his background did not fit within Japan’s “very homogenous society.” Caple,
Dice-K, supra note 5.
57. Braver, supra note 5, at 445.
58. Id.
59. Tom Singer, Matsuzaka Posting System’s Latest Gem, Nov. 14, 2006,
http://mlb.mlb.com/content/printer_friendly/bos/y2006/m11/d14/c1740635.jsp.
60. In 1935, at the age of seventeen, Sawamura pitched against a U.S. team during a
barnstorming tour and struck out four consecutive batters representing the biggest names
in U.S. baseball at that time: Charlie Gehringer, Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, and Jimmie
Foxx. Id.
61. Following the strikeouts, Sawamura was quoted as saying, “My problem is I hate
America, and I cannot make myself like Americans.” Id.
62. Many consider Japanese baseball to be inferior to the MLB product; the sentiment
was much stronger prior to the recent era which has seen the successful transition of
players such as Nomo, Ichiro, and Hideki Matsui. See Jim Albright, Why Haven’t we
Had More Japanese Players in the Majors; http://baseballguru.com/jalbright/analysis
jalbright15.html [hereinafter Albright, More Japanese Players] (last visited Apr. 14,
2008) (discussing quality of Japanese baseball players and teams from the early twentieth
century through the 1960s).
2008] OUT AT HOME 1077
the United States to cheer for him following such a statement.
63
Unsur-
prisingly, player exchanges did not occur between the two leagues until
three decades later.
64
During the 1960s, Japanese teams sent their players to train in MLB’s
minor league system.
65
Masanori Murakami came to America in 1964 as
part of a training expedition to the San Francisco Giants.
66
Prior to his
arrival in San Francisco, his NPB club, the Nankai Hawks, agreed to an
option clause granting the Giants the right to purchase Murakami’s con-
tract if he played with the parent club.
67
The Giants exercised this right
after Murakami was called-up from the minor leagues, but the Hawks
vehemently opposed it and pressured Murakami to return to Japan.
68
Fol-
lowing this announcement, MLB and NPB tensions escalated and both
sides threatened lawsuits.
69
Eventually, the leagues reached a compro-
mise and Murakami played in San Francisco for one year, and was then
allowed to return to Japan without further challenge.
70
Following this
incident, both sides signed the Working Agreement of 1967, mandating
that each league respect the other’s reserve system.
71
This agreement es-
sentially created a “de facto ban” and nearly thirty years passed before
another Japanese player emerged in MLB.
72
63. During the Tokyo Giants’ United States tour in 1935, the Pittsburgh Pirates tried
unsuccessfully to recruit Sawamura to play in MLB. Sawamura declined the offer, citing
haughty women, bad rice, and an inability to speak English as a few of his reasons for not
wanting to live in America. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 72.
64. Attitudes towards the United States slowly improved following the end of the
U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II. Even so, “support networks” for Japanese
players attempting to make the move did not exist at this time and it was therefore more
difficult for a Japanese player to adapt to his new surroundings. Albright, More Japanese
Players, supra note 62.
65. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 73–74.
66. Like other minor leaguers, Murakami and other Japanese players spent time play-
ing in the minors to gain experience, but could be called up to the parent club. Id. at 73–
74.
67. Id.
68. The Hawks went so far as to tell Murakami that if he chose to remain in the
United States, he might never be able to return to NPB. Id. at 75–76.
69. Id. at 76–78. MLB alleged that Nankei’s refusal to let Murakami play in MLB
was a breach of their working agreement. Additionally, when San Francisco exercised its
right to Murakami, he signed a standard player contract and became part of MLB. There-
fore, he also became part of the reserve system under which he was perpetually bound to
the Giants until (and if) they unilaterally decided not to renew his contract. Id.
70. Id. at 79–80.
71. Id. at 84.
72. Id. at 118.
1078 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
Don Nomura, a Japanese agent, decided that 1995 was the optimal time
for a Japanese superstar to enter MLB.
73
The image of MLB in the minds
of its fans was tarnished due to the labor strike of 1994,
74
and Nomura
knew of an unexploited loophole in the de facto baseball ban.
75
He con-
tacted Hideo Nomo, a dominant Japanese pitcher, and explained his sim-
ple, yet undetected loophole.
76
Nomo could retire from Japanese base-
ball, forcing his NPB team to release him from his contract and allowing
him to join MLB as a free agent.
77
Amid outrage from both Japanese fans
and the league,
78
Nomo retired from NPB and moved to MLB’s Los An-
geles Dodgers.
79
After winning Rookie of the Year Honors in 1995,
80
Nomo was no longer considered a traitor, but rather a national star in his
homeland and a testament to competitive Japanese baseball.
81
The next NPB star to move to MLB was Hideki Irabu in 1997, when
the San Diego Padres negotiated for his rights from the Chiba Lotte Ma-
rines.
82
Irabu, however, did not want to leave Japan and refused to play
in San Diego, despite Chiba Lotte’s repeated warnings that he did not
have a choice.
83
The Padres, frustrated with Irabu’s unwillingness to play
in San Diego, finally transferred his rights to the New York Yankees.
84
Although MLBPA was against this move, MLB Commissioner Bud
Selig allowed the transfer, but later prohibited any future purchase of
73. Id. at 102–03.
74. The MLBPA and MLB ownership were unable to reach an agreement preventing
a labor stoppage in 1994. Greenwood, supra note 20, at 273–74. While players were
seeking more money, MLB ownership sought unilateral implementation of a salary cap to
contain player salaries. Id. Because of the strike, the World Series was cancelled for the
first time since championship play began. Id. at 260–61. In the hearts and minds of
American fans, the game had lost its appeal. See Matsui Interview, supra note 5 (stating
that following the strike, MLB “faced a significant decline in fans”).
75. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 103.
76. Id. at 102–04.
77. Id.
78. The Japanese media publicly assaulted Nomo, referring to him as both a “traitor”
and a “troublemaker.” Stein, supra note 11, at 270–71.
79. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 107.
80. Id. at 112.
81. Whiting, Batting Out of Their League, supra note 50.
82. San Diego had a working agreement with Chiba Lotte, including “exclusive
rights” to Irabu. Richard Sandomir, Baseball: Irabu’s Legacy is a High-Stakes Auction,
I
NT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 6, 2006, at 20.
83. Both Irabu and his agent opposed his going to the United States and likened the
process by which San Diego obtained his rights to “indentured servitude.” Id.
84. Irabu asserted that if he had to play in MLB, he would only do so for the Yankees.
Id.
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player contracts.
85
Then in 1998, Nomura used the Nomo loophole again
to bring Alfonso Soriano to the New York Yankees,
86
prompting MLB
and NPB to discuss a mutually agreeable protocol for Japanese player
transfers to MLB.
87
B. The Posting System
MLB and NPB signed the Posting Agreement on July 10, 2000, and es-
tablished the posting system.
88
Posting allows Japanese players who have
not yet attained the minimum eight years of service which triggers true
free agency in NPB to come to MLB.
89
It also provides compensation to
the posted player’s NPB team for the loss of an elite athlete.
90
The “Ini-
tial Termination Date” of the Posting Agreement was December, 15,
2002, but it remains operative on a yearly basis so long as neither league
notifies the other of its intention to terminate the agreement.
91
85. Chief Operating Officer of MLBPA Gene Orza referred to the working agreement
between San Diego and Chiba Lotte as “trafficking in human flesh” and opposed it be-
cause it deprived Irabu of his freedom. Id. Although MLBPA was unsuccessful in its
attempt to invalidate the working agreement, MLB later prohibited any agreement that
assigned “exclusive rights” of players to any MLB team. Id.
86. Although not a Japanese native, Soriano was under contract with an NPB team
and wanted to play in MLB. Following Nomo through the narrow loophole in the Japa-
nese-American ban, Soriano eventually landed in New York and played second base for
the Yankees. Even though Soriano was a “foreign player” by Japanese standards, he was
still under contract with NPB and his “retirement” occurred at age twenty-one, enraging
NPB officials. Additionally, NPB claimed that it had closed the loophole prior to Soriano
leaving the league, which angered MLB officials as it signaled NPB’s unilaterally
amending the working agreement. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 141–
45.
87. MLB and NPB began negotiating for a player transfer system in 1998 and offi-
cially entered into the Posting Agreement on July 10, 2000. Duncan, supra note 1, at
100–01.
88. Id. Although the agreement was signed in July 2000, it was not effective until
December 15, 2000. Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 17.
89. Tim Kurkjian, Posting Process Needs to be Altered, Dec. 15, 2006, http://sports.
espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=kurkjian_tim&id=2697354; see Posting A-
greement, supra note 8, para 4 (requiring MLB teams to inquire with the NPB commis-
sioner regarding players currently under contract in Japan).
90. Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 9. This provision was included to address
NPB’s concerns over the dilution of the league because of players leaving for MLB.
Stein, supra note 11, at 272.
91. The original agreement “terminated” on December 15, 2002 (the “Initial Termina-
tion Date”), unless the Commissioner of either league notified the other “(180) days prior
to the Initial Termination Date . . . of his intention to modify or terminate” the agreement.
When neither side did so, the agreement became effective from year-to-year and remains
so until either Commissioner gives notice otherwise “(180) days prior to any anniversary
of the Initial Termination Date.” Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 17.
1080 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
Pursuant to the Posting Agreement, an MLB team may inquire as to an
NPB player’s status between November 1 and March 1 of any given
year.
92
If the player’s NPB team agrees to posting,
93
it notifies the NPB
Commissioner’s office who then notifies the MLB Commissioner’s of-
fice.
94
The MLB Commissioner then informs all MLB teams and within
four days of notification interested teams must submit a sealed bid to the
MLB Commissioner.
95
At the conclusion of the bidding period, the MLB
Commissioner notifies NPB of the highest bid without disclosing the
name of the bidding team.
96
The NPB team then has an additional four
days to either accept or reject the bid.
97
If accepted, the MLB team is dis-
closed and has thirty days to negotiate a contract with the posted player.
98
If successful, the player joins his new MLB team and the bid price is
passed on as a transfer fee to his NPB team within five days.
99
However,
if the negotiations fail, the player returns to Japan until the posting period
of the following year and no money changes hands.
100
Teams are ex-
pected to negotiate in good faith and the MLB Commissioner oversees
the process.
101
The Posting Agreement satisfies MLB’s interest in obtaining the best
talent in the world and assuages NPB’s fear that it is becoming nothing
more than a farm team for MLB.
102
One integral group, however, is left
92. Id. para. 9. An NPB team may also decide to post a player without prior MLB
inquiry. Id. para. 8.
93. Id. para. 5.
94. Id. para. 9.
95. Id.
96. “At the conclusion of the bidding period, the U.S. Commissioner shall determine
the highest bidder . . . [and] then shall notify the Japanese Commissioner of the amount
of the bid submitted by the successful bidder.” Id. para. 10 (emphasis added).
97. Id. Teams decide whether to accept or reject the MLB team’s bid because they are
the ones that will eventually get that money if the negotiations are successful, not the
player. Id. paras. 9, 11.
98. Id. para. 11.
99. Id.
100. Id. para. 12. Some criticize this provision in the Posting Agreement because there
is a real possibility that some teams may submit high bids, fully aware that they will not
be able to sign the player within the thirty-day window, simply to block another team
from doing so for at least another year. Gould, supra note 2, at 294.
101. The MLB Commissioner has “the authority to oversee the bidding procedures . . .
to ensure that they [have] not been undermined in any manner.” Furthermore, the MLB
Commissioner has the power to revoke a team’s exclusive rights, or to declare any con-
tract between a Japanese player and the winning bidder void if he “deems [that the con-
tract] was the result of conduct that was inconsistent with [the] Agreement or otherwise
not in the best interests of professional baseball.” Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para.
13.
102. Whiting, Batting Out of Their League, supra note 50.
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out: the Japanese players.
103
Under the posting system, players have
minimal involvement and their only decision is whether to accept the
MLB team’s offer.
104
Because only one MLB team may negotiate with
the player, his market value, and thus his final contract value, is kept arti-
ficially low.
105
In addition, NPB teams generally post players because the
prospect of extraordinary bid prices is attractive to their financially de-
spondent organizations.
106
The notion of exorbitant bids somewhat
counters an original selling point of the posting system, which was that
blind bidding ensured that large-market teams would not be the only or-
ganizations capable of landing celebrated Japanese players.
107
The stark,
unfair nature of the system as it relates to NPB players’ rights was not
thrust into the forefront until the 2006 off-season.
108
103. MLB teams usually end up with great players who make an immediate impact on
their respective teams, while the NPB teams collect the multi-million dollar transfer fees,
leaving the Japanese players with a chance to play in the United States for less money
than they would be worth on the free agent market. Kurkjian, supra note 89.
104. The Posting Agreement specifically prohibits MLB teams from contacting Japa-
nese players under contract with NPB without MLB’s Commissioner asking permission
of the NPB Commissioner. Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 4. Additionally, MLB
must still seek NPB’s approval and follow the posting rules. Id. para. 5. The player is
only personally involved in the negotiation of his contract with a team that has “sole,
exclusive, and non-assignable” rights to him. Id. para. 11.
105. Under posting, the player’s “purchase price” is a combination of both the bid
amount and the resulting contract terms. Since only one team may negotiate with him, the
player has diminished leverage and is denied his “maximum earning potential.” Kurkjian,
supra note 89.
106. Id. At the time of writing, there was much speculation about when, or if, NPB’s
biggest young star, Yu Darvish, would be posted. Bobby Valentine, former MLB man-
ager and current manager of the Chiba Lotte Marines, speculated that Darvish’s possible
move to MLB will depend on whether his team, the Nippon Ham Fighters, “[are] in a
state where they need a lot of money.” Caple, Dice-K, supra note 5.
107. Small-market teams favored blind bidding because they felt that it leveled the
playing field for them against large-market clubs. Kurkjian, supra note 89. The Tampa
Bay Devil Rays are the only small-market team to successfully bid and negotiate a con-
tract with any NPB player. In 2005, the Devil Rays signed a two-year, $1.3 million con-
tract with Shinji Mori, formerly of the Seibu Lions. Most recently, during the 2006 off-
season, the Devil Rays signed a three-year, $7.7 million contract with third baseman Aki-
nori Iwamura, formerly of the Yakult Swallows. Tampa Bay paid a total of $5.5 million
in transfer fees to the NPB teams for both players. Posting System, supra note 54. Dai-
suke Matsuzaka’s posting in 2006 seemingly thwarted this reasoning. Kurkjian, supra
note 89.
108. See Kurkjian, supra note 89 (discussing how the posting process deprived Dai-
suke Matsuzaka and his agent, Scott Boras, of leverage in the negotiating of Matsuzaka’s
contract with the Boston Red Sox).
1082 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
C. Daisuke Matsuzaka
In 2000, the Seattle Mariners bid roughly $13 million for Ichiro Su-
zuki, and later signed him to a three-year contract worth $12 million.
109
The amount of money bid for Ichiro has not been questioned because he
was expected to be a star, and his skills have successfully transferred to
MLB.
110
Following Ichiro’s signing, the posting system experienced
modest success until 2006, when it was criticized for encouraging high
bidding and unfair practices.
111
In November 2006, the Boston Red Sox
submitted a sealed bid to the MLB Commissioner’s office of $51.1 mil-
lion for the negotiating rights to Daisuke Matsuzaka.
112
The Red Sox
later signed a six-year, $52 million contract with the Japanese pitcher.
113
Prior to this astronomical bid, MLBPA opposed the posting system,
114
but did not challenge it and most MLB team executives kept their per-
sonal opinions about the system to themselves.
115
Following the bid,
however, sports writers and team executives openly stated that MLB had
to change the system.
116
One unidentified executive went so far as to re-
fer to the posting system as “silly” and even “stupid.”
117
MLB free agents rely on competition among at least two teams in ne-
gotiating the best possible contract.
118
Here, NPB players are explicitly
deprived of that right in that they may only negotiate with one MLB
109. WHITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 22–24.
110. Kurkjian, supra note 89. Others, like Hideki Irabu, were unable to translate their
NPB success into MLB stardom. Many see Irabu as one of the Yankees’ worst invest-
ments. Sandomir, supra note 81.
111. Sandomir, supra note 81; Gould, supra note 2, at 294.
112. Kurkjian, supra note 89.
113. The contract includes a $2 million signing bonus and provides for a base salary of
$6 million in 2007, $8 million in 2008–2010, and $10 million in 2011 and 2012. Begin-
ning in 2009, Matsuzaka’s contract contains escalators for his performance in both
Cy Young Award and Most Valuable Player voting. He also has a no-trade provision and
various other benefits. Matsuzaka Contract Details, http://www.boston.com/sports/base
ball/redsox/articles/2006/12/15/matsuzaka_contract_details/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
114. Gene Orza, then counsel to MLBPA, questioned the legality of posting because it
deprived the player of choice and “totally ignore[d] his rights,” but later admitted that
MLBPA was limited in its efforts to help the Japanese players by the fact that JPBPA
would not act on behalf of its members. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at
146–47.
115. Kurkjian, supra note 89.
116. Id.
117. Id. Given the trend in escalating posting prices, baseball insiders speculate that if
Darvish Yu, a young and powerful pitcher, is posted within the next few years that he
will garner up to a $75 million bid from an eager MLB team. Caple, Dice-K, supra note
5.
118. Greenwood, supra note 20, at 273.
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team.
119
By eliminating every other MLB team from negotiations, post-
ing keeps a player’s market value artificially low.
120
It is reasonable to
apply at least part of the bid price to the final contract price in ascertain-
ing a player’s market value, as both amounts together represent what he
is worth to the MLB team.
121
Arguably then, Matsuzaka’s value was over
$100 million, while he personally realized just half of that amount and
had little choice in doing so.
122
Not every Japanese player desires to be-
come an MLB hero but, for those who do, the process is utterly anti-
player.
123
III.
U.S. ANTITRUST AND LABOR LAW
A. The MLB Antitrust Exemption
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case
of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Pro-
fessional Baseball Clubs.
124
Plaintiff, an organized professional baseball
league, alleged that MLB’s AL and NL purchased other Federal League
clubs and “induc[ed] all those clubs . . . to leave [that] League” in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.
125
While the trial court found for the plaintiffs,
the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the business of baseball did
not fall within the scope of the Sherman Act, and the Supreme Court af-
firmed.
126
In the decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., concluded
that the business of baseball was of “giving exhibitions of baseball,
which [is] purely [a] state affair[],” thus rejecting plaintiff’s claim that
MLB’s practices violated federal antitrust laws.
127
Furthermore, Justice
119. Kurkjian, supra note 89.
120. See supra note 114.
121. See Kurkjian, supra note 89 (discussing debate over what constitutes “purchase
price” for luxury tax purposes). In essence, MLB teams have to pay twice for a player,
which is “an expensive restriction.” W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 146.
122. See supra note 121, and accompanying text.
123. Stein, supra note 11, at 266.
124. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
125. The Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore was one of eight member teams of the
Federal League of Professional Base Ball Clubs, which was one of various professional
baseball leagues that attempted to compete with a fairly young, yet well-established,
MLB for the professional baseball market. Plaintiffs alleged that MLB was trying to mo-
nopolize the U.S. baseball market and extinguish, through prohibited business practices,
any leagues that attempted to compete with them. Id. at 207.
126. The trial court found a conspiracy to monopolize the baseball market in violation
of the Sherman Act and awarded $80,000 in treble damages for the antitrust violation. Id.
at 208–09.
127. Id. at 208.
1084 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
Holmes noted that while such exhibitions require players to cross state
lines and are undoubtedly money-makers, “the transport is a mere inci-
dent, not the essential thing.”
128
Moreover, baseball could not be desig-
nated “interstate commerce” within the scope of the Sherman Act be-
cause its product was one of “personal effort,” which is not a component
of commerce.
129
Thus, the Supreme Court created baseball’s antitrust
exemption and placed the decision to remove it squarely in the hands of
Congress.
130
In 1952 Congress issued its “Celler Report”
131
on the study of monop-
oly power which, following hearings on the business of baseball, con-
cluded that “[t]he evidence adduced . . . would clearly not justify the en-
actment of legislation flatly condemning the reserve clause.”
132
This
Congressional inaction coupled with Federal Baseball led later courts to
apply the exemption established therein to validate the reserve clause.
133
128. Justice Holmes stated that player transport was an incident to an “exhibition [of
baseball that], although made for money would not be called trade or commerce in the
commonly accepted use of those words” and “[t]hat which in its consummation is not
commerce does not become commerce among the States because the transportation that
we have mentioned takes place.” Id. at 209.
129. Id.
130. See Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (holding that
Federal Baseball concluded that Congress did not intend to include baseball within the
scope of the Sherman Act and was effectively put on notice with the Federal Baseball
decision that only it could amend the law through legislation specifically geared to bring
baseball within the scope of antitrust laws, and yet did nothing to accomplish the task);
see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (denying Curt Flood’s request for free
agency). Although the Flood Court concluded that “[p]rofessional baseball is a business
and it is engaged in interstate commerce,” it nonetheless upheld Federal Baseball be-
cause “what the Court said in Federal Baseball in 1922 and what it said in Toolson in
1953, we say again here in 1972: the remedy, if any is indicated, is for congressional, and
not judicial, action.” Id. at 282–85 (emphasis added).
131. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 532
F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1976).
132. 1952 Report of the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 229 (quoted in
Flood, 407 U.S. 258, 272–73).
133. E.g., Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356; and Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–84. As early as 1902,
players challenged MLB’s reserve system, albeit unsuccessfully. Nap Lajoie challenged
the reasonableness and equitability of the renewable provision in the standard player
contract and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the contract was reasonable
and the consideration adequate. The court further stated that “mutuality of remedy [does
not] require[] that each party should have precisely the same remedy, either in form, ef-
fect, or extent.” Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 220 (Pa. 1902). See also
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 16 (N.Y. 1914) (de-
nying “the proposition that the business of baseball for profit is interstate trade or com-
merce” and finding baseball outside the scope of the Sherman Act). The Chase court
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Indeed, it was this reasoning that prompted the Supreme Court to uphold
the baseball exemption with specific regard to the reserve clause in 1972
with its decision in Flood v. Kuhn.
134
The exemption lasted for over sev-
enty-five years before Congress finally removed it as it pertained to em-
ployment issues, with the Curt Flood Act of 1998 (“Flood Act”).
135
There
are limitations to the Flood Act’s application, however, in that Congress
tailored its provisions to only “major league baseball players [who] play
baseball at the major league level.”
136
Furthermore, section 26b(c) states
that “[o]nly a major league baseball player has standing to sue under this
section,” and section 26b(c)(1) defines a major league player as “a per-
further noted that “[b]aseball is an amusement, a sport, a game that comes clearly within
the civil and the criminal law of the state, and it is not a commodity or an article of mer-
chandise subject to the regulation of Congress on the theory that it is interstate com-
merce.” Id. at 17.
134. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. The Court stated that the baseball exemption was “an
aberration,” but that it was “loathe . . . to overturn [Federal Baseball and Toolson] judi-
cially when Congress, by its positive inaction, ha[d] allowed those decisions to stand for
so long and . . . ha[d] clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.” Id. at
282–84. Curt Flood’s claim nonetheless helped create free agency for all MLB players
and just four years later, two MLB players challenged the system by filing a grievance
with the league. Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of
the Montreal Expos both played the 1975 MLB season under the Standard Uniform
Player’s Contract because neither signed a new contract following the 1974 season. Sec-
tion 10(c) of the contract allowed each player’s respective team to unilaterally renew
their contract for another year. Following the 1975 season, both teams attempted, again,
to renew the players’ contracts under the same terms and Messersmith and McNally filed
grievances alleging that the provision only applied to one renewal year and that they were
actually free agents under contract to no team. The League, on the other hand, argued for
perpetual renewability, stating that the renewal provision applied to the entire contract,
including the renewal provision. In Messersmith’s and McNally’s case, the arbitrator
found that the League’s interpretation of the Uniform Player Contract was incorrect and
that the renewal provision only allowed for a one-year renewal of all terms of the con-
tract, excluding the renewal provision. Thus, both players were declared free agents and
were free to negotiate with any team in MLB for a new player contract, despite the pro-
tests of MLB officials. Kansas City Royals, 532 F.2d at 617–20. Following the Mess-
ersmith and McNally grievances, the Basic Agreements between MLBPA and MLB pro-
vided that “Arbitration Panel[s] shall not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, detract
from, or alter in any way the provisions of such agreements.” Basic Agreement, supra
note 27, art. XI.
135. Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b (2007). Section 26b(a) states: “the conduct,
acts, practices or agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major
league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball
players to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the
same extent . . . [as] in any other professional sports business affecting interstate com-
merce.” Id. § 26b(a).
136. Id.
1086 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
son who is a party to a major league player’s contract, or is playing base-
ball at the major league level.”
137
Therefore, not only are minor league
ballplayers excluded from the Flood Act’s provisions,
138
but it is impos-
sible for Japanese players to assert that the Posting Agreement violates
the Flood Act because, under the aforementioned provisions, a Japanese
player can neither claim that he is a “major league baseball player” nor
that he “plays baseball at the major league level.”
139
B. Labor Law and the MLBPA-MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement
Under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),
140
MLB must ne-
gotiate with MLBPA regarding topics relating to “wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.”
141
In Silverman v. Major
League Baseball Player Relations Committee,
142
the Second Circuit con-
cluded that anti-collusion, free agency and reserve issues were manda-
tory subjects of bargaining and that to hold otherwise “would ignore the
reality of collective bargaining in sports.”
143
One theory suggests that the
omission of the posting system from the current collective bargaining
agreement (“Basic Agreement”)
144
is itself a violation because posting is
137. Id. §§ 26b(c), 26b(c)(1) (emphasis added).
138. In addition to the Flood Act specifically identifying and defining “major league
baseball player,” section 26b(b)(1) avers that it does not “create, permit or imply a cause
of action by which to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust
laws to . . . the minor league level, any organized professional baseball amateur first-year
player draft, or any reserve clause as applied to minor league players.” Id. § 26b(b)(1).
139. See id. §§ 26b(c), 26b(c)(1) (defining players eligible to assert a claim under the
Act). When Japanese players are posted, they are still under contract with their NPB
team, hence the posting system provides the NPB team with compensation in the amount
of the winning MLB team’s bid. Further, these players have never played a single out in a
major league game, and will not do so until, and unless, they reach an agreement to play
for the winning MLB team. Therefore, they are not “major league players,” but rather are
still NPB players, and lack the necessary standing to sue MLB for an antitrust violation
pursuant to the Flood Act. See generally Posting Agreement, supra note 8 (Posting
Agreement is required for Japanese players to transfer to MLB because they are still un-
der contract with NPB).
140. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151–169 (2007).
141. Employers and employee representatives are obligated to negotiate in good faith,
although neither side is required to accept the other’s proposal or to make concessions.
Id.. § 158(d).
142. 67 F.3d 1054 (1995).
143. Id. at 1060–62. The Silverman court also analyzed salary arbitration and likened it
to “interest arbitration,” whereby employers and unions settle disputes over certain issues
by sending them to an arbitrator, rather than engaging in collective bargaining. Id. at
1062. Nonetheless, the court found that there was “reasonable cause to believe that [sal-
ary arbitration] is a mandatory subject of bargaining.” Id.
144. Basic Agreement, supra note 27.
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a mandatory topic for collective bargaining, rather than a permissive
one.
145
However, the problem with Japanese players alleging that the
Posting Agreement is a violation of the Basic Agreement is two-fold.
First, these players are not contemplated within the definition of “player”
found in the Basic Agreement.
146
Second, posting is neither covered by
the Basic Agreement nor is it a mandatory subject of bargaining.
147
The Basic Agreement applies to “Major League Players, and individu-
als who may become Major League Players during the term of [the]
Agreement, with regard to all terms and conditions of employment.”
148
Under this definition, Japanese players seem to fall within the purview of
the Basic Agreement
149
and could, therefore, argue that the Posting
Agreement falls within this rubric such that it is a “mandatory subject of
bargaining.”
150
Although the Basic Agreement encompasses employment
issues relating to “individuals who may become Major League Play-
ers,”
151
Japanese players do not fall under that determination. The only
players included in this category are those that are drafted by MLB teams
and who begin playing in the parent clubs’ minor league farm systems.
152
Thus, posting cannot be considered a mandatory subject of the MLBPA-
MLB bargaining relationship.
Additionally, the Basic Agreement states that players “shall be entitled
to negotiate in accordance with the provisions set forth in this Agree-
ment.”
153
Posting is not specifically covered in the Basic Agreement, nor
is it implied by its provisions.
154
The article dealing with “International
Play”
155
only pertains to “any game or series of games played by a Club
or Clubs” outside the continental borders of MLB, or in which a foreign
145. Gould, supra note 2, at 306–07; Stein, supra note 11, at 287–89.
146. See Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. II (defining “player”).
147. There is no section that either directly or indirectly refers to Japanese, or any for-
eign players for that matter, within the Basic Agreement, nor does it make any mention of
the posting system. The only references to player signings are found within the Articles
pertaining to Salaries, the Assignment of Player Contracts, and the Reserve System, none
of which encompass posting. Id. arts. VI, XIX, XX, respectively; see also Gould, supra
note 2, at 300 (citing the 2006 Basic Agreement, which is largely the same as the current
Basic Agreement).
148. Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. II.
149. See id. (referencing “players who may become” MLB players) (emphasis added).
150. Stein, supra note 11, at 285–87.
151. Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. II.
152. Sections of the Basic Agreement refer to Minor League Players and MLB player
assignments to the minor league clubs, as well as the allocation of draft picks to member
clubs losing ranked players to the free agency system. Id. arts. XIX, XX.
153. Id. art. II (emphasis added).
154. Gould, supra note 2, at 300.
155. Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. XV(J).
1088 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
club is a participant.
156
The article also refers to “Joint Cooperation”
among MLB clubs regarding international activities, but again there is no
mention of international player acquisitions or the rights afforded to such
players.
157
Rather, the provision attaches only to international competi-
tion and league-wide contracts.
158
Japanese players could only oppose posting as a violation of the Basic
Agreement if MLBPA decides to bring them within its definition.
159
MLBPA, however, has no incentive to include Japanese players as mem-
bers of its bargaining unit.
160
Japanese players are under contract with
other teams, in another league and have their own representation in the
JPBPA.
161
If Japanese players want their playing conditions changed in
NPB, their union approaches their teams and their respective league;
they do not seek help from MLBPA.
162
The Basic Agreement does not
reference posting and, since Japanese players are both under contract in
NPB and members of JPBPA, they do not fall within the meaning of
“Major League Player” and may not challenge posting as such.
163
IV.
JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY AND LABOR LAW
A. Japanese Antimonopoly Law
Japan did not adopt antitrust laws similar to the Sherman Act until the
conclusion of World War II,
164
when it enacted the Act Concerning Pro-
156. The Article specifically relates to games played “outside the United States and
Canada; or within or without the United States and Canada against a foreign club or
clubs.” The continental borders of MLB, as used above, pertain to the United States and
Canada as there are currently no MLB clubs attributed to any cities or countries outside
of the two aforementioned North American countries. Id.
157. Id. art. XV(J)(4).
158. The provision “includ[es] but [is] not limited to, international play, international
events for which Player participation is sought by or on behalf of a Club or Clubs (such
as clinics or skill competitions), [and] international competition among nations.” In addi-
tion to international competition on the field of play, the provision provides for “the ex-
ploitation of international rights, such as media and sponsorship contracts.” Id.
159. But cf. Stein, supra note 11, at 287–88 (recognizing that the Basic Agreement
does not cover the Posting Agreement, but stating that this omission is itself a violation of
MLB’s obligation to address mandatory subjects of collective bargaining).
160. Id. at 290–91.
161. Smull, supra note 17, at 2.
162. Id.
163. This is further evidenced, both that Japanese players are not covered by MLBPA
and the lack of incentive to include them, by the fact that MLBPA offered to help JPBPA
contest the validity of the Posting Agreement, either in the United States or Japan, and
JPBPA refused the offer. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 147.
164. B
ASIC JAPANESE LAWS 393 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1997).
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hibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (“An-
timonopoly Act”).
165
The Antimonopoly Act was drafted during the post-
war occupation and, therefore, resembles the Sherman Act in many
ways.
166
Both the Sherman Act and the Antimonopoly Act are primarily
concerned with prohibiting illegal restraints of trade, unfair business
practices, and monopolization.
167
For the purposes of this Note, the most
striking difference between Japanese and U.S. antitrust law is that Japan
does not have a baseball exemption.
168
This fact alone makes the Japa-
nese legal system a more attractive vehicle for challenging the Posting
Agreement.
169
The baseball exemption notwithstanding, U.S. jurispru-
dence finds certain sports’ business practices violative of antitrust legis-
lation as either unfair trade practices or illegal restraints of trade.
170
It
165. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of
Fair Trade, Law No. 54, (1947) (Jp.) [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act], translated at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/ama.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
166. Following World War II, occupational forces in Japan assisted the Japanese gov-
ernment in the drafting and adoption of the Antimonopoly Act, the premise of which was
largely against common economic practice in Japan at the time. Braver, supra note 5, at
436. Prior to World War II, the Japanese government routinely interfered in the affairs of
private businesses and there was little in the way of wealth distribution, as most power
was concentrated in a few companies. Id. The Antimonopoly Act was modeled after the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, but was stricter. Enforcement of the Antimonopoly
Act was lax, primarily because of Japan’s traditional allowance of cartels. Only after
amendments to the act in 1974 was the law strengthened and cartel fines increased. Even
then, however, the United States criticized Japan’s relaxed implementation, which led to
further amendments throughout the 1990s. O
DA, supra note 164, at 393. Much of the
resistance to enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act stemmed from Japan’s contempt of
the occupational forces because they represented both defeat and the imposition of West-
ern laws and ideals. Id. at 439–40.
167. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–7 (2007); Antimonopoly Act §1.
168. Smull, supra note 17, at 3 (stating that Japanese antimonopoly law does not rec-
ognize a baseball exemption); see discussion supra Part III (referencing the baseball ex-
emption).
169. Smull, supra note 17, at 3.
170. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (holding that the reserve system was a viola-
tion, but the exemption was entitled to stare decisis, and the Court left removal of the
exemption to Congress); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding that the NFL’s rookie player draft was a violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act because it had “severe anticompetitive effects and no demonstrated procompetitive
virtues” and was therefore an unreasonable restraint of trade); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d
606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that NFL’s “Rozelle Rule,” which required compensa-
tion for a team losing a player to another NFL team via free agency, was an unreasonable
restraint of trade because it promoted a highly restrictive system of free agency in which
player mobility was deterred rather than encouraged).
1090 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
follows, therefore, that these violations are the proper context under
which to analyze the posting system with regards to Japanese law.
171
The Antimonopoly Act defines an unfair trade practice as “[a]ny act
. . . which tends to impede fair competition” within the scope of activities
generally classified as unfair and designated an unfair trade practice by
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission.
172
Of the six activities set forth in
section 2, the current posting system fits squarely within both “[d]ealing
with another party on such conditions as will unjustly restrict the busi-
ness activities of the said party”
173
and “[d]ealing with another party by
unjust use of one’s bargaining position.”
174
Furthermore, because the
amount of the winning bid goes to the posted player’s NPB team, thereby
depriving the player of his full market potential, the posting system could
arguably be considered “[d]ealing at unjust prices.”
175
By its nature, the posting system is an unjust restriction on NPB play-
ers’ business activities.
176
Initiating the process for a possible transfer to
MLB relies not on the player’s approval, but ultimately on that of his
NPB team.
177
Further, once the highest bid is determined, the winning
team is awarded the “sole, exclusive, and non-assignable right to negoti-
ate with and sign” the player.
178
Moreover, if the NPB club does not ac-
cept the bid, or if the MLB team fails to sign the player, “another request
171. See Smull, supra note 17, at 5; and Braver, supra note 5, at 453–54 (both noting
the availability of Japanese antitrust claims).
172. Antimonopoly Act § 2(9). Japan’s Fair Trade Commission is an independent five-
person agency charged with enforcing the Antimonopoly Act, and is largely based on the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Braver, supra note 5, at 438.
173. Antimonopoly Act § 2(9)(iv).
174. Id. § 2(9)(v).
175. Id. § 2(9)(ii); Smull, supra note 17, at 2.
176. See discussion supra Part II.B (detailing inequities of posting system); see Anti-
monopoly Act § 2(9)(iv) (prohibiting practices that unjustly restrict the another party’s
business activities).
177. Posting Agreement, supra note 8, paras. 5, 6. Additionally, the Japanese club may
make one of its players available for posting without any inquiry on the part of an MLB
team. Id. paras. 7, 8. Either way, the player’s prerogative in the matter is never mentioned
in any paragraph relating to the initial inquiry.
178. Id. para. 11. Buttressing this part of the problem is the fact that the MLB team that
submits the winning bid does little more than quote a number. The bid price does not
change hands unless the MLB team successfully negotiates a contract with the player
and, in the event that no agreement is reached, there is no penalty on the team; the entire
bid is then off the table and neither the player nor the NPB team sees any money. Once
again, the Japanese player is subjected to this process and has no say in where he goes or
with whom he may negotiate, further proving the “anti-player” nature of the posting
system. Rehan Waheed, The Posting System in Major League Baseball, J.
OF BUS. L.
SOC’Y, Nov. 2, 2006, http://iblsjournal.typepad.com/illinois_business_law_soc/2006/11/
the_posting_sys.html.
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for posting with respect to that Japanese player shall be prohibited until
the following November 1.”
179
The only time the posted player is person-
ally involved in this process is when he negotiates with the winning
MLB team.
180
Thus, posting unjustly restricts a player’s freedom of
choice and his ability to “shop” his talents to an array of MLB teams and
may, therefore, be a violation of the Antimonopoly Act.
181
Additionally, the posting system may be actionable as an “undue use of
one’s bargaining position.”
182
Here, NPB and MLB each have superior
bargaining positions to the Japanese players.
183
While both organizations
have power over the player, it is ultimately the NPB team that can unduly
control the process since they must approve a player’s posting before
further action is taken.
184
This skewed power is also visible where the
NPB team has the sole right to reject the winning MLB bid, thereby en-
suring that no team will have the opportunity to negotiate with the player
until at least the following November.
185
MLB has superior bargaining
power because by awarding “sole, exclusive, and non-assignable” rights
to the player, only one team “competes” for his services and his contract
value is kept artificially low.
186
Essentially, the player has no bargaining
power and if he does not acquiesce to the bidding team’s final offer, or if
his NPB team does not approve both the initial posting and the bid
amount, he must return to Japan for at least another year.
187
Alternatively, if either of the preceding analyses is insufficient to es-
tablish a violation, the combination of the two may be viewed as
“[d]ealing at unjust prices.”
188
It is difficult to grasp the concept of a six-
year contract worth $52 million
189
as “unjust,” until the terms of Daisuke
Matsuzaka’s player contract are compared with the $51.1 million wind-
fall for his former NPB team, the Seibu Lions.
190
In total, the Boston Red
179. Posting Agreement, supra note 8, paras. 11, 12 (emphasis added).
180. Id.
181. Smull, supra note 17, at 5; Meshefejian, supra note 2.
182. Antimonopoly Act, Law No. 54, § 2(9)(v) (1947) (Jp.).
183. Smull, supra note 17, at 5.
184. Posting Agreement, supra note 8, paras. 6–8.
185. Id. para. 11.
186. Id. Thus restricting the number of teams involved in negotiations to one. Smull,
supra note 17, at 5; see discussion supra Part II.C.
187. Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 12.
188. Antimonopoly Act, Law No. 54, § 2(9)(ii) (1947) (Jp.).
189. Matsuzaka Contract Details, supra note 113.
190. Boston bid $51.1 million for the rights to negotiate with Matsuzaka, all of which
was transferred to the Seibu Lions upon Matsuzaka’s agreement to Boston’s contract
offer. Kurkjian, supra note 89; see Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 11 (detailing
the procedure and timeframe for transfer of the bid amount to the NPB club).
1092 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
Sox spent roughly $100 million to acquire Matsuzaka,
191
and arguably
his talent alone commanded such a price tag.
192
Furthermore, Matsuzaka
has to earn his money over the course of the next five seasons
193
while
Seibu received their transfer fee once the contract was signed.
194
There-
fore, Matsuzaka received an “unjust price” for his services as his contract
reflects only one-half of his potential value.
195
One other possible violation of Japanese antitrust laws is that posting is
established by an international agreement, and section 6 of the Antimo-
nopoly Act prohibits parties from signing “an international agreement or
international contract which contains such matters as constitute an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade or unfair business practices.”
196
As established
above, Japanese players have colorable claims against posting under ei-
ther provision. Further, the Antimonopoly Act provides for private
causes of action by “person[s] whose interests are infringed or likely to
be infringed” by the illegal conduct.
197
Thus, if either the JPBPA or any
individual posted player can show an undue restraint of trade or an unfair
business practice associated with the Posting Agreement, they can bring
a suit in Japan for either monetary damages or injunctive relief.
198
Fur-
thermore, enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act favors the idea that any
international agreement in violation of section 6 is unenforceable and
191. Even before negotiations took place, Boston’s total package for Matsuzaka was
expected to be between $80 and $100 million. Barry M. Bloom, Red Sox Win Matsuzaka
Bid, MLB.com, Nov. 15, 2006, http://mlb.mlb.com/content/printer_friendly/mlb/y2006/
m11/d13/c1739983.jsp.
192. In an interview following MLB’s announcement regarding the Red Sox’s winning
bid, Omar Minaya, General Manager of the New York Mets, said, “You’ve got to pay a
pitcher like Matsuzaka when he’s already proven himself in the Olympics and in Japan
and the [World Baseball] Classic. A lot of people respect this pitcher.” Id. (alteration in
original).
193. At the time of writing, Matsuzaka had completed one full season with the Red
Sox, a campaign that brought the World Series trophy back to Boston for the second time
in the past four years. Nick Cafardo, Well-earned Recognition, B
OSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4,
2007, at E19.
194. Paragraph 11 states that, “the U.S. Major League Club shall pay the Japanese
Club the amount of its successful bid within five (5) business days of the confirmation of
terms.” Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 11. It is also worth noting that Seibu
agreed to post Matsuzaka following his Most Valuable Player performance in the 2006
World Baseball Classic in part due to the team’s financial troubles. Kurkjian, supra note
89. The team even marketed Matsuzaka throughout the posting process as “a national
treasure.” Singer, supra note 59.
195. See supra notes 121 and 122, and accompanying text.
196. Antimonopoly Act, Law No. 54, § 6 (1947) (Jp.); see Smull, supra note 17, at 4
(explaining the possibility of a section 6 claim for JPBPA).
197. Antimonopoly Act § 24.
198. Id. §§ 24–26; Smull, supra note 17, at 4.
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entirely null and void.
199
According to JPBPA, however, it is near futile
to bring a lawsuit in the Japanese legal system because “trials last forever
[in Japan].”
200
MLBPA even offered to assist its Japanese counterpart in
pursuing the action, in either the United States or Japan, but the offer was
rejected.
201
Thus, the Posting Agreement remains effective and will con-
tinue to limit Japanese players’ mobility and earning potential until ac-
tion is taken to invalidate it.
202
B. Japanese Labor Law
In Japan, unions meeting certain criteria
203
are permitted to negotiate
towards collective bargaining agreements with employers and are not
liable for concerted activity, such as strikes.
204
Since formation in 1985,
JPBPA has been a far weaker version of MLBPA,
205
and remains reluc-
tant to strike because of “traditional Japanese cultural views of collective
harmony, company loyalty, and a tendency to promote the benefit of the
group over the individual.”
206
Nonetheless, JPBPA has successfully em-
199. Smull, supra note 17, at 4.
200. Whiting, Batting Out of Their League, supra note 50.
201. Toru Matsubara, an official with JPBPA responded to MLBPA by saying that
court proceedings in either country would be too lengthy and, therefore, that “the prob-
lem can’t be helped.” W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 147.
202. Id. at 146–47.
203. Article 28 of Japan’s Constitution guarantees the right of collective action, which
“inherited many of the effects of the guarantee of the dispute right in advanced capitalist
countries.” K
AZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW 539–40, (Leo Kanowitz, trans.)
(1992). To come within the purview of the Labor Union Act, a Japanese union must have
“formed voluntarily . . . for the main purposes of maintaining and improving working
conditions and raising the economic status of the workers.” Labor Union Act, Act
No.174, art. 2(1) (1949) (Jp.), translated at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/
data/lua.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). In addition, labor unions must be financially
independent of their employer. Id. art. (2)(1)(ii).
204. Labor Union Act, arts. 1(1), 6; S
UGENO, supra note 203, at 539–40 (discussing
collective action by unions, including “dispute acts” such as strikes and boycotts). Fur-
thermore, if an employer refuses to “bargain collectively with representatives of the
workers employed by the employer without justifiable reasons,” it is considered an unfair
labor practice. Labor Union Act, art. 7(ii). Justifiable collective actions are exempt from
criminal liability. Id. art. 2. Also, employers cannot claim damages arising from strikes or
other “acts of dispute.” Id. art. 8. Dispute acts are typically defined as those which “im-
pair an employer’s normal operation of its business conducted in the course of a labor
dispute” and include strikes and picketing. S
UGENO, supra note 203, at 544. Justifiable
dispute acts must be “aimed at achieving an object of collective bargaining.” Id. at 550.
205. Stein, supra note 11, at 269.
206. Duncan, supra note 1, at 93. For a general discussion of the evolution of Japanese
cultural opinions towards labor, see A
NTHONY WOODIWISS, LAW, LABOUR AND SOCIETY
IN
JAPAN: FROM REPRESSION TO RELUCTANT RECOGNITION (1992).
1094 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
ployed both the collective bargaining and concerted activity mechanisms
to effect changes within NPB.
207
Therefore, JPBPA could feasibly utilize
either of these rights to achieve player-friendly changes to the posting
system.
208
Pursuant to Japanese labor law, JPBPA has a right to bargain collec-
tively with NPB regarding payment and working terms and conditions.
209
Also, if JPBPA is established in its constitution as a democratic organiza-
tion affording equal treatment to all of its members, it may claim admin-
istrative relief from unfair labor practices.
210
The union may demand col-
lective negotiations regarding posting because it directly affects both
players’ salaries and working terms and conditions, and it is within
NPB’s power to change the system.
211
Furthermore, although posting
affects the aforementioned player interests, JPBPA was neither consulted
during the drafting of the Posting Agreement, nor did the union ratify
it.
212
If JPBPA demands collective bargaining and NPB refuses to nego-
tiate, it would constitute an unfair labor practice within the purview of
207. In 1993, NPB instituted its first free agency system. NPB’s system was fashioned
after MLB’s system, but remains a more restricted version of the free agent market.
Braver, supra note 5, at 453. Some suggest that this Americanization was the product of
former MLB stars playing in Japan and making more money than the native Japanese
players and bringing their “pro-union” attitude with them. Id. at 446–48.
208. Smull, supra note 17, at 5.
209. Labor Union Act, arts. 1, 6.
210. Article 5(1) of the Labor Union Act states that any labor union meeting Article
5(2) constitutional requirements and complying with the Article 2 definition of a labor
union may utilize administrative procedures and be awarded remedies pursuant to the
provisions of the Act. Id. art. 5(1); S
UGENO, supra note 203, at 423–31 (explaining quali-
fications of labor unions as a prerequisite for taking action pursuant to the Labor Union
Act). If a union alleges unfair labor practices in violation of Article 7 of the Labor Union
Act against the employer, the union may file, within one year of the act’s commission, a
motion with the Labor Relations Commission, which will then investigate the matter and
determine whether it should proceed to a hearing. Labor Union Act, art. 27. If the matter
goes to hearing, the Labor Relations Commission may award the relief sought by the
movant or it may dismiss the motion. Id. art. 27-12(1).
211. Although there is no provision in the Labor Union Act that specifically addresses
topics for collective bargaining, it is generally accepted that any issue which relates to
employee interests for which the employer has the “discretion to respond” is appropriate.
S
UGENO, supra note 203, at 485–86. With regards to posting, NPB exerts power over the
player both before he is posted and after MLB teams bid for his negotiating rights and
therefore have the discretion to respond to player inquiries as well as the overall agree-
ment with MLB. See supra Part IV.A (discussing NPB’s superior bargaining power to
that of its players).
212. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 147.
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the Labor Union Act.
213
JPBPA could then submit the issue to the Labor
Relations Commission or they could initiate a strike.
214
At present, the posting system is a sensitive issue in Japan, with
JPBPA likening the process to “human trafficking.”
215
Since 1985,
JPBPA has only gone on strike once, but the attempt was successful.
216
Given that posting directly relates to players’ rights, it is reasonable to
expect that JPBPA would be successful in at least making the process
more player-friendly through either collective bargaining or concerted
activity.
217
Thus, the issue is ripe for action by JPBPA without fear of
criminal or civil liability.
218
If they remain hesitant to strike, JPBPA can
either file a complaint seeking administrative relief with a district labor
relations commission,
219
or they may file suit in the court system for
213. In order for NPB to refuse collective bargaining, the league would have to provide
a legitimate reason to do so. Labor Union Act, art. 7.
214. Employees may file motions with the Labor Relations Commission alleging un-
fair labor practices against an employer and requesting that the Commission investigate
the matter. If the Commission finds sufficient bases for pursuing the matter, it will initiate
a hearing to further explore the allegations. Id. art. 27(1). The Labor Relations Commis-
sion includes members representing employers, workers, and the public interest. Id. art.
19(1). The Commission has authority to investigate alleged unfair labor practices and to
resolve labor disputes. Id. art. 20.
215. Smull, supra note 17, at 2.
216. In 2004, the JPBPA protested the possible merger of two NPB teams because it
threatened both the stability of the dual-league format and the jobs of players and team
personnel. JPBPA and NPB ownership signed an agreement, ending the action after two
days and preventing a second strike, which provided that the merger would proceed as
planned, but that NPB would initiate the process of finding corporate ownership for a
new team to enter the league the following year in 2005. Additionally, the agreement
abandoned the traditional exorbitant league entry fees charged to new corporate owner-
ship while establishing an expansion draft-type system to ensure the new team’s com-
petiveness. Id.
217. Both public opinion and that of the legislature currently favors collective action
by JPBPA. Id. at 3. Unions in Japan may decide to strike prior to reaching impasse in
collective bargaining, but it is generally recognized that to strike over a term currently in
negotiations is improper. Failure to give notice of a possible strike to an employer prior to
the action is not dispositive of the legality of the concerted activity, but the propriety of
such action is assessed based on whether it amounted to an intentional paralysis of the
employer’s operations. S
UGENO, supra note 203, at 553–54.
218. As previously discussed, labor unions meeting statutory criteria may participate in
administrative procedures and demand relief from unfair labor practices. See supra note
210 and accompanying text. In addition, such qualified unions may exercise their statu-
tory right to engage in collective action while enjoying exemption from both criminal and
civil liability. S
UGENO, supra note 203, at 424. Furthermore, if JPBPA does strike over
the posting system and it is deemed a “justifiable act,” NPB would not be permitted to
claim damages against the union for the disruption. Labor Union Act, art. 8.
219. Labor Union Act, art. 27.
1096 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
monetary damages.
220
Once again, JPBPA must initiate the reform pro-
cess, but is reluctant to do so both because of cultural barriers and the
daunting length of Japanese trials.
221
V.
PROPOSAL FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE POSTING SYSTEM
In the absence of JPBPA action invalidating the Posting Agreement,
there are modifications that can make the system more amenable to
Japanese players’ rights.
222
First, the bidding process, which takes place
entirely in the United States among MLB teams, can be altered so that
sole negotiating rights to the posted players are not awarded to the high-
est bidder.
223
Instead, the rights to negotiate with the player could be
given to multiple teams thereby creating a pseudo-market in which the
player may “shop” his talents to the club offering the best overall pack-
age, including term of contract, compensation, and location.
224
If more
teams are allowed to negotiate, the player can extract more value for his
talents and is assured the opportunity to bargain for an amount closer to
his market potential, rather than a low offer which he must accept if he
does not wish to remain in Japan.
225
Alternatively, the Posting Agreement can require MLB teams to pay
NPB teams a percentage of the total package negotiated with the player,
rather than having them place a bid beforehand.
226
This amount would be
a percentage of the total package, but would not come out of the player’s
salary; it would be a separate payment to the NPB team, but would serve
a similar purpose and be transferred comparably to the current bid
220. SUGENO, supra note 203, at 627. If JPBPA seeks relief from the Labor Relations
Commission, it will not be entitled to “consolation money” or “compensation for abstract
losses,” but if it seeks relief solely from the court system, they can only obtain remunera-
tion for past wages and will not be able to affect the employer-employee relationship in
the future. Id. at 691–92.
221. W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 147.
222. See discussion supra Part II.B–C.
223. Contra Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 11 (stating that only the highest
bidder gets negotiating rights to the posted player).
224. This system would resemble free agency in that teams would actually compete to
sign the player, therefore encouraging better offers. See Greenwood, supra note 20, at
273 (stating that escalation of players’ salaries is due to free market competition encour-
aged by free agency); Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. XX(B)(2) (setting forth pro-
cedures for negotiating and signing free-agent contracts).
225. See Gould, supra note 2, at 292 (referencing the potential for higher salary
through free agency); see id. at 294 (referencing potential for MLB teams to bid high
while knowing they cannot sign the player); Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para.12
(stating that players return to Japan for another year if negotiations are unsuccessful).
226. Contra Posting Agreement, supra note 8, para. 11 (providing for bidding process
which occurs prior to a player’s posting).
2008] OUT AT HOME 1097
price.
227
Since this alteration is analogous to the system in the Basic
Agreement whereby MLB teams losing free agents to other teams are
compensated with draft picks, it would encourage competitive negotia-
tions with Japanese players.
228
Interested teams could submit skeletal
contracts outlining some terms and conditions which they are prepared to
offer, and then let the player choose the teams with whom he wants to
negotiate based on his own criteria.
229
This pro-cess would afford the
player a pro-active role in deciding where he will eventually play. Not
only would he be given a chance to make an informed decision, but he
would also have the leverage enjoyed by free agents to extract maximum
value.
230
C
ONCLUSION
The Posting Agreement is the product of decades of U.S.-Japanese
baseball tensions resulting from NPB’s animosity towards players desir-
ing to prove their skills in MLB. The strictures placed on player mobility
and bargaining power are the embodiment of NPB’s desire to keep Japa-
nese players in Japan, and to not become a farm system for MLB. Oppo-
nents to the system have suggested that its unfair labor practices violate
both antitrust and labor law. However, for a Japanese player hoping to
challenge the posting system in the United States, the baseball exemption
from antitrust law and the lack of protection from MLBPA are near-
insurmountable hurdles.
By instituting the proposed changes, MLB can still access Japanese
talent while ensuring that NPB remains a competitive professional league
and receives compensation for posted players. Furthermore, players will
acquire bargaining power and freedom of choice, both of which the cur-
rent Posting Agreement denies them. Nonetheless, the only way to truly
combat this problem is for JPBPA to demand a better free agency system
and collective negotiations specifically geared towards remedying the
unfair labor practices that are encourgaed by posting. They can also ac-
complish this task by invalidating the Posting Agreement under Japan’s
227. See id. (stating that in the event of successful contract negotiations, bid price goes
to NPB team).
228. See Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. XX(B)(4) (setting forth team compensa-
tion for loss of free agents).
229. Not only does this create a market for the player, but it re-establishes his freedom
of choice. See W
HITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 146 (quoting MLBPA offi-
cials as questioning the legality of posting for depriving players of choice and rights).
230. See Kurkjian, supra note 89 (discussing how the posting process deprived Dai-
suke Matsuzaka and his agent, Scott Boras, of leverage the negotiation of Matsuzaka’s
contract with the Boston Red Sox).
1098 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3
antimonopoly law. MLB cannot unilaterally fix a problem arising from
NPB’s feudalistic and out-dated policies, and they “can[no]t force the
Japanese players to stand up for their interests.”
231
If Japanese players
will not assert their rights, the Posting Agreement will remain intact and
will continue to restrict their mobility and market value indefinitely.
Victoria J. Siesta
*
231. WHITING, MEANING OF ICHIRO, supra note 4, at 147.
* A.B., Princeton University (2001); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (expected 2009);
Managing Editor of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2008–2009). I would like
to thank my family, especially my parents, Michael and Marian, my sister, Christina, and
my grandfather, Vincent J. Siesta, Sr., for their unwavering love and support. Thank you
also to the 2007–2008 Executive Board and staff of the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law for their help in preparing this Note for publication. All errors and omissions are my
own.
